WHO COUNTS? HOW THE STATE (RE)CREATES HOUSEHOLDS

A Dissertation

by

CAROL SUE WALTHER

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2007

Major Subject: Sociology

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Approved by:

Chair of Committee,	Dudley L. Poston, Jr.
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ABSTRACT

Who Counts? How the State (Re)creates Households. (August 2007)

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Prior research focused upon the intersection of race, ethnicity, citizenship and identity produced as a result of the Census Schedule. In this dissertation, I focus on the Census, as an instrument of the state, to capture the process of inclusion and exclusion as it relates specifically to the intersection of sexualities and family formation. Using Sewell's (1992) concept of dual structures, that is, cultural schemas and resources, I argue that sexuality is structural.

Using mixed-methodology and three different data sources, I produce five different indices to determine settlement patterns of same-sex households in various geographic areas. Secondly, drawing on variables operationalized as cultural schema and resources, I identify characteristics of metropolitan areas that have arguably been related to levels of gay and lesbian concentration. In the multivariate context, the variables that are most influential in predicting levels of gay and lesbian concentration are physical temperature index, poverty rate, and heterosexual cohabitation rate. Variables focusing on characteristics of the metropolitan areas of relevance mainly to gays and lesbians

such as those dealing with sodomy laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual orientation, as well as the presence of political and religious conservatism are either not statistically important predictors or exhibited minimal influences.

Through the Internet survey and thirty interviews, I examine how gay and lesbian couples answered the Census Schedule. The highest percentage of individuals marked single on the Census Schedule, suggesting that partnered homosexuals are being underenumerated by the Census Bureau. Furthermore, in regards to the Census and the state, two underlying ideas influence individuals' enactments of agency: legal consciousness and statistical consciousness. Legal consciousness refers to people's lay understandings of the law, while statistical consciousness refers to everyday knowledge of statistics. In both cases the production of legal interpretation and statistics by authoritative sources is then variously understood, consumed, and employed by ordinary citizens for their distinct purposes. This understanding takes on forms of generally unquestioned folk knowledge, despite being socially constructed in specific historical-cultural contexts. The production and consumption of statistics serve as a pivotal point of contestation of power and resistance, especially for these interviewees.

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Having arrived at Texas A&M University with little idea of what I wanted to study except something about sociology, many faculty members have guided and challenged me in pursuing my research interests. I would like to first thank my committee, Dudley Poston, Joseph Jewell, Sarah Gatson, Rogelio Saenz, and Jenny Sandlin. All of the committee members gave generously of their time by reading multiple drafts of this dissertation, answering my questions, and questioning me on my ideas. I would also like to thank Nancy Plankey-Videla, Rob Mackin, Zulema Valdez, and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, who while they did not formally serve on the committee, gave me the important advice of "finish the dissertation," and "send your stuff out," and the necessary encouragement that I needed to complete this process. I hope to mentor my future graduate students as well as they have mentored me.

No intellectual or creative activity is accomplished without persistence, but it also takes love, compassion, and dirtiness. While my house has never been totally clean during this whole entire process, I would like to thank the people who love and care for me, especially my friends and family. While my colleague and former office mate, David, would rather curse at me than admit that he has helped me, he provided great assistance to me and my family. Other colleagues have listened ad nauseam to ideas about my dissertation. Friends from Friends Congregational Church have at points during this process listened to discussions of the Census Bureau and Census Schedule, watched and fed my children, drove and picked me up from airports, allowed me to live with them and loaned me money, computers, and furniture while maintaining a lively,

but losing softball team. Finally, my life would be incomplete and boring if it was not for my immediate family, Corrine, Seth, and Ian. I hope that I can support and love you, Corrine, in your endeavours as you have loved and cared for me. And while Seth writes his dissertation, “Something about Spider Man,” of course Mama, and Ian still take naps, I dedicate the following to Corrine Marie Francis Wickens.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

> On one level it is the simplest of efforts – a counting of noses, a headcount – necessary for the apportionment of the Congress and state legislatures. On another, it is a most complex exercise, involving the collection of many bits of information on – among other things – families, households, housing, consumer patterns, work, mobility, race, and ethnicity (Anderson 1988: 1-2).

The United States' Constitution[1] declares that a Census should be taken every ten years for the purpose of apportionment for a representative democracy. Ideally, every household is counted in the Census. However, for the founders, the meaning of those who participated in civil society, the concept of "one man, one vote," and thus those who really counted meant one English-speaking, land-owning, male citizen who was preferably Protestant (Prewitt 2003; Rodríguez 2000). Not all families count or were counted.

The Census Bureau, over time, has determined the need to encourage different demographic groups to participate, and complete the Census schedule. For instance, in

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This dissertation follows the style of *American Sociological Review*.

[1] Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution states: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct." Initially, the census was to be delivered to the Congress within 9 months of it taking (Title 13, United States Code; U.S. Department of Commerce 1995: 1-4). In 1975, Title 13 was amended with Public Law 94-171 which changed the time to one year instead of 9 months for delivery.

1990 the Census Bureau produced advertisements to encourage Americans to fill out the census form. One such advertisement was directed toward Native Americans and read, "Only you can tell us!" (U.S. Commerce Department 1990: 5-23-5-25; 1-19-1-21). To solicit enumeration of racially diverse populations, the Census Bureau in 1990 and 2000 provided census forms in Spanish, Chinese, and other languages, as well as offered a toll free number for those who had questions about the forms (Badgett and Rogers 2005; Fay and Krejsa 2003). Thus, the Census Bureau has increasingly sought the broadest participation possible in the census.

Political interest groups have prompted contestation about enumeration on the Census Schedule as they have advocated for increased recognition, inclusion, and representation on the Census Schedule. For example, Mexicans and Mexican-Americans lobbied for inclusion on the 1970 census as a separate ethnicity question (Bean and Tienda 1987; Rodríguez 2000). In 1980 various pan-Asian-American groups petitioned for inclusion on the Census schedule, eliciting new racial categories with the opportunity to identify specific Asian groups (Lee 1993). In 2000, multiracial people could self-identify on the census schedule because of compromises between various groups and the Census Bureau (Williams 2006).

Likewise, in 2000 the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a gay political organization, ran a campaign entitled "Make Your Families Count." The HRC sent emails to its membership encouraging them to mark their relationship on the Census schedule. While the HRC did not challenge the language of the Census schedule specifically, they sought increased recognition through the improved enumeration of

gays and lesbians. As a result, the census reported an increase of male and female same-sex couples (Simon and O'Connor 2003).[2]

Despite these recent efforts to increase participation, there have been struggles over what constitutes a family. Ultimately, these struggles are rooted in how the state, and the Census as its instrument for this explicitly purpose, determines measurement (Anderson 1988: 4; Smith 1992). Census data have been misconstrued in regards to race (El-Badry and Swanson 2004; Gatson 2004; Rodríguez 2000; Zuberi 2001), ethnicity (Kertzer and Arel 2001; Waters 1990), poverty, income and occupations (Anderson 1990; Newman 2000), household definition (Romero 1990; Ruggles and Brower 2003; Smith 1992) and sexuality and the status of same-sex households. My dissertation examines how the state determines what constitutes a family and in turn how those couples themselves construct their household definitions.

1.2. Major Questions

Categories in the census shape how groups are conceptualized and then how resources are subsequently allocated. Such categories are created or constructed based on social understandings at particular points in history. This issue of social construction is one of sociology's fundamental insights: the application of a label or a category shapes the expectations of individuals and groups and institutions; these expectations, in turn, shape attitudes and behaviors.

[2] In a 3 month period, 92 newspaper articles were published about the enumeration of gay and lesbian couples.

My research centers on the question of how the state determines processes of inclusion and exclusion in contemporary society. In particular, I am interested in whether and to what extent official statistics collected by the state reflect and affect the social structure as it pertains to race, class, gender, and sexualities, and intersections across these social groupings. Towards this end, I focus on the Census as an instrument of the state to capture the process of inclusion and exclusion as it relates specifically to the intersection of sexualities and family formation. I examine four main questions related to the census: 1) How has the census configuration of family and sexuality affected self-identified same sex households? 2) How do different measures or indices of gay and lesbians affect conclusions drawn about prevalence and geographic location? 3) How do social environments affect influence settlement patterns of gay and lesbian couples? 4). How do individual gay and lesbian couples respond to the census categories and how do they socially construct their relationships?

While in recent decades those in the Census Bureau realized that they could enumerate same-gender couples on the census, this realization has not come about without significant debate, including concerns about potential misunderstandings of census terminology, possible stigma, and issues of self-identification (Black et al. 2000; Chevan 1995; Phua and Kaufman 1999; Rosenfeld 2007). Such issues of stigmatization and self-identification lead to questions of different personal and institutional privileges based on presumptions of heterosexuality.

A cultural debate over the definition of what makes up an efficient and functional family demarcates the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate societal definitions

(Allen and Demo 1995; Carrington 1999; Santorum 2005; Waite and Gallagher 2001). One side of the cultural debate represents those who argue that marriage should only occur between "one man and one woman" (Dobson 2004; Santorum 2005), while others (Cott 2000; Moats 2004) advocate that marriage should occur between two loving people, whether they are of the same-sex or not. Even within the gay and lesbian communities, not all people agree whether energy should be expended fighting for marriage rights, nor whether its presence defines a family (Graffe 1999).

The Census Bureau has constructed a definition of household which is represented by a heterosexual family or relationship. For instance, the unmarried partner category was added to the 1990 census schedule because of the increase in heterosexual cohabitation. However its inclusion also enabled the enumeration of same-sex couples. While there is no one statistically dominant family type in the United States, there exists the ideology of the Standard North American Family (SNAF), which is the ideology of a heterosexual family with children (Smith 1993: 52). Smith (1993) argues that this Standard North American Family ideology is located across discourses and influences institutions including the Census Bureau. Furthermore, even in heterosexual family formations, the Census Bureau has difficulty enumerating diverse heterosexual families. Romero (1993) conducted a qualitative study of El Salvadorian households in San Francisco, California to determine the undercount of immigrants. She found that many people were not counted due to multiple families living within the same household. Specifically for gay and lesbian households, Fields and Clark (1999) examined the editing process of the Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal conducted in April, 1998 in

Sacramento, California and in South Carolina. They found that same-sex couples who marked spouse were older, had children, owned property, and were less likely to have moved in the last five years. Taking the Census Schedule as a "cultural toolkit" (Swidler 1986), I will analyze the currently used definitions of the Census and show how gay men and lesbians blur the boundaries of these definitions.

In examining the Census as a cultural tool, we have to examine the field of demography. Many researchers have recently called for demography to open up to other theoretical perspectives. Horton (1999) introduced a new paradigm, "critical demography" which he defines as analytical, theory-driven, reflexive and challenging of the status quo. He contrasts critical demography with conventional demography which he defines as data-driven, assumptive, and acquiescent to the prevailing social order (Horton 1999). Riley and McCarthy (2003) argue that the postmodern and feminists perspectives have a dramatic effect on the theoretical understanding of demographic processes (Riley 1997). Watkins (1993) in her article, "If All We Knew About Women was What We Read in *Demography*, What Would We Know?" argues that demography has focused exclusively on fertility to the exclusion of other demographic processes for women. Because of the exclusion of men, Poston and Chang (1999) propose comparing male and female fertility theories and find that female fertility models do not do as well in explaining male fertility. Kuumba (1999) examines how global population policy maintains racial, class, and gender exploitation by via variation funding in administered to various non-governmental organizations.

Using Sewell's (1992) concept of dual structure and critical demography, I ask to what extent sexualities exist as a social structure that empowers and constrains resources such as marriage and family. Sewell (1992) argues that there is

> a dialectical relationship between culture as meaning system and culture as practice. It is the structural features of culture (its meaning-system qualities) that make innovative cultural practices possible. Cultural structures consist of both schemas and resources, but their schemas are open to multiple interpretations and their resources can be deployed for a variety of purposes….we might say that the possibilities for cultural agency are embedded within cultural structures (1999: 13).

Gay men and lesbians historically and currently are denied resources based on heteronormative privileges and sanctions. A good example of resources being denied for gay men and lesbians involves the workplace (Embrick, Walther, and Wickens 2007; Humphrey 1999; Schneider 1986). Other examples of resources being denied to gay men and lesbians are marriage (except in Massachusetts), adoption, and inheritance rights (Bennett and Gates 2004; Cahill 2004; Cott 2000; Defense of Marriage Act of 1996; Eskridge 2001; Graff 1999; Moats 2004; Mello 2004; Rauch 2004; Wolfson 2004). Historically, examples of resources denied include housing (Chauncey 1994) and association in bars (Kennedy and Davis 1993).

1.3. Rationale

While other research has examined race, ethnicity, citizenship and identity produced as a result of the census schedule, I critically examine gay and lesbian household formation derived data from the 2000 U.S. Census. While other quantitative work has examined gay and lesbian relationships (Baumle, Compton, and Poston 2007;

Bennett and Gates 2004; Dang and Frazer 2004; Gates and Ost 2004; Walther and Poston 2004), the literature predominately focuses on the prevalence or description of same-sex households[3]. For example, Dang and Frazer (2004) compare percentages of African American gay male and lesbian couples to White gay male and lesbian couples on income, education, and home ownership, but do not extend the comparison into other aspects. Gates and Ost (2004) map the number of gay male and lesbian couples in the United States. Previously, it was difficult to have a national sample of gay men and lesbians with which to measure basic demographic characteristics. While Sewell's construction has been applied to race (Bonilla-Silva 1996; Duster 2001; Lewis 2004) and same-sex marriage (Hull 2006), it has rarely been applied to sexualities (see Barnard 2004 and Rich 1986 for the exceptions). Gay men and lesbians historically (Chauncey 1994; Kennedy and Davis 1993, among a few) and currently (Mello 2004; Moats 2004, among a few) are denied resources. My dissertation moves away from describing demographic characteristics to other aspects of the lives of gay men and lesbians, theorizing demography as a set of practices deployed in culturally meaningful ways. In a struggle for symbolic and material resources, being seen as a viable category is a beginning salvo in changing hegemonic understandings of identity and political power.

1.4. Investigation of the Research Questions

To answer the first research question, namely, how has the census configuration of family and sexuality affect self-identified same sex households, I provide in Chapter

[3] Baumle, Poston, and Compton (2007) is an important exception.

II a literature review of how the household categories have been constructed in the census.

To answer the second and third research questions, namely, how do different measures or indices of gay and lesbians affect conclusions drawn about prevalence and geographic location and how do social environments affect influence settlement patterns of gay and lesbian couples, I propose five different indices to measure the concentrations of gay and lesbian households. I then show that one index is a better demographic measurement of the prevalence of same-gender households.

Using an index, I identify the kinds of characteristics of metropolitan areas that may be related to their levels of gay and lesbian concentration. It makes sense to hypothesize that gays and lesbians will live in areas with favorable social environments such as low unemployment and mild climates. For instance, Kahn (1995) has argued that gay and lesbian adults tend to settle in areas where wages are high and rental prices are low, and his colleagues have also noted the importance of the area's social attitudes, political orientation and religious fundamentalists. Moreover, O'Reilly and Webster (1998) have written that the social and political characteristics of communities should be associated with the levels of gay and lesbian concentration. Given that people generally have freedom to move and live where they would like (exceptions include people living in segregated cities), gay and lesbian couples may well reside where they can use and receive the most value for their resources. As such, a gay or lesbian couple may not receive the most value living in metropolitan areas with a large Republican and/or Southern Baptist membership. The Republican Party has long been identified, rightly or

wrongly, as having an anti-homosexual orientation. Although there is a vocal homosexual group in the Republican Party (the Log Cabin Republicans), its influence on the party is thought to be minimal (O'Reilly and Webster 1998; 501; Green et al. 1995; Guth 1995). Also, the Southern Baptist conference regularly passes resolutions that consider homosexuality as an "abomination in the eyes of God" (Steinfels 1988: 6). Accordingly, I hypothesize that in metropolitan areas with high percentages of Southern Baptist membership and high percentages of Republican voting, the concentrations of gay and lesbian households should be low.

The literature also suggests that adult amenities such as employment and physical climate should be correlated with levels of partnering in general. If physical climate plays a role in the settlement patterns of gay men and lesbians, I would expect a negative association between July temperature and gay and lesbian concentrations because most individuals do not wish to live in areas which are extremely hot, preferring mild climates.

To investigate the fourth research question, namely, how do individual gay and lesbian couples respond to the census categories and how do they socially construct their relationships, I conducted a series of interviews. I expect to find shared gay and lesbian networks among gay men and lesbians who discussed how to fill out the census form. Many (Kertzer and Arel 2001; Nobles 2000; 2002; Rodríguez 2000; Waters 1990) have examined racial and ethnic identity and its impact on the completion of census schedules. I expect that gay men and lesbians will impose different identity positionalities to the census schedule. Smith-Lovin (2003) highlights three primary

elements that contribute to an individual's socially-constituted identities: particular roles (e.g. parent, student, friend), social groups and organizations (e.g. church, leisure groups, professional organizations), and category memberships (e.g. gender, race, class, sexual orientation) (King 1988). The significance attributed personally to any of these three components should depend on the social significance infused in the labels.

Category memberships accentuate one's group location in a socially stratified society. That power and resources are inequitably distributed based on these social categories should cause them to frequently imbue more personal and social significance. Our social markers – race, class, gender, sexual orientation – have through historical and political processes gained significance to others and to ourselves. But because we inhabit various identity markers at the same time, those disenfranchised on multiple levels may inhabit a "multiple consciousness," in which they constantly negotiate their different identities in different contexts (King 1988; Ellemers et al. 2002). I hypothesize that when couples are open about defining their relationship, they are more likely to adopt a couple identity and thus fill out the 2000 census schedule indicating husband or wife.

1.5. Data and Methods

In this dissertation, I use a mixed-methodology of interviews, surveys, and secondary data. To answer the second and third research question, I used secondary data from the 2000 Census data in which I propose five different indices to measure and count gay men and lesbian and then analyze the properties of each measure. After composing the five different indices, I then argue that one index is the best demographic measure of same-sex couples. Using this index as the outcome variable, I collected data

on various social environment variables, such as percentage of Southern Baptist membership, percentage voting Democrat, unemployment rates, poverty rates, infant mortality rates, temperature index, sodomy laws, anti-discrimination laws, population size of metropolitan areas, and heterosexual cohabitation rate.

To answer my fourth research question, dealing with how gay men and lesbians fill out the census forms, I conducted interviews and Internet surveys and collected newspaper accounts. Using snowball sampling techniques, I interviewed thirty self-identified gay and lesbian couples living in Texas. I gave each respondent a modified 2000 Census Schedule form and I asked the respondents to answer questions from the census, such as the category of relationship to "Person 1" or head of the household. I followed with questions about their selection and whether they found the question confusing. The second source of data was an Internet survey which was a shortened version of the interview questions. This survey was emailed to self-identified gay men and lesbians or their allies nationally.

1.6. Outline of Dissertation

I now turn to an outline of the dissertation. In Chapter II, I give an overview of the history of the census and family and the literature. The Census Schedule's definition of family has changed with the historical emphasis over time. For instance, in the 19th century, the Census Schedule usually listed the householder, usually male, first, followed by his wife, sons, daughters, and slaves if the family owned any. The definition of householder changed to mean "a common table," that is, providing for the entire family. Jumping to the present, there are no family types which dominate the US family

landscape. Thus, how has the Census been used to define family? Are gay men and lesbians confused when filling out the census?

Chapter III describes the methodology to consider questions of dual structure and boundary work. I use a mixed-methodology. I first create five indices to determine the prevalence of gay male and lesbian populations and then apply one index to the state, metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and tracts. Furthermore, I estimate ordinary least square regressions to analyze the prevalence of same-sex couples. Secondly, I conducted interviews with self-identified gay men and lesbians, using snow-balling techniques. I asked whether there might be a distinction in gay male and lesbian headed households in the way they fill out the Census? Did gay men and lesbians use networks and social resources to fill out the census? Are Census data unreliable for counting gay and lesbian individuals?

Chapter IV reports the findings of the analyses of the five indices. I extended the work of Black and his colleagues (2000, 2002), Walther and Poston (2004), and Gates and Ost (2004) regarding the validity of census-based statistics on the homosexual populations of the U.S. metropolitan areas I argue that one gay and lesbian index is the best measure of gay men and lesbian unmarried partners prevalence. I conclude the chapter estimating regressions which extends Walther and Poston's (2004) work. I find that the more agreeable the physical temperature of the area, the higher the concentration of gay partners. Further, the higher the poverty rate in the metropolitan area, and the higher the percentage voting Republican, the lower the concentration of partnered gays. And the larger the area's population, and the higher the level of heterosexual

cohabitation, the higher the concentration of gays. None of the four independent variables dealing with sodomy laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual orientation are shown to be significantly associated in the hypothesized negative direction with the level of gay concentration. The main differences in the two sets of the gay men and lesbian results are that the infant mortality rate is significant in the lesbian equation. The presence of laws prohibiting discrimination in the public and private sectors on the basis of sexual orientation is significant in the lesbian equation, but the log of population size is not.

Chapter V reports the findings of the interviews. Using constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss 1967), I create themes coming from the interviews. In Chapter V, I examined how gay and lesbian couples answered the Census Schedule. The highest percentage of individuals marked single on the Census Schedule. This is significant because more research is demonstrating that gay men and lesbians are being underenumerated by the Census Bureau. I also found that the second most marked category was "unmarried partner" on the Census Schedule rather than "husband/wife" or "housemate/roommate." Many of the respondents based their marking on the Census Schedule based on how they viewed their relationship and how society viewed their relationship. For the couples who marked the category, husband/wife, had lived together for a longer time period, owned property together, and had not moved as often. They viewed themselves as a married couple – who deserved similar legal rights as heterosexual married couples.

Furthermore, in regards to the Census and the state, two underlying ideas influence 'individuals' enactments of agency: legal consciousness and statistical consciousness. Legal consciousness refers to people's lay understandings of the law, while statistical consciousness refers to everyday knowledge of statistics. In both cases the production of legal interpretation and statistics by authoritative sources is then variously understood, consumed, and employed by ordinary citizens for their distinct purposes. This understanding takes on forms of generally unquestioned folk knowledge, despite being socially constructed in specific historical-cultural contexts. The respondents described the Census Schedule as a legal document which they knew how to fill out properly. However, when I asked about other legal forms such as life insurance, interviewees have placed their partners on these forms. These forms are less secure than the Census Schedule. The production and consumption of statistics serve as a pivotal point of contestation of power and resistance, especially for these interviewees and newspaper accounts. Some of the respondents discussed wanting to be counted on the Census Schedule because power is represented in enumeration. If one's household is counted, the group is powerful.

Chapter VI concludes the dissertation. My work contributes to the literature about the quality and validity of Census data. The Chapter IV demonstrates that cultural schemas and resources do not play a significant importance in settlement patters of same-sex households. Furthermore, my interviews provide rich data about a legal consciousness of injustice in everyday life and how couples negotiate their identity in gay marriage movements. I find that couples view the Census Schedule as a legal

document which should be filled in “properly.” Furthermore, the couples discuss how they participate in the gay marriage movements in their everyday lives.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

> The state seeks to bring order, if not out of chaos in the case of the household, then from the messier diversity of the persons and institutions under its jurisdiction (Smith 1992: 424).

Definitions of census categories have often been at the center of conflict. The Census is used as a blunt instrument and as a toolkit. Swidler (1986: 273) defines a cultural toolkit as, "symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems." The Census seeks to reduce complexity into discrete measurable categories. In the United States, very few classifications and categories of the Census schedule have remained the same over an extended period of time (Anderson 1988: 4; Anderson 2000; Smith 1992). Indeed, many categories change from Census to Census. Definitions of racial, ethnic and family categories have been recreated in the context of the society, politics, and history of the United States. In recent decades, the diversity of family definitions has resulted in different enumerations of family structures and formations which in turn reflect organic changes in interpersonal relationships. They also reflect more purposeful political shifts in collective group boundaries and the power to express those shifts.

I am interested in whether and to what extent official statistics collected by the state reflect and affect the social structure, as it pertains to race, class, gender, and sexualities, and the intersections across these social groupings. Although other research

has examined the intersection of race (Marx 1998; Nobels 2000, 2002), ethnicity (Goldscheider 2001), symbolic power (Loveman 2005), citizenship and identity (Kertzer and Arel 2001) and the state as it applies to the Census, I critically examine households and family formations that are missing from the literature. Towards this end, I focus on the Census as an instrument of the state, so to be able to capture the process of inclusion and exclusion as it relates specifically to the intersection of sexualities and family formation. As such, I begin with a history of the family as it applies to the Census Schedule in which I demonstrate the changing definitions of family and family formation as they play out on the Census Schedule. I then turn to an examination of how the Census has been used in identity construction and nation-building in terms of sexuality. Because legal aspects are involved in determining the status of same-sex households as they are counted by the state, I examine predominant laws pertaining to family and sexualities. Finally, I conclude the chapter reviewing Sewell's (1992) concept of dual structures and Marshall's (2005) concept of legal consciousness of injustice. Extending these two key theoretical perspectives, I posit the concept of *statistical consciousness* which I define as the awareness and use of statistics by people in everyday life. The production and consumption of statistics will be shown to serve as a pivotal point of contestation of power and resistance.

2.2. The Intersecting History of the Census Schedule and the Family

For much of U.S. history, census-taking has been a haphazard process, lacking the descriptive categories as we know them today. In fact, except for the mean size of the household, it was not until the 1940s that the Census Bureau even published any of

the statistics it had gathered on family and household composition (Ruggles and Brower 2003: 73; Shammas 2002; Smith 1992). For instance, prior to the American Revolution, the census merely served as a means for counting the number of English persons inhabiting the colonies. Although not specified to do so, enumerators frequently listed names and other information about household members. But if more complete information about the dwelling and the members of the dwelling was offered, it was completely rejected (Smith 1992). Despite a lack of direction in the enumeration process, in almost all cases enumerators followed a similar pattern, listing the oldest free male of the dwelling first, followed by his wife, then sons and finally daughters (Cott 2000; Smith 1992).

Although the Census Bureau required a numerical representation of each given household prior to 1850, enumerators did not necessarily need to visit each household residence to gain this record. The Census statute stated that an enumerator could inquire "at each dwelling house *or* to the head of every family" to enumerate the household (Smith 1992: 429, italics added). Thus, enumerations of households often depended largely on the claims made by the head of the household. In 1850, however, the Census Bureau made two important changes to this policy. First enumerators were supposed to actually visit each household residence. Second, enumerators were asked to list the names and characteristics of every free person in each household (Shamas 2002; Smith 1992). These changes pretty much formed the basis for current policies and categories by the Census.

The constitution of the household, and head of household, in particular, has likewise undergone dramatic changes in the history of the Census. The authority of the "head" first defined and demarcated the extent of the household. Specifically, between the years 1790 and 1840, the definition of the family on the Census Schedule was "a group of slaves or all those who by nature or law are placed under the authority of a single person" (Herlihy 1991: 3; Smith 1992: 430).[4] Then by 1850, the notion of the primary (male) provider was the basis for determining the head of household. Thus, his family was redefined as "one or more persons who lived separately from others in a house or part of a house with a common means of support" (Smith 1992: 437). However, by 1870, the central defining focus for the head of household shifted from economic provider to provider of a "common table" (Smith 1992: 437). In fact, this facilitated enumeration within boarding houses and tenement residents using a household definition of a "tie of a common roof and table" (Smith 1992: 437).

As noted earlier, in 1850, Census enumerators for the first time were asked to list the name and characteristics for every free person in each household. In 1880, the Census Schedule began clarifying the relationship of household members and the head of household. This change differentiated households from a generalized group of people to individuals, each with a specific relationship to the head. This enabled the Census to begin tracking the nature of those relationships and different family formations.

Although diverse family formations have existed throughout U.S. history, the Census and its enumerators have historically de-emphasized such households. For

[4] The Latin term "familia" originally meant a group of slaves. In the Middle Ages, familia could refer both to people and to property. Classical Latin carried several different meanings of familia (Herlihy 1991).

instance, prior to industrialization, families were economically structured to produce almost all domestically used products. As such, families came to be described as the "little commonwealth" (Cott 2000; Gillis 1996; Mintz and Kellogg 1988; Smith 1992). However, due to widespread poverty, many families- between two-thirds and three-fourths of all families- could not afford to rear their own children (Gillis 1996: 7). Adolescents were often sent to other households to learn a trade, known as "living out" (Gillis 1996: 32-33).[5] In the Census, adolescents were counted as part of the household in which they resided at a given time, and not the household into which they were born. As a result, the social practice of living out enabled the establishment of household formations that did not reflect the structure of blood ties, although this was not explicitly acknowledged on the Census Schedule (Smith 1992).

Rather, as I noted previously, enumerators morphed diverse family formations into patriarchal structures following the cultural beliefs and practices of the time. Even when women formed the head of the household, enumerators frequently listed instead the oldest male as "head." They also reorganized Native American families who generally lived in multigenerational, multifamily, and kinship households into male-headed nuclear households (Cott 2000: 26; Strong and Winkle 1996). Patronymic family surnames were likewise assigned to keep identification and property succession clear (Cott 2000: 122).

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[5] Shamas (2002: 150) asserts that household size increased from the founding of the nation until the Civil War and then decreased significantly afterwards. In the thirty years between 1850 and 1880 the proportion of the population falling into the "household headed" category jumped at a faster rate, going from 15.4 to 20.3 percent of the population.

While the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted in dramatic changes in the construction of family, as defined by the Census, these categories remained constant for the majority of the twentieth century. In 1940, the Census finally began publishing household data beyond its mean size, but it would not be until after the cultural revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s that the Census would again reevaluate the concept of the head of household.

In the 1970s, American families perceived a significant shift in family formation.[6] The nation experienced an increase in both rates of divorce and remarriage (Bramlett and Mosher 2001; Kreider and Fields 2002; Schoen and Standish 2001), falling birth rates[7], increases in heterosexual and homosexual unmarried domestic partnerships[8] (Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991; D'Emilio 1998; Lichter and Qian 2005; Sweet and Bumpass 1987), increases in single parent households (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994) and people living alone (Lichter and Qian 2005; Sweet and Bumpass 1987; Waite and Gallagher 2000). For instance, the proportion of households with one person living alone increased from 17 percent in 1970 to 26 percent in 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). In 1970, there were 1.1 million multiperson households in the United States who were neither married nor related by blood or adoption. In 2000, this

[6] As discussed earlier in the chapter, families were rarely nuclear and living in neo-local residences (Coontz 1998, 2000). However, society has lived under a myth that in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s families were predominately nuclear and authoritarian with fathers as head of households.

[7] Such countries as Sweden, Germany, France and Australia offer parents cash incentives to increase fertility (Stacey 1996: 44), while other countries such as China and South Korea are encouraging parents to have daughters because of the current sex ratios.

[8] Many countries include homosexual unmarried domestic partnerships and/or same-sex marriage. For instance, France has PACS, Pacte civil de solidarité, Belgium, Canada, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, Israel, Andorra, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Andersson et al. 2006).

increased to 5.5 million (Simon and O'Conner 2003). The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that the number of opposite-sex cohabiting couples grew from 440,000 in 1960 to 3.8 million in 2000 (Litcher and Qian 2005). Furthermore, in the 1990s, women between the ages of 15 to 29 were less likely to marry the father of their child compared to the 1970s (only about one in every 10 pregnant women in the 1990s and four in every 10 pregnant women in the 1970s) (Raley 2001). The number of children who would live in a household with just one parent due to divorce rather than death of a parent throughout their childhood also increased (Bianchi and Spain 1995; Bumpass and Sweet 1987; Coontz 2000; Graefe and Lichter 1999). Given these cultural changes, Bernardes (1988) estimate that there are as many as two hundred different arrangements that Europeans and Americans now regard as legitimate "family." As such, no single type of family formation statistically dominates in the United States (Gillis 1996), and the "traditional family," of a working husband, his stay-at-home wife, and their children represent only about 10 percent of all households today (Lichter and Qian 2005).

In 1970 the Census Bureau responded to these cultural shifts by simply defining "head of household" as "the person who is regarded as the head by the members of the household" (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973: ix). However, feminists still challenged this definition, noting the category was not as open as the informal definition implied (Presser 1998). Wives and children under the age of 16 could not be the head of household. Although Arthur Norton, Chief of the Marriage and Family Statistics Branch, argued that the term "head" was a purely statistical indicator and therefore a good measure, feminists contended that this category of head of household and the editing

practices of the Census Bureau implied an authoritarian structure for households and families that were dutifully measured.[9] Thus, unless women were not married, they could not be the householder head. Moreover, welfare had been denied to women in some states based on not being defined as heads of their household (Presser 1998).

In response to increased political and cultural changes occurring at the times, in July 1976, President Ford ordered the Justice Department to review all federal laws and make any recommendations to eliminate sex bias. Arthur Fleming, Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, wrote the following to Robert Hagan, Acting Director of the Census:

> The Bureau's current policy also seems contrary to the proper mandate of the Census Bureau, which ought to be to *describe* accurately the social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the people, rather than to *prescribe* appropriate and inappropriate relationships within households (as cited by Presser 1998).[10]

[9] Female demographers in 1976 met with Paul Glick, a senior demographer at the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau had conducted a special survey to determine how people were defining head of household. Among 1,880 individuals, 49 percent named a male as the head of household; about one-third of the individuals responded that there were joint heads of household. Glick argued that the 1980 Census Schedule should remain as pretested while members of the Social Scientists in Population Research (all women) argued that to the contrary. They questioned if the respondents understood what household head meant providing various interpretations such as "the person in charge of household affairs, in charge of the children, in charge of all family members, including the wife?" (Presser 1998: 148). According to Presser, Glick responded that head of household meant "who is top dog."

[10] While the Census Bureau changed the category to "Person 1," many reports and agencies continued to report "head of household" such as the General Social Survey. The documentation of the General Social Survey (GSS) states that "For many households the designation of head is an arbitrary assignment." It also states that "Head does convey useful information in determining household type among non-spousal relatives. For example, it indicates whether an adult child is living in the parental home or a parent is living with his/her adult child" (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss/report/m-report/meth73.htm).

As a result of these governmental initiatives and lobbying efforts by the group Social Scientists in Population Research and other women's organizations, the Census Bureau again reconceptualized the head of household category to "Person 1." Person 1 was considered to be the person under whose name a residence was owned or rented. Person 2, 3, 4, etc. were deemed coresidents of the household. The relationships between these household members and Person 1 were to be clearly delineated on the Census Schedule.

To better enumerate and depict ongoing changes within U.S. families, the Census reorganized and added different categories. For example, in 1980, the categories of nonrelated persons included roomer, boarder; partners, roommate; paid employee; and other nonrelative (to be written in). In 1990 the category was changed to "roomer, boarder or foster child."[11] The 1990 questionnaire also separated the 1980's "partner, roommate" category into "housemate, roommate" and "unmarried partner." Thus the 1990 questionnaire attempts to specify who is living together as opposed to simply rooming together (Barrett 1994, 17). Based on the purported increase of intergenerational and blended families, the 1990 census also added the categories grandchildren and stepchildren and thus distinguished stepchildren from natural-born or adopted children (U.S. Department of Commerce 1995: 1-15).

As suggested above, in recent decades, the Census has also sought to determine those living and cohabiting together (Bumpass and Sweet 1989). In 1980, the Census created the category POSSLQ (person of the opposite sex sharing living quarters), which

[11] In 1980, it was often not clear whether foster children should be listed as relatives or as unrelated persons; this category specifies their status.

served as a de facto category for couples who were not married and of the different (opposite) sex (Bunting 1987; Casper and Cohen 2000; Osgood 1981). This enabled the Census Bureau and other demographers to better track changes in heterosexual cohabitation. In the mid-1980s, Donald Hernandez, the Chief of the Marriage and Statistics Branch of the Population Division of the Census Bureau, and Arthur J. Norton, his supervisor, made the decision to add the response category of "unmarried partner" to the Census Schedule (Hernandez 2006). Therefore, in 1990, the Census reconstructed POSSLQ as "unmarried partner," defined as a close personal relationship and having a "marriage-like" relationship with Person #1 (Barrett 1994). However, unlike POSSLQ, sex was denoted through the unmarried partner category, enabling the enumeration of same-sex households for the first time.[12]

Table A.1 in the Appendix is a timeline of significant shifts by the Census Bureaus in regards to household definitions and policies. Figure A.1 in the Appendix presents part of the 2000 Census Short Form Schedule.

2.3. How the State Creates Identity Based on Race and Ethnicity

While family categories changed little during most of the twentieth century, race and ethnic categories underwent frequent evolutions, often adding changing or deleting categories on nearly each Census Schedule. For instance, in the 1890 Census, Croatians in North Carolina were counted as White, but were counted as Indian in the 1900 Census (Rodríguez 2000: 80). Then, in the 1930 census, four new racial categories were introduced: "Mexican, Filipino, Hindu, and Korean" (Lee 1993: 79). This was the first

[12] Hernandez (2006) notes that the Census Bureau was aware that same-sex households would mark their relationship on the Census Schedule.

and only time that Mexican has appeared as a race on the census schedule (Anderson and Fienberg 1999: 182-183), and by the 1940 Census, Mexicans were counted as Whites (Rodríguez 2000: 82-83). Thus, within a ten year period, Mexicans had been shifted from their own "Mexican" category to being included in the "white" category, unless "they appeared to census interviewers to be 'definitely Indian or of other Nonwhite races" (Rodríguez 2000: 84). Then the 1960 Census included eleven racial classifications including Hawaiians, part Hawaiians, Aleuts, and Eskimos (Lee 1993: 79), but part Hawaiian, Aleut, and Eskimo were omitted in the following decade. In 1980, fifteen racial categories appeared on the Census, along with a Spanish/Hispanic origin question (Lee 1993: 79; Anderson 1988: 227). In 1990, however, the Census was significantly scaled back by grouping nine categories under a new category “Asian and Pacific Islander” (Lee 1993: 80; Anderson and Fienberg 1999: 167-168).

Categories involving African Americans and Native Americans were especially problematic, as the Census tended to focus on degrees of racial ancestry (Hirschman et al 2000: 382; Anderson 1988; Malcomson 2000; Nobles 2000; 2002; Rodríguez 2000: 74-75; Zuberi 2001). By the 1890 Census Schedule, racial biological precision “had led to census categories based on degrees of African ancestry (mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon)” (Hirschman, et al. 2000: 382), and enumerators were instructed to be careful in choosing which category Blacks belonged based on perceived blood quantities (Lee 1993: 77; Nobles 2002; US Bureau of the Census 1989: 36). Although in 1900, the categories Mulatto, Quadroon, and Octoroon were dropped from the Census, the Mulatto category reappeared on the 1910 and 1920 Censuses, making sure that biracial

individuals were enumerated as non-White persons (Lee 1993; Nobles 2002). For Native Americans, the Census required the proportion of "white blood" (none, ½, ¼, 1/8) for each enumerated Native American (Anderson 1988; Hirschman et al 2000: 382; Lee 1993; Rodríguez 2000: 80).

In the latter part of the twentieth century, the Census Bureau acknowledged for the first time that race was to be socially constructed, rather than biologically innate. Specifically, in 1950 the Bureau admitted that the concept of race lacked scientific reason and was based on public opinion alone (Rodríguez 2000). As a result, in 1970, it allowed individuals to check or write-in their own race, and thus be able to self-identify their racial classification.

The ability to self-identify racially on the Census Schedule has prompted other conflicts around racial and ethnic categories. For instance, some Latinos marked the "Other" race category on the 1990 census, self-identifying racially as Latino/a or Chicano/a, rather than as an ethnicity. A similar dispute is currently underway regarding classifications for Arab/Arab Americans. On the 2000 Census, Arab and Arab Americans predominately self-identified as White (El-Badry 2004), but there has been an increasing push since September 11, 2001 to racially constitute Arab/Arab Americans as non-White.[13]

[13] According to Directive 15: Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting in May 1977, Census racial categories were defined as American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; and White. Therefore, there is not a clear racial category for Arab and Arab Americans. All people from Arab countries were racially defined as White by the Census. As such, Arabs and Arab Americans who chose another racial category were often flagged and moved to the White racial category. However, Samhan (1999) argues that the Census Bureau views the Arab and Arab American population as "not quite white," while many Arab and Arab Americans live a life as a person of color. Moreover, the Census Bureau released a census brief, *The*

Just as the Census has reconceptualized the category "head of household" in numerous iterations, it has constructed and reconstructed racial and ethnic categories in line with ongoing cultural shifts and conflicts. Historically, it has added, deleted, changed categories often with each Census. In the early 1900s, it attempted to evaluate racial ancestry of Native Americans and African Americans with finite precision. At different times, it racially constituted Latinos/as as Mexican, White, or ethnically as Hispanic.[14] Despite acknowledging in the 1950s that race was a social construction, the Census Bureau has retained racial categories on the Census Schedule largely for historical continuity. [15]

Arab Population: 2000 along with a more detailed special report, *We the People of Arab Ancestry in the United States* in 2003 and 2005 respectively. In these reports the Census demographic characteristics of the Arab and Arab American population based on ancestry questions. The Census Bureau defined Arab as "most people with ancestries originating from Arabic-speaking countries or areas of the world are categorized as Arab" (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005: 1). The reports leave out any multiple Arab ancestries people. It is unclear as to why the Census Bureau released these reports when previously the Census Bureau had paid little attention to the Arab and Arab American population. Furthermore, the Census Bureau provided information of metropolitan statistical areas that had 1,000 Arab population to the Department of Homeland Security. As a result, many Arab and Arab American leaders from the Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Arab American Institute (AAI), and the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a civil liberties group, argued that this action promoted collective suspicion and backlash against Arabs and Arab Americans. On the 2010 Census Schedule, there will no longer be an ancestry question, suggesting that the demographic characteristics of the Arab and Arab American population will be even harder to enumerate in the future.

[14] Hispanic is a term created by the Census Bureau to measure a panethnic Latino/a identity (Bean and Tienda 1987).

[15] There has been confusion between race and ethnicity categories on Censuses (Kertzer and Arel 2004). European census practice rejected race in favor of ethnicity and nationality. The first exception of counting by race and ethnicity occurred in the 1939 Nazi German Census when the Census asked people if they had one Jewish grandparent (Aly and Roth 2004; Kertzer and Arel 2004). In 1991, a grass-roots campaign, started by the Toronto Star, "urged Canadians of all backgrounds to identify their origins as "Canadian" ("Call Me Canadian!"), a category which had never been allowed by census-makers. In the 1991 census, 3.3 percent entered "Canadian" in the category "Other-specify" of the question on origins, making it the fifth largest "ethnic" group" (Kertzer and Arel 2004: 16). When an ethnic group is listed on the census, the number of respondents increase with a particular group. For example, in Canada, the number of Americans of Slovak, Croat, and French Canadian ancestry more than doubled between the 1980 and 1990 censuses, while the number of Cajuns increased sixty-fold – all four categories which were not listed in 1980, but were in 1990 (Kertzer and Arel 2004; Passel 1997).

As noted in the last two sections, the Census, as a state regulated institution, has been strongly influenced by cultural frameworks around gender and race. Missing from this rich discussion has been the impact of heterosexuality on family and household definitions. Up until the 1990s, the Census has presumed and assumed to be heterosexual households. Then in 1990, the Census added "unmarried partner" at which time same-sex households could first specify their relationship on the Census.

2.4. Heteronormativity

Cultural norms around sexuality have historically assumed and privileged heterosexuality over nonheterosexuality, such that heterosexuality has been constituted as "compulsory" (Rich 1986). Rich first demonstrated that this privileging of heterosexuality had infiltrated all institutions and "need[ed] to be recognized and studied as a political institution (Rich 1986: 35). Ingraham (1997) elaborated this argument positing the existence of a "heterosexual imaginary." She argued that research and institutions

> conceal the operation of heterosexuality in structuring gender and closes off any critical analysis of heterosexuality as an organizing institution. The effect of this depiction of reality is that heterosexuality circulates as taken for granted, naturally occurring, and unquestioned, while gender is understood as socially constructed and central to the organization of everyday life (Ingraham 1997: 275).

The lack of a critical examination of heterosexuality as a structuring force in society has resulted in "heteronormativity – the view that institutionalized heterosexuality

constitutes the standard for legitimate and prescriptive sociosexual arrangements" (Ingraham 1997: 275) Take the example of two professors who are applying for a higher position; one is a white heterosexual male and the other a white lesbian (Ingraham 1997: 284). The male professor decides to marry, inviting all his colleagues to his wedding. The male professor receives the job. Ingraham (1997) argues that this heterosexual practice is not questioned as influencing the decision making of the voting colleagues, but it likely does. Thus, the white male professor received material advantage by virtue of his wedding.

Involuntary sterilization is another example of how the body is controlled through the regulation of sexuality by the state. As part of the eugenic movement (Paul 1995; 1998) compulsory sterilization initially targeted mentally ill people who were primarily living in state institutions. Other state laws targeted the deaf, the blind, the epileptic and those who were physically deformed (Reilly 1991). On many reservations, Native American women were sterilized without their knowledge (Lawrence 2000). The first state to introduce compulsory sterilization legislation was in Michigan in 1897, but Indiana was the first state to actually enact sterilization legislation in 1907 followed by Washington and California in 1909. The Supreme Court case, *Buck v. Bell* legitimized sterilization of patients in a mentally ill Virginia institution. The number of sterilizations increased until 1942 when the Supreme Court ruled in *Skinner v. Oklahoma* that sterilization violated criminals' equal protection clause of the constitution. Sterilization continued to occur until late the 1970s, including in commonwealth provinces such as

Puerto Rico (Briggs 2002). Between the 1900s and the 1970s, the United States government sterilized over 64,000 people (Kevles 1985).

Another example of how the state controls and regulates sexualities is via abortion. Before the scientific discovery of human development of conception, the English common law allowed abortions to be performed before "quickening," that is, when the women feels the fetus move for the first time. The Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1803 made abortion illegal after quickening had occurred. Prior to 1973, the Comstock law, for example, made it illegal to send lewd material via postal mail (Beisel 1997). As Beisel notes, the Comstock law demarcated a class distinction between the newly minted middle class and the lower class. Abortionists were depicted as lower class and degenerate. Abortion was illegal until 1973 when the court case *Roe v. Wade* ruled that abortion was legal. Even though abortion became legal, the state continues to place stipulations on people who can have an abortion. For instance, in some states, women must be over the age of 18 to have an abortion, while other states make the women wait for 24 to 48 hours before having an abortion.

A third example of how the state controls and regulates sexualities is interracial laws. Although interracial relationships were not uncommon in the United States, many colonies and later states used legal measures to punish interracial affairs. In 1622, the colony of Virginia declared interracial relationships as punishable by whipping and dishonorable to God (Korgen 1999; Williamson 1980). By 1725, Virginia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, Delaware, and Pennsylvania all had anti-miscegenation laws (Bennett 1993: 301). The punishment for interracial

relationships included extension of time in which a white[16] servant was kept in servitude; free Blacks were sold into slavery, or sold out of the colony. Ministers and other person who performed such marriages were also fined. Many of these miscegenation laws remained until 1967 (Bennett 1987: 303; Takaki 1989), when the Supreme Court ruled on the court case, *Loving v. Virginia*. However, two states, Alabama and South Carolina, still have anti-miscegenation laws in their state constitutions. Although interracial relationships were discouraged, it was only in cases in which legal wives were publicly disrespected (Berry 1999; Cotts 2000).

Anti-miscegenation laws of the 1920s continued to increase the hardship to immigrants and household formation. The Racial Integrity Act of 1924 was passed to retain the integrity of the white race. It prohibited "any white person…to marry any save a[nother] white person" (*Racial Integrity Act of 1924*). This law was passed in the heat of nationalism in which immigration laws considerably cut the number of immigrants who could enter the United States (Anderson 1988; Berry 1999; Pedraza 1996; Takaki 1989). The Johnson Act was based on a quota system of 2 percent of the 1890 census (Anderson 1988; Ngai 1999). This was to ensure that non-whites and Southern Europeans could not immigrant to the United States (Jacobson 1998).

In the 1930s, new laws prohibited interracial marriage. For instance, Salvador Roldan in 1933, wanted to marry his White fiancée. Almost immediately, the California legislature amended their law to include "Malay race" as a restricted category (Takaki

[16] The definition of a white person changes over historical periods. Jewish, Irish and German Americans for example were not necessarily viewed as white (Brodkin 1999; Jacobson 1998; Kazal 2004).

1989). Twelve other states also prohibited marriage between Whites and Filipinos, mostly on the West coast (Takaki 1989).

Although various laws prohibited interracial marriage, the judges in the court case, *Prince versus Massachusetts*, ruled that marriage was a private affair. The US Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Constitution protected a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter (*Prince v. Massachusetts* 1944).

In December of 1945, Congress passed Public Law 271, which became known as the War Brides Act (Spickard 1989). Soldiers who were in the European warfront could bring women they had married overseas to the United States. Many German and Italian wives entered the United States with few problems, but Japanese wives were excluded. Congress later passed an amendment to the War Brides Act, which allowed G.I's to bring Japanese wives to the United States for only one year, 1947 to 1948.

By the 1950's, thirty-one states had banned interracial marriages between Whites and non-Whites (Berry 1999). In 1958 Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving were married in Washington D.C., where interracial marriage was legal. Upon marriage, they moved and lived together as husband and wife in Caroline County, Virginia. Because of the Virginia statute, the Lovings were charged with Breaking Virginia's code 20-54. Virginia's statue stated,

> It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry and save a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the purpose of this act, the term "white person" shall apply only to the person who has no trace whatsoever of any blood other than

> Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasian blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to marriages prohibited by this chapter (*Virginia Code 20-54*).

On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail (Coolidge 1998). The judge, however, agreed to suspend their sentence if they agreed to leave Virginia for 25 years. The code further stated that interracial marriages conducted in other states would not be recognized in Virginia. The Lovings contested the code not on the basis of the definition of race, which was clearly defined in the statue, but on the basis of the fourteenth amendment.

By 1963, fourteen states had already repealed laws outlawing interracial marriages (Coolidge 1998).[17] In 1948, the Supreme Court of California (*Prez v. Sharp*) ruled that the state's ban on interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment (Takaki 1989). In 1967, the Supreme Court ruled on *Loving v. Virginia* that interracial couples could legally marry.

From the above examples, it is clear that the state decides who is socially controlled based on the social and political environment. The state decides who can and cannot be sterilized, who can or cannot have an abortion or who could marry. The state decides that mentally ill women should be sterilized to ensure that their children would not be born. Surgeons on reservations act as agents of the state and thus sterilize Native

[17] Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming

American women. While upper class women usually were able to ensure an abortion if they wanted, the state imposed legal regulations primarily against lower class women. Furthermore, the state determined who could and could not be married.

One effect of the dominant structuring power of heteronormativity relates to family formation in the ideology of the Standard North American Family (SNAF). SNAF is the legal conception of a married couple who may or may not have children. The adult male is in the paid labor force and the woman's primary responsibility is caring for her husband and children (Smith 1993: 52). Although this family type comprises only approximately ten percent of the current U.S. population (Lichter and Qian 2005), its ideological force infuses a wide range of discourses and institutions.

This same ideology of the "traditional" nuclear family compelled missionary groups and the U.S. Congress to reestablish matriarchal, non-nuclear Native American families into patriarchal households, in which the man/husband labored and the woman/wife served, cleaned, and cared for children. SNAF has also prompted more recent legislation seeking to confront the "culture of poverty." In 1965, Moynihan argued that widespread households headed by Black single mothers had resulted in the emasculation of Black American males, producing behavioral deficiencies that reinforce conditions of poverty. He recommended policies that would encourage marriage and the promotion of nuclear families.

Numerous other policies have continued to emphasize marriage as a means to decrease poverty and other social ills. In the early 1970s, when teenage pregnancy

reached "epidemic" proportions,[18] policies were initiated to encourage teenage mothers to marry the father of their children. Even in current welfare programs, increased benefits are being granted as incentives to encourage marriage as a stabilizing force and as a means out of welfare itself.

Perceived assaults on the primacy of heterosexual marriage and SNAF, via same-sex marriages and civil unions, have even prompted national legislation in the form of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA 1996). [19] Section 3 specifically defines marriage and spouse, stating:

> In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman, a husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers to only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife (Federal Code 2419).

Contrary though to usual federalist precedents that uphold legal declarations in other states, including marriage certificates, wills, and adoptions, Section 2 of this same act nullified this provision, again stating:

> no state…shall be required to give effect to any public act, record or judicial proceeding in any other state…respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other state,…or a right or claim arising from such relationship (Federal Code 2419).

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[18] Luker (1996) shows that numerically teenagers had more births during the 1950s than in the 1970s.
[19] The U.S. Senate voted 85-14 for DOMA and the House had passed it by a vote of 342-67 (Chauncey 2004: 125).

To further strengthen this enactment, more than thirty states (at the time of this writing in Spring of 2007) have passed similar state constitutional Defense of Marriage Acts.[20] President George W. Bush and others have even called for a national constitutional amendment to verify marriage as "one man and one woman."[21]

Specifically in regards to the Census, this SNAF ideology has led to the misenumeration of numerous households in the U.S., especially some created in unique social contexts (de la Puente 1993; Martin and Griffin 1994; Presser 1998). In fact, the 1990 Post Enumeration Survey of the 1990 U.S. Census reported a 1.8 percent of within household census coverage errors of the total population due to household mistakes (Hogan 1992). In one case, in the town of Woodland, Oregon, Montoya (1992) observed the establishment of "ad hoc" households, created in response to poverty and a lack of affordable housing. The relationships to each other in these households were maintained based on the allocation of money. In some cases, people living within the ad hoc households did not know the identities of others. Those who were enumerated were those who coincided with the enumerator's visit. In another situation, in Florida, a high

[20] As early as 1977, states were writing into their constitutions the definition of marriage as "one man and one woman." The following states have passed state DOMA's Alabama (1998); Alaska (1996); Arizona (1996); Arkansas (1997); California (2000); Colorado (2000); Delaware (1996); Florida (1997); Georgia (1996); Idaho (1996); Illinois (1996); Indiana (1997); Iowa (1998); Kansas (1996); Kentucky (1998); Louisiana (1996); Maine (1997); Michigan (1996); Minnesota (1997); Mississippi (1997); Missouri (1997); Montana (1997); Nebraska (2000); North Carolina (1995); North Dakota (1997); Oklahoma (1996); Pennsylvania (1996); South Carolina (1996); South Dakota (1996); Tennessee (1996); Texas (2000); Utah (1995); Virginia (1997); Washington (1998); and West Virginia (2000) (Eskridge 2002: 28; www.hrc.org).

[21] The Census Bureau has had to edit all same-sex couples into the unmarried partner category. This disregards the research that has demonstrated the distinctions in the gay and lesbian communities between those who mark 'husband/wife' and those who mark 'unmarried partner' (Fields and Clark 1998). If the Census Bureau believes that the sex question has been miscoded, they do what they define as a consistency edit. Black and his colleagues (2002) note a false positive problem can occur if a different-sex partner is enumerated as a same-sex couple. This could be as large as a third of the sample and thus bias the same-sex couple sample.

degree of fluctuation and mobility influenced Haitian households, such that some household members were described by others as "just passing through." Residence by any one household member ranged anywhere from two weeks to four years (Wingerd 1992). As such, in both instances, those who were enumerated were those whose residence coincided with the enumerator's visit.

In a third study, Romero (1993) noted overlapping considerations of SNAF and fears of INS deportation in relation to the (mis)enumeration of El Salvadoran households in San Francisco, California. While multiple families often lived within the same household, only one family/home was listed on the mailbox and residential documents, e.g. utility bills and apartment leases. This one family would be counted in the Census, while missing all the others. In all of these cases, specific contextual factors such as poverty, temporality, and deportation fears led to the creation of unique households in different U.S. locations. While these specific factors likely also impacted the enumeration, misenumeration has been tied most directly to enumerators' assumptions about household makeup and SNAF.

According to SNAF, households tend to be constituted as single dwelling residences of nuclear families. In an ethnographic study, Gerber (1990, 1994) demonstrated an alternate criterion employed by members of multiple family households to define a household member and who lives there. The more complex the household relationship, the more criteria they used to determine if the person should be considered part of the household. The criteria included peoples' intentions and agreements, the location of belongings, and where mail is received; these determined for the respondents

whether they were as living in the household. Because of the Census definitions, this may lead respondents to leave off "marginal" people who should be enumerated in the census or are included in error.

In previous sections, I have discussed how the state, via the Census Bureau, has constituted household, race, and ethnic categories – and how these categories have shifted overtime. Underlying these constructions, however, has been the presumption of heteronormativity, largely unheeded until recently prompted by increasing debate around civil unions and same-sex marriages. As such, state and national legislation has been instigated to ensure and enforce single monogamous heterosexual marriage. In the way, the state has enacted powerful structuring forces around sexuality itself. In this next section, I explore this concept of sexuality as structure in greater depth.

2.5. Sexualities as Structural

One of the primary concerns in sociology is with the structuring of social life, be it social class structuring politics, gender that structures employment opportunities, or sexuality structuring the state. Giddens (1984: 377) defines structure as "Structure. Rules and Resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action." In other words, Giddens underscores the interaction of forces, in which structures shape people's actions, but people's practices in turn also reproduce and/or constitute structures.

In an elaboration on Giddens' notion of structure, Sewell (1992) posits the existence of dual structures at work in social arenas. He reiterates these structures are

comprised of two key components – a) rules or cultural schema, and b) resources. Sewell, however, emphasizes that these components are culturally mediated, such that structures such as the state are consciously established, maintained, fought over, and disputed, rather than taken for granted as if they were unchangeable features of the world (Sewell 1992: 24). Sewell (1992: 8) defines cultural schema as the "generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social life."

Two distinct applications of Sewell's (1992) work are Lewis' (2004) analysis of race relations in education and Hull's (2006) examination of gay marriage. Lewis noted, in regards to race, that

> Sewell's formulation gives us a way of understanding race as both symbolic and structural, as comprised of both cultural schemas (e.g. rules of sexual interaction and folk understandings of the meaning and differences between sexual groups) and resources (e.g. cultural capital, wealth) (Lewis 2004: 630).

Lewis applied Sewell's concept to whiteness and argues that Whites enact cultural schemas of racial dominance and thus gain material advantages from non-Whites. In regards to sexuality, Hull (2006) examined the cultural schema around marriage ceremonies, particularly related to gay marriage. Despite the lack of legal recognition of the ceremonies, many same-sex couples enacted weddings and commitment ceremonies. Many of the respondents discussed the cultural aspects of "getting married" and how it changed the status of their relationship among their friends, family, and themselves.

One common cultural schema that pervasive across institutions, practices, and discourses, challenges men who work in predominately female jobs, such as nursing or

teaching. Williams (1992) finds that the public holds negative cultural attitudes about male nurses, questioning their sexuality and assuming they are gay (Connell 1995). Likewise, many male teachers of young children are accused of being gay and or pedophiles (King 2004). Despite evidence to the contrary from national professional organizations (AMA, APA, ASA among a few), others continue to argue that gay male teachers will “recruit” young children into a homosexual lifestyle or that “homosexual promotion” provides an avenue to recruit young children into homosexuality (Squirrel 1998; Whatney 1991). These assertions then tend to reinforce and conflate cultural schemas around gender and sexuality, predisposing public opinion to negatively perceive men working in typically female-gendered occupations.

Furthermore, cultural schema regarding gay men and lesbians are threaded throughout U.S. law. "Contemporary condemnation of gay and lesbian people is not simply a matter of individual attitude or idiosyncrasy, but rather is deeply embedded in the structures of our culture and law" (Law 1988: 187). This includes local ordinances, civil and criminal suits, and state and national legislation. For example, in Buffalo, New York, a city ordinance from the 1920s banned two same-gender people from dancing or openly associating with each other unless in a bar (Kennedy and Davis 1993). In New York City, a local decree from the same time period prohibited two non-relatives from sharing an apartment together, thus denying gay or lesbian couples the opportunity of living together. Even in current civil and criminal suits, a gay or lesbian identity can be a detriment. Child custody has been denied to biological parents based on a nonheterosexual orientation (Patterson 1992). In hate crime trials, defense lawyers often

appeal to a "gay panic" or Non-violent Homosexual Advance Defense to gain their client's acquittal (Smyth 2006). This defense argues the inherent right to retribution of heterosexuals against purported advances by homosexual men. In 1996, a proposed bill called Employment Non-Discrimination Act would have ended workplace discrimination against gays and lesbians, but it was narrowly defeated (Berg and Lien 2002). In the same year, however, President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) into law, which has since prompted more than thirty states to pass similar legislation. A recent appeal in Michigan has even denied domestic partner benefits, based on the judicial interpretation of a domestic partnership as "marriage-like" denounced in Michigan's DOMA amendment (Michigan Court of Appeals 2007).

While laws represent critical enactments of cultural schemas, they also manifest the second aspect of dual structures – resources. Sewell (1992: 9) defines resources as "anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions." He argues that they are of two types: nonhuman and human. Nonhuman resources are material aspects which are valued and can be used to enhance or maintain power. Examples include "factories owned by capitalists, stocks of weapons controlled by kings or generals, or land rented by peasants" (Sewell 1992: 10). Human resources, though, describe personal and social attributes which encourage particular forms of action. These include "children's sense of obligation toward their mothers, or the fear and reverence that subjects feel for their king" (Sewell 1992: 10). Cultural schemas embody a particular ordering of the social world, and human resources characterize actions compelled by those schema.

Gay men and lesbians historically and currently are denied resources based on heteronormative privileges and sanctions. Historically, examples of resources denied include housing (Chauncey 1994), failure to enforce laws and police harassment (Comstock 1991; Deitcher 1995; D'Emilio 1983), criminal prosecution of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) activist (Adam 1987; Stockdill 2003) and association in bars (Kennedy and Davis 1993). Other resources that may be denied to gay men and lesbians are marriage, adoption, and inheritance rights (Bennett and Gates 2004; Cahill 2004; Cott 2000; Defense of Marriage Act of 1996; Eskridge 2001; Graff 1999; Moats 2004; Mello 2004; Rauch 2004; Wolfson 2004).

Many examples of resources being denied to gay men and lesbians involve the workplace. Researchers (Humphrey 1999; Schneider 1986) have also found that many homosexuals are fired when their sexual orientation is discovered. In terms of the hiring process, homosexuality, at least initially, may not play as large a factor as actual on the job training or work (Benokraitis and Feagin 1995; Levitt and Klassen 1974). Bernstein and Kostelac (2002: 316), who studied police officers, found that one-fourth of their sample "felt that recruiting homosexual officers undermines department morale." Furthermore, studies suggest that although many lesbians and gay men anticipate discrimination, a smaller percentage actually experiences discrimination in their workplace (Bell and Weinberg 1978; Humphrey 1999; Levine and Leonard 1984; Saghir and Robins 1973; Schneider 1986; Taylor and Raeborn 1995). In Embrick, Walther, and Wickens' (2007) study, heterosexual men denied gays and lesbians the resources of a good job by ensuring that no gay men or lesbians entered into the place of employment.

Other research suggested that in some cases gay men and lesbians must pass as heterosexuals in order to gain access to the job market (Badgett, Donnelly, and Kibbe 1992).

In the previous sections, I have discussed how the state, via the Census, has variously shaped and defined households, family, race, and ethnic categories. I have also noted the dual aspects that structures sexuality – the cultural schemas, tied to heteronormativity, that typically negatively define homosexuality and resources, the material consequences denied to gay men and lesbians, e.g. housing, child custody, and employment of these schemas. While I have focused on the structuring forces centered on sexuality, I recognize structures are not unilaterally enacted (Giddens 1984). Sexualities rather, just as structures shape people's behaviors, individual practices impact those same structures. Much of the evolution of Census categories has in fact been in response to lobbying efforts by particular groups. Pressures by women's groups led to the change of the head of household category to Person 1. Multiple groups,[22] people,[23] and legislators[24] have tried to influence the categories on the Census Schedule,

[22] Groups who weighed in on the debate over the addition of multiracial categories include: A Place For US Ministry, Honor Our Ethnic Youth or HONEY, IMAGE, Interracial Network, Interracial/Intercultural Pride or I-Pride, Multiracial Americans of Southern California or MASC, Biracial Family Network, Parents of Interracial Children, Interracial Connection, Interracial Family Alliance, Interracial Club, Interracial Family Circle, Interracial Families, Inc. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Groups who weighed in on the debate over the addition of the category, Hispanic, included: Mecha, Crusade for Justice, Brown Berets, Black Berets, and Young Lords to name just a few. Other groups who lobbied for a change in the definition of head of household included Social Scientists for Population Research, National Organization for Women, the Women's Equity Action League, and the National Abortion Rights Action League.

[23] People who supported or disagreed with adding the multiracial category included: Pat Barner, Kevin Barber, Charles Byrd, Reginald Daniel, Ramona Douglass, Carolos Alejandro Fernández, Susan Graham, Sarah Ross, Ruth and Steve White, among a few.

[24] Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI), Representative Thomas Sawyer (D-OH), Representative Robert Matsui (D-CA), Representative Thomas Petri (R-WI), Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, among a few. In the case of the head of household category, included Representative Patricia Schroeder who was also the Chair of

the Census Schedule still revolves around a nuclear heterosexual family formation (de la Puente 1993; Martin and Griffin 1994; Presser 1998).

In regards to the Census and the state, two underlying ideas influence 'individuals' enactments of agency: legal consciousness and statistical consciousness. Legal consciousness refers to people's lay understandings of the law, while statistical consciousness refers to everyday knowledge of statistics. In both cases the production of legal interpretation and statistics by authoritative sources, is then variously understood, consumed, and employed by ordinary citizens for their distinct purposes. This understanding takes on forms of generally unquestioned folk knowledge, despite being socially constructed in specific historical-cultural contexts.

2.6. Legal Consciousness

A common understanding of "law" suggests a fixed and immutable set of guidelines that differentiates right from wrong, and the institution of penalties upon "breaking the law." However, much like concepts of race (Omi and Winant 1994) and sexualities (Chauncey 1993), law is both durable and malleable. It is a social construction and fluid in its boundaries (Schauer 2006). Berger and Luckman (1966) argue that all of social order and social life is a social construction. In regards to law, Berger and Luckman give an example of the death penalty. They write that the, "institution of the law posits that heads shall be chopped off in specific ways under specific circumstances and that specific types of individuals shall do the chopping (executioners, say, or members of an impure caste, or virgins under a certain age, or

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the U.S. House Subcommittee on Population and the Census at the time and Arthur Fleming who was Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

those who have been designated by an oracle).” Law shapes how people make meaning in their lives at both the structural and individual levels, intersecting with institutions such as the state, religion, and family, among a few (Engel and Munger 2003; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Merry 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1993; Nielsen 2000). In these intersections, people fight to recreate or to affirm the law in their everyday life. For instance polygamy has been outlawed in the United States since 1862 with the Morrill Anti-Polygamy Act; however, polygamy is practiced in the some states such as Utah, Arizona, and Texas (Dobson 2006).[25]

Although law is malleable and durable, Max Weber (1947) writes about “the subjective meaning-complex of action” which can be applied to the intersection of social agency and legal consciousness. Unlike Marx, Weber suggests that culture can influence agency while agency can influence culture. Weber describes the subjective interpretation of action as an effect to understand human behavior in terms of “the concepts of collective entities” (Weber 1947: 102). This suggests that for Weber a dual character of action/consciousness in which thoughts or concepts “have a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as of something actually existing, partly as something with normative authority” (Weber 1947: 101-102).

Because Weber suggests a dual character of action and consciousness in which concepts have meanings in people’s everyday life, Merry extends by suggesting the concept of legal consciousness. Merry (1995: 5) defines legal consciousness as “the ways people understand and use law” and as “the way people conceive of the ‘natural’

[25] In 2001, the state of Utah convicted Thomas Green of criminal non-support and four counts of bigamy for having 5 serially monogamous marriages, while living with previous legally divorced wives.

and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and action and their commonsense understanding of the world." For instance, a person is in a car accident. It is the other persons fault, but the insurance company will not issue a loaner car. The person in the accident responds by saying that if the insurance company does not provide a loaner car then she will lose her job and have to sue the person who caused the accident. In this example, the person invokes legal consciousness in suggesting that she will have to sue the person who caused the accident. Legal consciousness is in the practical knowledge in which people do things (Bourdieu 1977). Scholarship about legal consciousness has demonstrated how law shapes the everyday lives of people (Ewick and Silbey 1992, 1998; Hartog 1995; Nielsen 2000; Sarat 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1995; White 1990). Many empirical studies of legal consciousness exist about the white working class and middle class people (Greenhouse 1986; Merry 1990; Engel 1983; Engel 1984; Merry and Silbey 1984; Yngvesson 1988), while other studies have uncovered legal consciousness by focusing more on people of color rather than socioeconomic status (Bumiller 1988; Sarat 1990; Friedman 1985; Tyler 1990; White 1990).

Extending Merry's definition, Ewick and Silbey (1998) argue that legal consciousness develops through individual experience and changes with contradictory experiences. People will shift what they are doing if it is not working or contradicts what happens to them. Swidler (1986) calls this "strategies of action." "Strategies of action" are the normative rules and values and the familiar, repeated ways of practices. Swidler (1986: 273) suggests that culture can be understood as "a 'tool-kit' of symbols, stories,

rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems." Individuals develop particular "strategies of action" which are based on repeated practices that are linked together over time. Culture consists of repertoires of skills, styles, habits, and techniques which explain patterns of action. Individuals consistently learn new repertoires and competencies, especially when the existing ones prove to be inadequate or inconsistent or when new ways of examining culture become available. When one experiences contradictions in one's life, Swidler suggests that individuals and groups will tend to abandon familiar repertoires for new ones.

In Ewick and Silbey's book, *The Common Place of Law* (1998), they found that people often abandon familiar repertoires for new ones. Most people would not have considered the legal system as an avenue toward a solution to their problems. However, many in their study began using the legal system as a solution to their problems. Ewick and Silbey find three orientations to law: before the law; with the law; and against the law. Those respondents who were "before the law" saw the legal system as a trap, something standing in the way of their everyday life. Those respondents who were seen as "with the law" engaged the legal system, using it to work for them. Those respondents who were "against the law" were people who viewed the legal system as a trap and supporting systems of oppression, or they resisted the legal system. Many (Merry 1995; McCann 1994; Thompson 1975) argue that those who use the legal system as a tool of resistance have legal consciousness.

Another study about legal consciousness examines public speech. Nielsen (2000) finds variations in how legal consciousness is applied to public speech by gender, class, and race. She finds four paradigms to the law: the freedom of speech paradigm, the "autonomy" paradigm, the "impracticality" paradigm, and the distrust of authority/cynicism about law paradigm. Those respondents who argued the freedom of speech paradigm used a "slippery slope" argument, that is, if one form of speech is restricted then what is to stop other forms of speech from being restricted (Nielsen 2000: 1074). In the "autonomy" paradigm, respondents downplayed public harassment and did not want to be perceived as victims. Respondents who were in the "impracticality" paradigm suggested that it was impractical to catch, try, and punish individuals who violated public harassment laws, if the laws existed. Finally, respondents who were categorized as having a distrust of authority or cynicism about the law argued that the laws would not be enforced because of a lack of authority. African American respondents specifically were more likely to argue that public speech could not be legally enforced because of their lack of belief in authority. One African American respondent even compared the idea to affirmative action saying "They're never going to enforce laws like that anyway. Look at affirmative action – it's all going away anyhow" (Nielsen 2000: 1084-1085). Nielsen's findings indicate that social groups experience and define legal consciousness differently based predominately on social hierarchies.

In another study, Anna-Maria Marshall (2005: 2) extends the concept of legal consciousness in everyday life and asserts the concept of "legal consciousness of injustice." She defines legal consciousness of injustice as "represent[ing] an effort to

understand the relationship between law and social change from the bottom up, where changing social, political, and cultural values create conflict in everyday life" (Marshall 2005: 2). She argues that people do not necessarily need to understand the exact interpretation of the law. In her study of sexual harassment, many of the women applied more stringent rules to define an event as sexual harassment than what is stated in the written policy, but were aware of sexual harassment occurring in the workplace. Many of the respondents were aware of the sexual harassment; however, they did not seek legal assistance because they felt that it was pointless, that is, the law would not be enforced. I turn now to a discussion of Sewell's argument and the concept of statistical consciousness.

2.7. Statistical Consciousness

People often see statistics operating in their everyday lives when they pick up a newspaper or watch television. Social scientists and critics produce statistics for public consumption. Journalists report on social problems which have been constructed (Best 1995, 2001; Loeseke 1999; Spector and Kitsuse 1977). Reporters have a much easier time reporting news stories if the statistics are exaggerated (Hewitt 1996). These exaggerations can occur within powerful organizations and institutions such as governmental offices (Crossen 1994).

Joel Best (2001) argues that society is innumerate – "mathematical[ly] illiterate" (Paulos 1988). People do not critically examine the statistics that permeate their lives. When Kinsey and his colleagues first published their book, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, one statistic regarding homosexuality emerged from this study that has

since become ubiquitous in the everyday understanding of American society, the "10 percent" statistic. Kinsey and his colleagues reported that "10 per cent of the males are more or less exclusively homosexual (i.e., rate 5 or 6) for at least three years between the ages of 16 and 55. This is one male in ten in the white male population." They continue that they found 8 percent of males are exclusively homosexual and that "4 per cent of the white males are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives, after the onset of adolescence."[26] Kinsey and his colleagues clearly reported differences of homosexuality based on age, race, and practices of male sexual activities. Best (2001: 62) describes the 10 percent statistic as a mutant statistic – "distorted versions of the original figures." However, the 10 percent statistic has remained.[27]

Gay and lesbian activists continue to assert that in the United States, 10 percent of the population is homosexual. Activists use the slogan, "10 percent," to show the power and numbers of the gay and lesbian population. The 10 percent statistic has taken on a mythical realm in queer communities. For instance, the 10 percent statistic has appeared in scholarly work (Jennings 1994; Smith 1998), work about religion (Thompson 2005) and youth (Owens 1998). Peter Sprigg from Family Research Center, accounts for 124,000 google hits of the 10 percent statistic. The 10 percent statistic has become pervasive throughout society.[28]

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[26] Many researchers have critiqued Kinsey's methods of data collection, reports, and interpretation of their data (Brickman 2004; Cochran 1954; Himelhoch and Fava 1955; Laumann et al. 1994)

[27] Please see Chapter III for a discussion of the percentage of the population who are lesbian or gay.

[28] One of the reasons that the 10 percent statistic remains pervasive in our society is because of what Biderman and Riess (1967) call the "dark figure" in criminology. The dark figure is the "occurrences that by some criteria are called crime yet that are not registered in the statistics of whatever agency was the source of the data being used" (Biderman and Riess 1967: 1). Many people have non-heterosexual sexual activity, but do not self-identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or queer (Humphreys 1975; Laumann et al. 1994;

Once a statistic has taken on a life of its own, Best (2001) describes this as number laundering. Best (2001: 35) writes that, "Its origins as someone's best guess are now forgotten and, through repetition, it comes to be treated as a straightforward fact – accurate and authoritative." The 10 percent statistic is not only a mutant statistic but has become pervasive throughout society.

Another example of mutant statistics derives from the 2000 Decennial Census. When the data from the 2000 Decennial Census became available 92 news articles were published about the increase in the number of reported same-sex households between the 1990 Census to the 2000 Census. For instance, the *Indianapolis Star* reported:

> According to U.S. Census Bureau data released Wednesday, the number of same-sex households in the state grew by more than fourfold – about 428 percent, from 1,935 in 1990 to 10,219 in 2000 – during the 1990s even though their relative numbers remain tiny (Callahan 2001).

Furthermore, the *Chicago Sun-Times* reported, "Same-sex partner households in Illinois jumped 267 percent statewide between 1990 and 2000…" (Guerrero and Sweeney 2001) and Toosi (2001) describes the dramatic increase for the state of Wyoming as "only 30 such couples were reported in 1990. In 2000, it was 807, a 2,590 percent increase." These accounts report enormous percentage increases in the numbers of same-sex households in various states, but these newspaper accounts do not provide the entire story.

Russell and Poston 2007; Walther, Terrell, and Poston 2007). Because of non-heterosexual sexual activity, there is always a dark figure of how many lesbian and gay men are there?

Very few researchers have critically examined the Census data; but the 2000 Census data were reported throughout the media and continues to be referred to in news articles without the caveats of the problems with the census data. In a news article about the gay marriage vote in Kansas, Bellafante (2006), a journalist, wrote,

> [Gary Gates] found a 68 percent jump in Kansas households headed by same-sex partners between 2000 and 2005. In 2005, 11 out of every 1,000 couples living together in Kansas reported themselves as same-sex, according to Mr. Gates's review of the Census Bureau's annual American Community Survey data, a figure closer than one might expect to those recorded in New Jersey and New York, where 12 and 14 out of every 1,000 couples, respectively, are same-sex.

With the census data, researchers and activists have produced statistics for public consumption.

Because of these examples of statistics used for public consumption and civil understanding, I assert the concept of statistical consciousness. Following Marshall's (2005) work on legal consciousness of injustice, I define statistical consciousness as representing an effort to understand the relationship between statistics and social change, where changing social, political, and cultural values create conflict in everyday life.

In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology I used to address my research questions. I used a multiple method design including secondary analysis, survey collection, and qualitative interviews with gay and lesbian couples.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

Sociologists have used multiple methods to analyze communities and answer overarching macro level questions about a variety of issues. For instance, Du Bois (1899/1996) collected ethnographic and survey data about Philadelphia Blacks. He included "six schedules" covering nine thousand Blacks: a family schedule, an individual schedule, a home schedule; a street schedule; an institution schedule for organizations and institutions; and finally a slight variation of the individual schedule was used for house-servants living at their places of employment. Secondly, Drake and Clayton (1945) collected data (population; distribution of poverty; distribution of foreign-born, etc.) and compared African American communities in the *Black Metropolis* and the *Deep South* on these demographic characteristics. Luker (1997) analyzed teenage pregnancy using both historical demographic data and interviews with teenage parents. In studying Mexican migration, Douglas Massey (1987a, 1987b, 1994) created the ethnosurvey which combines ethnographic and survey methodologies (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Massey et al. 1998; Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994). Furthermore, using the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), a survey, Rumbaut (2005) constructed interview questions to contextualize ethnic identities, which led to a better understanding of multiple generational identities and education.

While many sociologists and anthropologists have used both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect data about populations, demographers only began

noticing qualitative research in the 1970s (Kertzer and Arel 2001).[29] Two research projects began exploring anthropological and qualitative methodology. In the 1970s, Ansley Coale and many of his students undertook the Princeton European Fertility Project. Using demographic transition theory with three stages, pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional to explain declining fertility in European countries, Coale and his students found onsets of fertility decline for different economic conditions that were not predicted by the demographic transition theory (Coale and Watkins 1986; Knodel and van de Walle 1979). For instance, Coale and Watkins (1986) found fertility declines in France due to "cultural changes" such as linguistic, religious, or geographic variations.

In a second case, dissatisfied with the World Fertility Survey (Caldwell 1982, 1985), John Caldwell began doing field studies in Nigeria and Bangladesh (Caldwell 1977). Using focus groups and key informants, Caldwell defined "microdemography," later as anthropological demography for smaller demographic projects (Caldwell, Hill and Hull 1988).

This was a significant shift for demography. Caldwell (1982: 4) wrote,

> Most demographers work on large data sets, often with little contact with the people whom the statistics describe. Fortunately, in early 1962 it became clear that the 1960 Ghana Census was not going to yield material quickly enough to absorb my time. We thereupon used our limited funds for cheap and relatively small scale investigations which meant borrowing methodology from the

[29] In the 1970s and 1980s, other disciplines such as education began combining ethnographic and survey methods in one single study design (Louis 1982; Miles and Humberman 1984; Smith and Robbins 1982).

> anthropologists (and reading them) and becoming intimately acquainted with village and family in turn. For a demographer with traditional training, the experience was illuminating – so illuminating that we have attempted to use similar methods ever since.

Because of his "illuminating experiences," Caldwell began actively promoting culture and truncated qualitative studies in demographic theory. Caldwell argued for a Wealth Flows Theory (Caldwell 1982), which was based on his analysis of data using the microdemographic methodology.

Since Caldwell's Wealth Flows Theory, demographers have primarily focused mixed-methodology upon fertility (Coale and Watkins 1986; Knodel, Chamratrithiron, and Debavalya 1987). Recently, various anthropologists (Fricke 2005; Scheper-Hughes 1997) and demographers (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Fricke and Teachman 1993; Kertzer and Friske 1997; Riley 1997) have suggested new and various methodological combinations such as focus groups (Morgan 1996), critical interpretive anthropology (Scheper-Hughes 1993, 1997), ethnosurvey (Massey 1987a), combining ethnography and GIS technology to study poverty and disability (Skinner, Matthews, and Burton 2005), and the neighborhood history calendar (Axinn, Barber, and Ghimire 1997).

3.2. Why Use Mixed-Methods?

Many (Denzin and Lincoln 2005) argue that mixed-methodology is epistemologically opposed. There are at least two groups in this debate: the purists and the pragmatists. The purists argue that the two methodologies are incompatible because of different assumptions about the manner in which to conduct research (Guba 1978).

Firestone (1987: 16) writes for purists that "there is a logical relationship between the principles inherent in the paradigm and the methods chosen; methods are derived from first principles." Firestone (1987) stresses four assumptions that are debated among purists and pragmatists: 1). Assumptions about the world; 2). Purpose; 3). Approach; and 4). Researcher's role.

1). Assumptions about the world. Qualitative researchers stress the social construction of reality or the multiple "truths" of a context (Smith and Heshusius 1986). Reality is a social construction rooted in the individual and/or a collective definition of the social situation (Taylor and Bogdan 1984). Purists argue that reality can never be captured, only approximated (Firestone 1987; Guba 1990: 22; Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 21). Qualitative studies capture and represent in depth context(s) which are deemed socially significant. In the purists' views, quantitative researchers argue that there is only one truth that is based on positivist philosophy (Firestone 1987). Qualitative research is seen as "value-laden" and subjective while quantitative researcher is seen as "value-free" and objective (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 10; Firestone 1987; Powdermaker 1966).[30]

2). Purpose. Qualitative studies tend to be more concerned about understanding the social context. Qualitative researchers will try to understand the social actors in their contexts. They will provide rich descriptions of the social world which is not found in quantitative studies. For example, in Gamson's (1998) book, *Freaks Talk Back*, he participated as a member of the audience at talk shows, interviewed people who participated in the shows, interviewed people who worked at the shows, and analyzed

[30] Critiques of quantitative research being "value-free" may be found in Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi (2001); Gusfield (1976); House (1979); Zuberi (2001).

multiple shows using content analysis to come to an understanding about what talk shows meant to the participants, the audience, and to those who produced the shows.

Quantitative studies are less concerned with rich descriptions because of the nature of their methods and being able to generalize to a larger population (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 12; Firestone 1987). Quantitative analysis is typically based on large data sets to explain the determinants of social facts through objective measuring and the quantification of variables (Greenhalgh 1997). Within demographic analysis (Coale and Watkins 1986; Forbes and Frisbie 1991; Hammel 1990; Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Watkins 1986, 1987, 1990), culture becomes a leftover variable. That is, outcomes that were not expected occurred and some researchers suggest that culture was the influence to these outcomes.[31] This produces a causal effect rather than an understanding (vertschen) of the social actors.

3). Approach. Quantitative researchers typically use methods such as logistic regression, path analysis or log-linear analyses that are seen as objective or "true" (Cronbach 1975; Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 11). Qualitative researchers will use ethnographic or participation observations to study a social context. These methods vary in basic assumptions of "truth." Qualitative researchers reflect upon multiple "truths," arguing that there is not just one "truth" (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).

4). Researcher's role. Qualitative researchers usually account for the position of the researcher by clarifying their social class, gender, race, and sexual identity. Social status

[31] For instance, Forbes and Frisbie (1991) in one the first studies of Hispanic and Anglo infant mortality conclude that cultural aspects play a factor in the decreased level of Latino infant mortality. However, they do not underscore what they mean by culture or what aspects of Hispanic culture have an influence on decreasing infant mortality.

makes a difference in how people respond to the interview. While Johnson-Bailey (1999) found in her interviews of returning older African American women to higher education that Black female respondents understood each other on race and gender issues, schisms of social class and color impeded the process of understanding these Black women. Quantitative researchers rarely account for their positionality (with an exception of Riley 1997). Quantitative researchers are more likely to describe that they have no position.

Mixed-methods for purists remove qualitative methods from their natural home within a critical, interpretive framework (Howe 2004; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003). Moreover, they allow the inquiry to be dichotomous: exploration (qualitative methods) versus confirmation (quantitative methods) (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003).

Pragmatists, however, make a distinction between methods and methodology. To purists, methodology should always be derived from theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), but for pragmatists methods are a collection of techniques to justify the outcome. Pragmatists argue that there is a false dichotomy that exists between quantitative and qualitative approaches (Onwuegbuzie 2002). They assert that qualitative and quantitative methods can be combined to answer most research question (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Onwuegbuzie 2002; Massey 1987a, 1987b 1994; Reichardt and Cook 1979).

Many researchers have overlooked the epistemological differences and combined qualitative and quantitative methods, suggesting that by combining methods there will be more strengths than weaknesses for the research (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Creswell 1995; Creswell et al. 2003; Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989; Massey 1987a, 1987b,

1994; Onwuegbuzie 2002; Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie 1998, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). For instance, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007: 5) define mixed methods research as

> a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in the research process. As a method; it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone.

While Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) do not separate the philosophical assumptions and the methods, they do point to combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches to better understand research problems.

Moreover, Sieber (1973) outlines numerous reasons that quantitative and qualitative research can be used together. First, at the research design stage, quantitative data can assist the qualitative phrase by identifying representative sample members. At the data collection stage, quantitative data can provide baseline information and help to avoid interviewing only high-status individuals. During the data analysis stage, quantitative data can facilitate the assessment of the generalizablity of qualitative data and shed new light on qualitative findings. Furthermore, qualitative analysis can assist the quantitative component of study with conceptual and instrument development.

Qualitative data can help with interpreting, clarifying, describing, and validating quantitative results (Massey 1987a, 1987b, 1994; Onwuegbuzie 2002).

Morse (1991) suggests two types of mixed-methods: simultaneous or sequential. The first is simultaneous use of qualitative and quantitative methods with little interaction between the two sources of data during the data collection stage, but the findings complement one another at the data interpretation stage. The sequential method is used to plan the next step in the research project (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Onwuegbuzie 2002). Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) note three ways in which mixed-methods can occur: merging or converging the two datasets; connecting the two datasets by having one build on the other; or embedding one dataset within the other so that one dataset supports the role of the other dataset. In my dissertation I used mixed-methods because neither quantitative nor qualitative methods alone could answer my research questions. Furthermore, my method was sequential. I first analyzed the Census data and then did interviews when new research questions came about.

3.3. What Are My Data?

I have used mixed-methods of interviews, surveys, and secondary data. I first examined the 2000 U.S. Census data. Using a sequential method and after examining the census data, I interviewed thirty self-identified gay men and lesbians. From the interviews, I constructed a preliminary Internet survey. My first data source are secondary data from the 2000 Census data. I used them to I propose five different indices to measure and index gay male and lesbian concentration.

3.3.1. Census Data

Until the conduct of the 1990 U.S. census, it was not possible to examine a national representation of same-sex couples. In the 1990 and 2000 censuses an "unmarried partner" response was added to the other responses (husband, wife, son, grandfather, etc.) to the census question pertaining to the standard "relationship to the householder," i.e., the person in the household designated as person #1. Person #1 is typically "the member of the household in whose name the home is owned, being bought or rented" (Barrett 1994: 16). Every person in the household, except for person #1, thus responds to a question about his/her relationship to person #1. The "unmarried partner" response enables the identification of persons in the household who are unrelated to person #1, but who have a "marriage-like" relationship with person #1. Census procedures allow respondents to check the "unmarried partner" response irrespective of whether the person's sex is the same as that of person #1.

One of the data tables available on Summary File 2 of the 2000 census, Table PCT 22, gives the number of households in which person #1 is a male, and another male in the household identifies himself as the unmarried partner of person #1; these are known as male-male households. A similar tabulation is provided for households in which person #1 is a female and in which another female identifies herself as the unmarried partner of person #1; these are known as female-female households. Because the "unmarried partner" response is meant to reflect a "marriage-like" relationship between the two persons, researchers make the assumption that these data on same-sex households (male-male or female-female) represent households inhabited by partnered

gays, or by partnered lesbians (Black et al. 2000; 2002; Gates and Ost 2004; Simmons and O'Connell 2003; Walther and Poston 2004).

There are at least two issues to be addressed in an appraisal of the same-sex partnering census data. The first asks about the accuracy of the 2000 census data in portraying the true numbers of partnered gay men and lesbians? Specifically, how well have the 2000 census data on same-sex partners enumerated the actual numbers of partnered gays and lesbians living in the U.S. in 2000? A second issue concerns the extent to which there is error in the same-sex partnering census data, perhaps due to sex miscoding.

3.3.1.1. How Well Have the 2000 Census Data on Same-Sex Partners Enumerated the Actual Numbers of Partnered Gay Men and Lesbians Living in the U.S. in 2000?

Census 2000 counted 1,188,782 same sex unmarried persons living in the U.S. in 2000. Of these, 605,052 are same-sex male unmarried partners, and 586,730 are same-sex female unmarried partners. To begin to evaluate the validity of these data, one would need to first know the true number of gay men and lesbians (of age 18 and over) living in the United States in 2000. There is no such number available, but it may be estimated with data from national surveys.

The U.S. population of males and females aged 18 and over, counted in the 2000 census, is comprised of 100,994,367 males, and 108,133,727 females. How many of these males are gay men, and how many of these females are lesbians?

One of the statistically best and nationally representative surveys of sexuality in the U.S. is the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) conducted in 1992 by Laumann and his associates (Laumann et al. 1994). The male and female respondents (of age 18 and over) in the NHSLS were asked a number of questions about same-sex behavior and identification (Laumann et al. 1994: 292-297). One can determine the percentages of gay men and lesbians in the NHSLS by tabulating the responses to both types of questions.

Regarding self-identification, one can use weighted data from the NHSLS and ascertain that 2.6 percent of the males and 1.1 percent of the females "report identifying with a label denoting same-gender sexuality" (Laumann et al. 1994: 297). Regarding behavior, the NHSLS weighted data indicate that 2.1 percent of the males and 0.9 percent of the females report having exclusively same-sex sex partners in the past twelve months. One can combine the two answers and develop an estimate of the percentages of gays and lesbians in the U.S. who self-identified as homosexual and/or engaged in exclusively homosexual behavior in the past year. The data show that 2.99 percent of the males may be classified as gay, and 1.48 percent of the females may be classified as lesbian. I note that these percentages of lesbians and gays based on weighted data from the NHSLS are lower than similar estimates of The Urban Institute that five percent of the U.S. population of age 18 and over is gay and lesbian (Gates 2001: 2).

Earlier I reported counts from the 2000 census of persons age 18 and over living in the U.S. Using the gay and lesbian percentages from the NHSLS discussed above, one can estimate that the gay population in the U.S. aged 18 and over in 2000 numbered

3,019,732 (that is, 100,994,367 x's 2.99%); and the lesbian population numbered 1,600,379 (that is, 108,133,727 x's 1.48%). Now one needs to determine how many of these gay men and lesbians are living in marriage-type relationships in the same households.

In *The Gay and Lesbian Atlas*, Gates and Ost (2004) review several studies to arrive at estimates suggesting "that 23.5 percent of gay men and 42.7 percent of lesbians are coupled" (2004: 13). Using these figures, one can estimate that in the U.S. in 2000, there were 709,637 gay men in committed relationships living in the same households (that is, 3,019,732 x's 23.5%). As noted above, Census 2000 enumerated 602,052 same-sex male partners in the U.S. This suggests that Census 2000 undercounted 107,585 committed gay men living in the U.S., for an undercount of 17.9 percent (Poston 2007).

With respect to committed lesbians, one can estimate that in the U.S. in 2000 there were 683,362 committed lesbians living in the same households in the U.S. (or 1,600,379 x's 42.7%). Census 2000 counted 586,730 same-sex female partners in the U.S., indicating an undercount of committed lesbians of 96,632, or 16.7 percent.[32]

Of course, there are many problems with these estimates. For one thing, the census questionnaire does not ask about the actual sexual orientation of the respondents. One is assuming that the census numbers of same-sex male and female partners reflect the actual numbers of committed gays and lesbians in the population. One is also assuming that the NHSLS-based estimates of the prevalence of gays and lesbians in the

[32] Badgett and Rogers (2003) used a survey of activists who attended the Washington Millennium March and a second source of an Internet survey conducted by Harris Interactive/Witeck-Coombs. They find an undercount between 16% and 28%.

NHSLS sample are true. Indeed it is not unlikely that the gays and lesbians were undercounted in the NHSLS (Gates 2001; Gates and Ost 2004).

The second issue to be addressed deals with the degree to which there could be error in the same-sex partnering data, perhaps due to sex miscoding errors. In the 1990 census, if a same-sex couple (a householder and an unmarried partner) checked themselves as being married, post-collection census editing treated this as an inconsistency, and "usually changed the sex as a consistency edit. This means that in data for 1990 released by the Bureau the couple was coded as a heterosexual married couple" (Gates and Ost 2004: 12). The Bureau changed this post-collection editing decision in the 2000 Census to treat it "as an inconsistency in the relationship to householder rather than in the spouse's sex. That is, the 'husband-wife' relationship designation was changed as a consistency edit to an 'unmarried partner' relationship. Since the sex variables were not changed as they were in 1990, the couple was counted as a same-sex unmarried partner couple" (Gates and Ost 2004: 12; U.S. Census Bureau 2002).

It is known that a very small fraction of census respondents makes an error on the "sex" question and enters the incorrect sex. It is estimated that the degree of sex miscoding error among heterosexual couples in the 2000 census is no greater than 0.2 percent. Recall that if this occurred in the 1990 census and one person in a married couple checked the wrong sex, the sex would be changed in the editing process and the couple counted as a married (heterosexual) couple. But in the 2000 census, the marital status code was changed and the couple was counted as an unmarried same-sex couple.

Census Bureau analysts, however, have determined that this sex miscoding measurement error is very small (as just noted) and "does not have any significant effect on geographical distribution patterns" (Gates and Ost 2004: 14).[33]

3.3.1.2. Problems with the Census Data

Currently, the data from the census about the unmarried partner category may contain numerous problems. First, some scholars have suggested, given a variety of definitions for cohabitation on several large scale surveys, that various respondents may have misunderstood the term "unmarried partner," inappropriately marking that category. For instance, the Current Population Survey defines cohabitation as being a household member. The National Survey of Family Growth – Cycle 1 defines cohabitation as "lover/partner," while the National Survey of Family Growth – Cycle 5 defines cohabitation as a "male partner" on the household roster and those "who live and sleep here most of the time" (Knab 2005: 6). Manning and Smock (2003) found using qualitative interviews that young couples "slide" into living together. In other words they did not discuss sharing the same household. For instance, during the college years, many couples begin dating while living in different apartments. Over time, however, they begin spending more time at one apartment and in a sense begin living together. However, the couples lacked common language such as partner or unmarried partner to identify their relationship and did not identify their relationship as "cohabiting."

Secondly, as Chevan (1996) has noted, a stigma may be associated with marking "unmarried partner" on the census form, which might discourage individuals from

[33] I have compared 1990 and 2000 Census data of indices of metropolitan statistical areas. The 1990 and 2000 Census data of indices are highly correlated.

marking that category. Chevan (1996) found that elderly heterosexual couples were less likely to mark unmarried partner due to increased pressure from adult children frequently worried about potential disputes over inheritance. Moreover, given the stigma associated with same-sex relationships (Goffman 1963), gay men and lesbians may be even less likely to mark their relationship on the census form.

Thirdly, it cannot be assumed that same-gender unmarried partners necessarily self-identify as gay men and lesbians. Phua and Kaufman (1999: 376-377) argue that same-gender unmarried partners may not necessarily self-identify as gay or lesbian. While Black and colleagues (2000) acknowledge that self-identification is an important aspect for gays and lesbians, they argue for census validity. They compare the number of self-reported gays and lesbians recorded in the General Social Survey and in the National Health SLS samples with 1990 U.S. Census data, they found that "about 35% of men living as partnered same-sex couples are recorded in the Census; for women the corresponding fraction is 29%," which is lower than the GSS or NHSLS estimated rates (Black et al. 2000: 18). Given concerns about self-identification, those who did mark "unmarried partner" or even "husband/wife" are likely to be more "out"[34] than those who did not (Black et al 2000: 8; Smith and Gates 2001). Therefore, the number of gay and lesbian unmarried partners may well be an underestimate of the total population of gays and lesbians.

In addition, another problem arises with regard to the editing practices of the Census Bureau. Following the stipulations of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, the

[34] To state openly and publicly that one is homosexual.

U.S. Congress defines marriage as a relationship involving opposite sex people. If a person marks his/her relationship to the householder, who also is of the same gender, as husband/wife, the Census Bureau is required to edit this respondent into the unmarried partner category. Fields and Clark (1999) examined the editing process of the Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal conducted in April, 1998 in Sacramento, California and in South Carolina. They found that same-sex couples who marked spouse were older, had children, owned property, and were less likely to have moved in the last five years. They wrote: "[I]t is clear from the examination of these unedited data that households which are identified as 'married couple' same gender households are a distinct group from households which are identified as unmarried partner same gender households" (1999: 10). Given these numerous problems, I now turn to the interviews I conducted.

3.3.2. Interviews

I first became interested in the Census Schedule after attending a party. At the party, a woman began a discussion about receiving an email from the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) about how to properly fill out the Census Schedule. Following this discussion, many women began discussing how to fill out the Census Schedule and "how to make their families count." One couple lived apart while one attended graduate school and another worked at an engineering firm. From these discussions, I began to investigate Census data and how they could be used.

McCorkel and Myers (2003: 200) show that "data" and analysis that researchers produce are "shaped by our relationship with the subjects of our research" and by the positions we occupy relative to them and within wider society. I am an out White lesbian

parent who has lived in this community for over five years. I participate in LGBT communities in which some of the interviews were conducted not only as a member of different communities, but also as a member of the university. Furthermore, I attend gay and lesbian events in the community. I petitioned some of the self-identified gay men and lesbians from the church that I participate in. Some of the interviewees are considered close personal friends who have visited my home, had dinner with me, and helped me with family medical issues. Finally, the community in which I conducted some of these interviews has extensive gay and lesbian networks. Many of the respondents to this study have sold houses to each other, watched their children together, and send their children to the same schools.

Using snowballing sampling techniques, I interviewed thirty self-identified gay and lesbians, some as couples, some as individuals. I gave each respondent a modified 2000 Census Schedule form, and I asked the respondents to answer questions from the census, such as the category of relationship to "Person 1" or head of the household. I followed with questions about their selection and did they find the question confusing.

Semi-structured interviews allow for certain major questions to generally be asked in the same manner for each interview (Fontana and Frey, 2005). At each interview I had a general questionnaire to which I would refer (Mishler 1986). While the order of the questions may be different for each respondent, all major questions were asked of each interviewee. I used active listening, probing the respondents if they were not forthcoming with information, or if I did not understand what they were discussing (Converse and Schuman 1974). I had numerous interactions throughout the interview

regarding to the topics discussed or about what the respondent stated. For example one respondent in a couple spent approximately thirty minutes discussing her previous work situation and the discrimination that she had felt at the workplace. If the respondents had a child, we would often deviate from the interview questions to discuss day care and/or schools. I was able to adapt the semi-structured interviews to the level of comprehension and the specific context of each interview situation.

The interviews became "a methodology of friendship" (Kong et al 2002). I tried to establish rapport and trust with my interviewees (Cicourel 1974). Douglas (1985) advocated revealing personal feelings and private situations to the interviewee as a quid pro quo of good faith. For instance, with many of the respondents I would discuss my own same-sex relationship and how we picked a day care for our children and if we had had any problems with the day care. I also discussed how the interview could be stopped at any time if they felt uncomfortable.

The interviews lasted from one hour to two and half hours. The interviews were transcribed after the interview. The respondents picked the locations of the interviews. Four interviews occurred in their homes. Eleven interviews occurred in their workplace or in my office. Four interviews occurred over email. I sent the interview questions to one person, and the respondent mailed back the interviews in which they had written their responses. The rest of the interviews occurred in various restaurants or coffee shops. Three times people declined to be interview. One potential interviewee refused because I would not pay for an interview. One woman refused because she had previously been interviewed by a colleague for a different study and did not feel

comfortable being interviewed again. And the last potential interviewee continually missed meetings stating that she had to much work to do.

In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of and effectively analyze the interviews, I first began by transcribing all my interviews and read the text of the interviews. As I reread the text from the interviews, I employed the constant comparative method to discern central and recurring themes (Glaser and Strauss 1967). While Glaser and Strauss' (1967) work is generally used for grounded theory, the constant comparative method is "compatible with the inductive, concept-building orientation of all qualitative research" (Merriam 1998: 159). With adhesive "post-its," I "unitized" (Lincoln and Guba 1985) the data by identifying with adhesive "post-its" points in the text that related specifically to my research questions, e.g. how do individual gay and lesbian couples respond to the census categories and how do they socially construct their relationships? Although Lincoln and Guba (1985: 345) define a "unit" as the "smallest piece of information about something that can stand by itself," constituted as a sentence or as much as a paragraph, narrative dialogue may require multiple paragraphs to convey a particular idea, and so I unitized the data onto index cards.

For clarity of organization, I labeled each card first with the interviewee's name and date of interview in the bottom left hand corner. In the bottom right hand corner, I numbered the data index cards as well. Next, I employed what Creswell (1998) describes as "axial coding." I placed these data cards into piles that could then be more easily manipulated. After placing each data card into a pile I then labeled key concepts or ideas

illustrated in the text and I reflected on the particular units. Depending on the text, I might reflect on themes and place ideas about themes on the top right hand corner of the card. Finally, I grouped these ideas about themes together to discern and form broadly encompassing categories and metacategories. These encompassing categories and metacategories lead to the themes I discuss in Chapter V.

3.3.2.1. Description of Sample

According to 2000 Census data, 5.5 million couples were unmarried couples which was an increase from 3.2 million in 1990 (Simmons and O'Connell 2003: 1). The majority of unmarried partners are different sex couples (4.9 million) and about 1 in 9 (594,000) are same-sex partners. Of the same-sex partners, 301,000 had male partners and 293,000 had female partners (Simmons and O'Connell 2003: 1). Of coupled households, unmarried couples make up about 9 percent of the total households. Of the 9 percent, only between one and two percent of the unmarried households are same-sex households (Simmons and O'Connell 2003: 3).

In 2000, same-sex unmarried couples are mainly from urban locales. Eighty-four percent of female same-sex households and eighty-six percent of male same-sex households lived in an urban location (Simmons and O'Connell 2003: 3). Same-sex households are more likely to be located in the West (Gates and Ost 2004; Simmons and O'Connell 2003; Smith and Gates 2001; Walther and Poston 2004). California has the largest number of unmarried-partner households with 684,000 same-sex couples or 12 percent of the 5.5 million total (Simmons and O'Connell 2003:7). However, this account does not distinguish between different (opposite) male and female same-sex couples.

The Great Plain states and west Texas and northwards have below-average proportions of unmarried partner households (Gates and Ost 2004; Simmons and O'Connell 2003; Walther and Poston 2004).

My interviewees are highly skewed in gender, income, education, and race (Table 3.1). There are seven male respondents (23% of the total sample) and twenty-three female respondents (77% of the total sample). The average age is 39 years. The average income is almost $75,000, with a maximum of $400,000 and a minimum of $20,000. My sample has a median income of $60,000. The average income of gay male respondents is $74,285 with a maximum of $100,000 and a minimum of $35,000. The gay male respondents have a median income of $81,250. The average income of the lesbian interviewees is a little over $74,000 with a maximum of $400,000 and a minimum of $20,000. The lesbian respondents have a median income of $42,000. Dang and Frazer (2004: 16) find the median income for White female same-sex couples to be $60,000 and $69,000 for White male same-sex couples, with Black and Latinos/as households having significantly less median income (Cianciotto 2005; Dang and Frazer 2004). My male respondents have a slightly higher median income, while the female respondents have a lower median income than the male respondents. Seventy percent of the respondents self-identify their race or ethnicity as White. The interviewees are highly educated with all respondents having at least some college (one respondent has an associate degree), and 23% of the interviewees have a PhD or professional degree.

According to the 2000 Census, sixty-seven percent of White same-sex partners have some education beyond high school (Dang and Frazer 2004: 28). Twenty-three percent of the respondents have previously been married, and three respondents had three children as a result of their marriage.

Gay/lesbian couples with children comprise almost 30% of same-sex households according to the 2000 Census (Bennett and Gates 2004). One in three female same-sex couples and one in five male same-sex couples have children under the age of 18 in residence (34.3 percent of female partners and 22.3 percent of male partners are raising children) (Bennett and Gates 2004). While all families (heterosexual or homosexual) on average make less money then families without children, gay and lesbian families with children tend to be in a higher income bracket. However, due to issues of federal and state benefits, same-sex couples decrease their income and class standing (Bennett and Gates 2004).

Table 3.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Name	Age	Education	Household Income	Race/ Ethnicity	Heterosexual Marriage	Children's Ages	Occupations
Tristan	43	Bachelor	62500	White	no		Librarian
Matthew	42	Bachelor	62500	White	no		Computer specialist
Madeline	52	Bachelor	90000	Texan	no	12	Computer tech
Heather	45	Master	120000	White	no	8, 6, 3	Nurse/professor
Leigh	40	Bachelor	75000	White	no	8	Hospital account manager
Ryan	44	Bachelor	44000	Hispanic	no		System analyst
Natalie	39	MD	400000	White	yes	6, 14 months	Doctor
Jenny	42	Bachelor	47000	White	no		Vet tech
Ava	37	PhD	47000	White	no		Professor
Candace	35	Masters	40000	Caucasian	no		Pastor
Brianna	34	Bachelor	Middle class	Caucasian	yes		Administrator
Jasmine	53	Masters	Middle/ upper class	Caucasian	yes	adult	Psychologists
Chloe	35	Masters	40000	Caucasian	yes		Graduate student
Aimee	40	PhD	Upper class	Caucasian	no		Psychologist
Larry	36	Masters	100000	White	no	trying to adopt	Administrator
David	31	Bachelors	100000	Hispanic	no	trying to adopt	Computer engineer
Abigail	28	Masters	21600	Black	no		Student
Barbara	41	Masters	95000	African-American	no	15	Administrator

Table 3.1. (cont.)

Name	Age	Education	Household Income	Race/ Ethnicity	Heterosexual Marriage	Children's Ages	Occupations
Christina	38	Masters	95000	Chicana	yes	15	Lecturer/editor
Sam	57	Associates	25000	German	no		Disability
Toby	34	Masters	35000	Asian	no		Professor
Randi	29	Bachelor	20000	Chinese American	no		Graduate Student
Becky	29	PhD	40000	White	yes		Researcher
Emma	45	Bachelor	30000	White	no		Production
Jessica	30	Bachelor	30000	Asian and Hispanic	no		General manager
Michelle	24	Bachelor	declined	Caucasian	no		System analysts
Lori	27	Bachelor	declined	Caucasian	no		Librarian Archivist
Xavier	41	PhD	60000	Hispanic	yes		Professor

The respondents with a child are eight lesbians and two gay men who are trying to adopt or have a child by surrogacy. Generally, speaking, parents are older, have higher incomes, and slightly more education than the non-parent respondents. The average age is 43 years of age. The average income is a little over $125,000 with a maximum of $400,000 and a minimum of $40,000. Of the respondents who have children, they have a median income of $97,500. The interviewees are highly educated with all respondents having at least a Bachelors degree and 30% of the interviewees have a PhD or professional degree.

3.3.2.2. Problems with the Interview Data

This sample is very limited and has three major problems: (1) the lack of diversity within the sample and the number of interviews; (2) the issue of the social position/status of the research and the respondents; and (3) all respondents must self-identify as gay or lesbian. First, a snowball technique was used by me; I am a White lesbian parent. The sample is skewed towards respondents who are middle class, who are highly educated, and who are predominately White. I sent emails, flyers, and letters to friends, to various “open and affirming” churches within the Metropolitan Community Church, United Church of Christ and Unitarian Universalist, to professional and student gay oriented organizations, to softball and rugby teams, and to GLBT parent organizations. I visited large metropolitan churches, participated in a softball team, and joined a parent organization. Many gay men and lesbians were asked to participate in the research and declined with two reasons cited most often, namely, not enough time or subjects were not being paid for an interview.

Secondly, social position and status of the researcher and the respondents was a problem with some of the interviews (Denzin and Lincoln 2005; Seidman 1991). McCorkel and Myers (2003) show that "data" and analysis that researchers produce are "shaped by our relationship with the subjects of our research" and, by the positions, we occupy relative to them and within wider society. I participate in the community in which some of the interviews were conducted (Crapanzano 1980). For example, I petitioned some of the self-identified gay men and lesbians from the church that I participate in. Some of the interviewees are considered close personal friends who I have visited their homes, had dinner with me, and helped me with family medical issues.

The interviews were not gender matched (Gluck and Patai 1991). Denzin (1989: 116) writes, "gender filters knowledge" and influences the interviewer and the interviewee. The respondents may embellish a response, give what is described as a "socially desirable" response, or omit certain relevant information (Bradburn 1983: 291). The respondent may also err due to faulty memory (Schwarz 1999). Two male couples openly discussed how they would offer more information to a gay man than they were offering to a lesbian. One man throughout the interview would make a statement and then state, "but you are not a gay man so you may not understand."

According to my selection scheme, all respondents must self-identify as gay men or lesbians. Because the interviewees have to self-identify as gay men or lesbian, this suggests a more essentialist perspective than a social construction perspective of sexualities. However, as many scholars (Humphreys 1970; Foucault 1990; Katz 1996;

2001; Laumann et al 1994) suggest, many people will have homosexual behavior but not self-identify as homosexual.

3.3.3. Internet Surveys

The third source of data was an Internet survey which was a shortened version of the interview schedule. This survey was emailed to self-identified gay men and lesbians or their allies, gay and lesbian groups, and churches nationally.

The Internet is being used more and more to collect survey data (Singapore, Teo, Lim, and Lai 1997) and to do ethnographies (Gatson and Zweerink 2004; Hine 2000). The Web has been used to collect medical records (Subramanian, McAfee, and Getzinger 1997), study drug dealers (Coomber 1997a, 1997b), and conduct laboratory experiments in behavioral and social sciences and psychology (Piper 1998; Smith and Leigh 1997). It is unclear under what conditions Internet surveys can be effective and whether an Internet survey can influence the data's validity or reliability. With postal responses significantly decreasing (Fowler 1993; Fox, Crask, and Kim 1988; Oppenheim 1992) Internet surveys may be the wave of the future. Numerous researchers (Roselle and Neufeld 1998; Shaw and Davis 1996) have used postal mail and email and found that email can be just as effective as postal mail.

I created a survey containing 61 questions. These questions were drawn from the interview questions. The survey was in the field for one month. I created a database which contained individual emails and mailing lists such as Gay and Lesbian Parent groups and Open and Affirming Churches. Once an individual or group received the email, then the person could go to the survey. The survey was located on a public Web

page with a database stored behind it. This survey did not require any email usernames and did not store the sender's address so to maintain anonymity. Furthermore, the survey does not ask for their location of the respondents (Coomber 1997b). If a respondent responded to the survey from a public host computer such as universities, cyber-café, and public libraries, it would be virtually impossible for me to trace their responses. Researchers (Coomber 1997b) suggest that using Internet surveys to contact minority (risk) populations may allow for those who would not be interviewed,[35] to fill out an Internet survey with relative anonymity.

3.3.3.1. Sample Description

Some of the demographic characteristics of the respondents from the Internet survey were similar to the Census data, such as age and income [N=54]. The average age is almost 35 years of age. The categories of income are the following: 30.5% of the respondents have a household income of $20,000 or less; 36.4% of the respondents have a household income between $30,000 and $60,000; 34.6% of the respondents make $70,000 or more in household income. Of the male respondents, 33.3% of the male respondents had a household income of $20,000 or less, 44.4% of the male respondents had a household income between $30,000 and $60,000, and 22.3% of the male respondents have a household income of greater than $70,000. Of the female respondents, 21.4% of the female respondents had a household income of $20,000 or less, 32.1% of the female respondents had a household income between $30,000 and

[35] Many potential respondents did not return requests, emails, or phone calls.

$60,000, and 46.5% of the female respondents have a household income of greater than $70,000 which is much higher than the male respondents. Sixteen percent of respondents marked 'unmarried partner' on the Internet survey.

The respondents to the Internet surveys are highly skewed in gender, education, and race. There are seventeen male respondents (31.5 % of the total sample) and thirty-two female respondents (59.3% of the total sample). According to the 2000 Census, of the same-sex partners, 301,000 had male partners and 293,000 had female partners (Simmons and O'Connell 2003: 1). Almost eighty percent of the respondents self-identify their race or ethnicity as White, 3.7% of the respondents self-identify as African American; 7.4% of the respondents self-identify as Asian, and 5.8% self-identify as biracial. Dang and Frazer (2004) report that of the same-sex unmarried population, twelve percent self-identify as African American, while Cianciotto (2005) notes that fourteen percent of the same-sex unmarried population self-identified as Latinos/as. The respondents of the Internet survey are highly educated with all respondents having at least some college (one respondent has an associate degree) and 57.4% of the interviewees have a PhD or professional degree. According to the 2000 Census, sixty-seven percent of White same-sex partners have some education beyond high school (Dang and Frazer 2004: 28). Twenty-three percent of the respondents have previously been married and three respondents had three children as a result of their marriage. Only 9.3% of the respondents reported having a child; this is much lower than the Census data report. Three of the female respondents had a child and two of the male respondents had

a child. The sample of the Internet survey is not a representative sample of gay men and lesbians.

3.3.3.2. Problems with the Internet Survey

Internet surveys have various problems. First, surveys on the internet may produce a biased sample and biased returns. Respondents are those who are most likely to have access and feel comfortable using internet technology (Berge and Collins 1996; Kiesler and Sproull 1986; Parker 1992; Sproull 1986). Therefore, Internet-based samples may not be generalizable to the entire population. Studies of Internet demographics suggest that certain social groups are underrepresented in the usage of the Internet and Internet surveys. For example, women, people of low social class, racial and ethnic minorities, people with lower education and older age groups are less likely to use the Internet or have problems using email (CommerceNet and Nielsen 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; GVU 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b; Marszalek and Goree 1995; Zhang 1999). In an email about my survey, Ruth (over 60 years old, Christian pastor) wrote,

> Well, I logged on but apparently didn't bother to sign the consent form and now I can do nothing. So do whatever you have to do to let me participate. DANG! Take me out completely, and I'll start all over again.

Zhang (1999) found that respondents who used the Internet to respond to a survey felt a higher overall ability to use the Internet than those who used postal mail to respond to a survey.

Technologically, not everyone in the sample may have all the specific software applications needed to complete a survey (Zhang 1999). For instance, if the survey has special plug-ins, or uses Adobe, a respondent may not have access to those softwares.

Moreover, respondents may self-select in filling out an Internet survey (Dolenko 1998; Marszalek and Goree 1995). Most Internet surveys are sent to mailing lists, newsgroups, or public Web sites. In my survey, the sample is not generalizable to the general population. I used a snowballing technique requesting respondents from various gay and lesbian organizations or their allies, "Open and Affirming" UCC churches, Unitarian Universalistic churches, and individuals.

When survey research is conducted as an impersonalized communication, the response rate is typically low (Berge and Collins 1996; Ciolek 1998; Kovacs et al., 1995; Spink et al 1998). Because of a lack of personal communication with the researcher, many respondents tend to "drop out" before they actually complete the surveys (Dolenko 1998). Among a few of the organizations, administrators acted as gatekeepers. For example, one parent group never sent my request for respondents to the general membership (I am a member of the group and am currently on the listserve). Secondly, one organization refused to send the survey request to the general membership because they felt it did not keep with the general mission of their organization. They wrote in an email to me,

> Carol,
>
> [Organizations'] leadership is centered in a Steering Committee that works by consensus. I forwarded your request to them and the questions below have

> emerged. Please send your answer to [email address]. That way the entire committee will get it and we won't have to waste time sending it around as we did to get here.
>
> [Person], who is a Professor of Sociology, and I both feel we would like to know a number of things before we would approve this. What does this study have to do with old Lesbians? Does this benefit Old Lesbians in any way? We would like to have a more in depth description of what this study is about. Are non-Lesbians also being interviewed and are younger Lesbians or non-Lesbians being interviewed?

Furthermore, many respondents emailed me saying that the request for participation was found in their 'junk mail.' For instance, Joyce wrote, "Carol, this went into my bulk email so didn't see it until now. Good luck!!!" If the respondents did not receive the request in their inbox it would be very unlikely that they would respond to the survey.[36]

Fifthly, Internet surveys may reach unintended individuals. Individuals can forward the request to others and other unintended groups (Goree and Marszalek 1995). Also public surveys can be reached by anyone who has a Web browser with an Internet connection. There has been no effective way to screen unintended participants. In my survey, unintended people may have responded to the survey. Although I wrote on the

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[36] In group studies, the target population and its number of participants are usually unknown (Berge and Collins 1996; Cronin et al. 1994). What is at issue is if the non-group participants are statistically different from the participating group. Anderson and Gransneder (1995: 41) found that "respondents were more likely to use the system more often and for more time than were non-respondents." There has been little conclusive research suggesting whether the respondent and non-respondent groups are statistically different.

survey that the survey was intended for gay men, lesbian, and bisexual women and men, there is not a specific question asking individuals their sexual identity. This can lead to self-identified heterosexual people filling in the survey. Noah (self-identified heterosexual man) commented that he was half way through the survey before he realized it was for gay men, lesbian, and bisexual women and men. Robert wrote in an email, "Is this for me to forward or do you want some of us 'breeders' to fill it out as well?" ("Breeders" usually refers to heterosexual individuals.)

Finally, the Internet survey did not skip questions as it should have and has ambiguous and awkward wording which will decrease the validity and reliability of the survey. For instance, if a respondent answered question 12 as having no children, then the survey was to skip to question 13. However, when it was in the field, I did not skip. Furthermore, one respondent wrote, "yes your wording in this survey is terrible on some questions." Another respondent stated, "What relationship question? This survey is very unclear." For all of these problems, I will be reworking the survey and trying to correct the majority of these problems.

In the next chapter, I examine the 2000 census data. I first present five indices to measure the level of same-sex couples. I argue that the first index is the best measure. Using the first index, I examine the differences in states, metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and certain selected tracts. I conclude the chapter with a regression analysis.

CHAPTER IV

INDICES AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS OF SAME-SEX HOUSEHOLDS

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I first discuss some of the relevant literature related to gauging patterns in the concentrations of gay and lesbian residence. Furthermore, I demonstrate how each index is formed and calculated, providing the pros and cons of each index. Then, I describe the five sets of lesbian and gay indices first among the states, 331 metropolitan areas, counties with 50 or more same-sex households within the county, and finally selected tracts using 2000 Census data.

While it is true that results from the 2000 U.S. Census indicate that partnered gays and lesbians live virtually everywhere in the U.S., 85 percent live in metropolitan areas (Simmons and O'Connell 2003: 2). Also, there is considerable variation among states, metropolitan areas, counties, and tracts in the presence of gays and lesbians (Gates and Ost 2004: 24-31). The different distributions of gays and lesbians are of interest if only for the fact that they seem to be associated with the political and social visibility of gays and lesbians. Areas where gays and lesbians have settled have become according to O'Reilly and Webster (1998), "gay spaces" with political force and activism. Metropolitan areas with the largest representations of gays and lesbians, for instance, San Francisco, New York, Houston, and Los Angeles, among other areas, are often the "gay spaces" that receive the most national attention. But as just noted, there are concentrations of gays and lesbians in virtually all the metropolitan areas of the country. However, with but a few exceptions (Black et al. 2000, 2002; Gates and Ost

2004; Rosenfeld 2007; Walther and Poston 2004), there has been little effort among social scientists at indexing these concentrations among the metropolitan areas of the U.S. and examining the extent to which the indexes are associated with the social and political characteristics of the areas.

In this chapter, I extend the work of Black and his colleagues (2000, 2002), Walther and Poston (2004), Gates and Ost (2004) and Rosenfeld (2007) regarding the validity of census-based statistics on the homosexual populations of the U.S. metropolitan areas. Black and his associates (2003) have developed gay and lesbian partnering indexes for 20 metropolitan areas with the largest gay-lesbian populations. They first used the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the 1990 census to obtain data on gays and lesbians who were in what they termed "marriage-like" relationships. They next examined the geographic distributions of these gays and lesbians in their sample. They found that almost 60 percent of their gay sample resided in 20 metropolitan areas, and that over 45 percent of their lesbian sample resided in 20 metropolitan areas (sixteen of which were among the 20 inhabited by gay men).

Their data indicated that Los Angeles contained 9.8 percent of all the gay partners in their sample, New York 8.4 percent, and San Francisco 7.9 percent. The same three cities also contained the most lesbian partners of all the cities in the U.S.: New York with 6 percent, Los Angeles with 5.4 percent, and San Francisco with 3.4 percent. Their data are interesting in their own right and provide further evidence that the census data on gays and lesbians do not consist "predominantly of mis-recorded opposite sex couples" (Black et al. 2000: 148). However, their percentage indexes are highly

associated with the size of the cities. The largest cities have the greatest numbers of gay and lesbian partners.

Gates and Ost (2004) used 2000 census data on same-sex partners and constructed gay and lesbian concentration indexes for the states, metropolitan areas, and counties of the U.S. in their *The Gay and Lesbian Atlas*. Their index is a "ratio of the proportion of same-sex couples living in an [area] to the proportion of households that are located in an [area]…This ratio…measures the over- or underrepresentation of same-sex couples in a geographic area relative to the population" (Gates and Ost 2004: 24). They found, for instance, that gay couples are more than four times as likely as a randomly selected household to live in the San Francisco metropolitan area, the area with the highest concentration index, and twice as likely to live in the Fort Lauderdale area. The Santa Rosa, Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, New York, and New Jersey metropolitan areas have the next highest index scores. Gates and Ost (2004) show that lesbian households were more than 2.5 times as likely than an average household to live in the Santa Rosa metropolitan area, and almost 2.5 times as likely to live in Santa Cruz-Watsonville. Santa Fe, San Francisco, Oakland, and Burlington are the metropolitan areas with the next highest lesbian concentration index scores. The rates that have been developed in this dissertation build on and extend the work of Gates and Ost (2004) (Black et al. 2000, 2002). In fact, one of the rates developed, namely the number of gay/lesbian households per 1,000 households, is mathematically equivalent to the index discussed by Gates and Ost (2004).

Rosenfeld (2007) uses the 2000 Census data to show the leading metropolitan areas for same-sex couples. He ranks the top 10 metropolitan areas and finds that New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are the top three metropolitan areas. He also finds that thirty percent of all same-sex households live in the top ten metropolitan areas. However, Rosenfeld (2007) only provides a strict count of the 2000 5% PUMS data on same-sex households and does not account for other aspects such as population size. The rates that have been developed in this dissertation build on and extend the work of Gates and Ost (2004) (Black et al. 2000, 2002; Rosenfeld 2007). In fact, one of the rates developed, namely the number of gay/lesbian households per 1,000 households, is mathematically equivalent to the index discussed by Gates and Ost (2004).

4.2. How Should One Index the Presence of Gay and Lesbian Partners?

Despite the work by Gates and Ost (2004), the question remains: how should one index the presence of gay and lesbian partners? One way would be to produce incidence rates, by determining the number of gays or lesbians per persons who comprise the demographic and statistical population from which gays and lesbians are drawn. In demography a rate is typically defined as the number of persons experiencing an event at a given time (the numerator) divided by the population at the risk of the event (the denominator). Thus a rate of first marriage for an area is the number of persons in the area in a given year marrying for the first time, divided by the total number of unmarried persons in the population of the area above a certain age, usually age 18. An out-migration rate for an area in a given period of time is the number of persons moving from the area in a given period, divided by the number of persons living in the area at the

start of the period (see Hinde, 1998: 80-81; 193). It is important when calculating incidence/prevalence rates that the persons in the numerator correspond with those in the denominator; that is, the denominator must include the persons in the numerator; this is known as the principle of correspondence (Hinde 1998: 4).

The rates are developed from the data from Summary File 2, Table PCT22 ("Unmarried Partner Households and Sex of Partners) of the 2000 U.S. Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003). For the gay rates, I used household data on "male householder and male partner," and for the lesbian rates I used household data on "female householder and female partner."

One way to develop a rate of gay (or lesbian) partnering for an area at a particular time would be to divide the number of gay (lesbian) partners by the number of unmarried males (females) in the population of age 18 or higher. The denominator would be restricted to unmarried persons because according to the statistical and demographic definitions used here, as well as Census Bureau coding procedures, married persons are by definition heterosexual, and would thus not be "at risk" (in a statistical sense) of being a gay or lesbian partner.

Thus my first index of gay (lesbian) partnering, Gay (Lesbian) Rate 1, is a straightforward rate with the statistically most appropriate denominator and is defined as

$$Gay(Lesbian)\ Rate1\ = \left(\frac{\#\ of\ \ Gay\ (Lesbian)\ Partners}{\#\ of\ \ Unmarried\ \ Males\ (Females)\ of\ \ age\ 18+}\right) * 1{,}000$$

The second index is related to Rate 1. Rate 2 measures the number of lesbian (gay) partners by the number of never married women (men) over the age of 18.

$$Gay(Lesbian)\ Rate2\ =$$
$$\left(\frac{\#\ of\ \ Gay\ (Lesbian)\ Partners}{\#\ of\ \ NeverMarried\ \ Males\ (Females)\ of\ \ age\ 18+}\right)*1{,}000$$

A third gay (lesbian) partnering rate for an area at a particular time would employ the same numerator as the first two indexes, but with a less restrictive denominator, namely all males (females) of age 18 or over, not just those who are unmarried. Unlike the Gay (Lesbian) Rate 1, this third index would not exclude married people from the denominator. This third index of gay (lesbian) partnering, Gay (Lesbian) Rate 3, is also a rate but with a less restrictive denominator and is defined as:

$$Gay(Lesbian)\ Rate3\ =$$

$$\left(\frac{\#\ of\ \ Gay\ (Lesbian)\ Partners}{Total\ \#\ of\ \ Males\ (Females)\ of\ \ age\ 18+}\right)*100{,}000$$

Since the denominator of Gay (Lesbian) Rate 3 is so much larger than the denominators of Gay (Lesbian) Rate 1 and 2 (because it includes married persons), I have multiplied this third set of indexes by a constant of 100,000, instead of 1,000 as I did in the first two sets.

The fourth and fifth indexes measure the prevalence among households. Rate 4 is the number of lesbian (gay) households divided by the total number of unmarried households.

$$Gay(Lesbian)\ Rate4\ =$$
$$\left(\frac{\#\ of\ \ Gay\ (Lesbian)\ Households}{\#\ of\ \ TotalUnmarriedHouseholds}\right)*1{,}000$$

Rate 5 calculates the total number of lesbian (gay households) divided by the total number of households.

$$Gay(Lesbian)\ Rate5 = \left(\frac{\#\ of\ \ Gay\ (Lesbian)\ Households}{\#\ of\ \ TotalHouseholds} \right) * 1{,}000$$

I have described the five lesbian and gay rates. I will now turn to a descriptive analysis of the rates across various kinds of geographical areas, such as states, metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and tracts.

4.2.1. States

Rate 1 for gays (Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the 50 states of 14.07 (Table 4.1). This means that across the states of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of 14 gay cohabiters for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over. Florida has the highest value on Gay Rate 1, a score of almost 20.4; for every 1,000 unmarried men in Florida in 2000, 20 of them (or more than 2 percent) were in a gay partnering relationship. South Dakota has the lowest Gay Rate 1 value, less than 1 per 1,000. This first rate for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 1) has an average across the states of just over 12 per 1,000. Vermont has the highest value of all the states with a score of 23.1; just over 2.3 percent of all unmarried females in Vermont of age 18 or more are in lesbian partnering relationships. North Dakota has the lowest score on Lesbian Rate 1.

Among gay men, the second rate, Gay Rate 2, has an average score across the states of 21.0 (Table 4.1). For every 1,000 never married males of age 18 and over, there is an average of almost 21 gays in partnering relationships. Florida has the highest score of all the states, 32.8 gay partners per 1,000 never married males in the population. South Dakota has the lowest score on this rate of all the states. For lesbians, the mean value on this second rate, Lesbian Rate 2, is 27.8. Across the 50 states, there is an

average of almost 28 lesbian partners per 1,000 never married females of age 18 and over. Vermont has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 2 of 49.7, and North Dakota has the lowest value (15.1).

Rate 3 for gay men (Gay Rate 3) has a mean value among the 50 states of 529.3 (Table 4.1). This means that across the states of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of a little over 529 gay cohabiters for every 100,000 men of age 18 or over. California has the highest value of Gay Rate 3, a score of 819.5; for every 100,000 men in California in 2000, almost 0.8 of them were in a gay partnering relationship. South Dakota has the lowest Gay Rate 3 value, 287.7 men per 100,000 men over the age of 18. Rate 3 for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 3) has a mean value among the 50 states of 528.3, slightly lower than Gay Rate 3 (Table 4.1). This means that across the states in 2000, there was an average of 528 female same gender cohabiters for every 100,000 women of age 18 or over. Vermont has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 3, a score of 981.5. For every 100,000 women in Vermont in 2000, almost 0.9 of them were in a lesbian partnering relationship. North Dakota has the lowest Lesbian Rate 3 value, 281.7 per 100,000 women over the age of 18.

Rate 4 for gay men (Gay Rate 4) has a mean value among the 50 states of 48.3 (Table 4.1). This means that among the 50 states of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of almost 48 male same-sex households for every 1,000 unmarried households. California has the highest value of Gay Rate 4. California has a score of 72.5. South Dakota has the lowest Gay Rate 4. Rate 4 for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 4) has a mean value among the 50 states of 50.9, slightly higher than Gay Rate 4 (Table 4.1). This means

that across the 50 states in 2000, there was an average of almost 51 female same-sex households for every 1,000 unmarried households. Utah has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 4 with a score of 70.7. Of all the rates for states, Utah seems to be the most unusual state to have the highest Lesbian Rate 4. Utah has the most heterosexual marriages in the United States (Gates and Ost 2004). North Dakota has the lowest Lesbian Rate 4 value.

Gay Rate 5 has a mean value among the 50 states of 2.5. This means that across the 50 states in 2000, there was an average of 2.5 male same-sex households for every 1,000 total households. California has the highest value of Gay Rate 5, a score of 4.3 for every 1,000 households in 2000. South Dakota has the lowest value of Gay Rate 5. Rate 5 for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 5) has a mean value among the 50 states of 2.6, slightly higher than Gay Rate 5 (Table 4.1). This means that across the 50 states in 2000, there was an average of almost 2.7 female same-sex households for every 1,000 households. Vermont has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 5 with a score of 4.8. North Dakota has the lowest Lesbian Rate 5 value. Tables A.2 and A.3 contain the values for all fifty states and the five rates.

Table 4.1. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values of Indices For States, 2000 U.S. Census

Rate	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Minimum Values State	Maximum Values State
Gay Rate 1	14.0 (3.0)	7.8 South Dakota	20.4 Florida
Gay Rate 2	21.0 (4.5)	11.0 North Dakota	32.8 Florida
Gay Rate 3	529.3 (126.6)	287.7 South Dakota	819.5 California
Gay Rate 4	48.3 (11.1)	28.0 South Dakota	72.5 California
Gay Rate 5	2.5 (0.6)	1.3 South Dakota	4.3 California
Lesbian Rate 1	12.6 (3.1)	7.0 North Dakota	23.1 Vermont
Lesbian Rate 2	27.8 (7.0)	15.1 North Dakota	49.7 Vermont
Lesbian Rate 3	528.3 (126.6)	281.7 North Dakota	981.5 Vermont
Lesbian Rate 4	50.9 (10.0)	30.1 North Dakota	70.7 Utah
Lesbian Rate 5	2.6 (0.6)	1.3 North Dakota	4.8 Vermont

Source: 2000 US Census Data Summary File 3 and 4

How are the rates related at the state level? Table 4.2 presents a matrix of zero-order correlations showing the relationships between the various rates. The five gay rates are highly correlated with one another. Of the five zero-order correlations involving the relationships between each pair of gay rates, the lowest is .614 between Gay Rate 2 and Gay Rate 4. The five lesbian rates are also positively and highly correlated with each other, although the correlations are not as high as those for the five gay rates. The correlations for the five pairs of lesbian rates range from a low of .420 (Lesbian Rate 2 with Lesbian Rate 4) to a high of .988 (Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 5). Between

the gay rates and the lesbian rates, the highest correlation is between Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 5 (0.806). However, Gay Rate 4 is not significantly related with Lesbian Rates 1, 2, or 3.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are a matrix of scatterplots showing the five gay and lesbian rates. Figures 4.3 through 4.6 show the relationship between each rate. Figure 4.3 compares Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1. As shown in the figure, there are 40 states that have a higher value on Gay Rate 1 than Lesbian Rate 1. This suggests that there are more states with partnered gay men per 1,000 unmarried men over the age of 18 than partnered lesbians per 1,000 unmarried women over the age of 18. Figure 4.4 compares Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. There are 2 states, Delaware and New York, which have more male same-sex partners than female same-sex partners. Figure 4.5 compares Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. Three states, Iowa, Louisiana, and North Carolina have more partnered gays per 100,000 males over the age of 18 than partnered lesbians per 100,000 females over the age of 18. Figure 4.6 compares Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. Thirteen states (Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming) have relatively more male same-sex unmarried households than female same-sex unmarried households. Figure 4.7 compares Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. Fifteen states (Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have relatively more lesbian total households than gay total households. Tennessee has exactly the same value for Gay Rate 5 and

Lesbian Rate 5. Thirty-four states have relatively more gay total households than lesbian total households.

Table 4.2 Zero-Order Correlation Matrix of Gay and Lesbian Indices, 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census

	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4
Gay Rate 2	0.94								
Gay Rate 3	0.97	0.89							
Gay Rate 4	0.71	0.61	0.67						
Gay Rate 5	0.94	0.84	0.98	0.70					
Lesbian Rate 1	0.66	0.65	0.66	0.20	0.65				
Lesbian Rate 2	0.58	0.70	0.54	0.10	0.50	0.91			
Lesbian Rate 3	0.73	0.68	0.76	0.26	0.73	0.97	0.85		
Lesbian Rate 4	0.64	0.55	0.59	0.79	0.58	0.54	0.42	0.59	
Lesbian Rate 5	0.77	0.69	0.80	0.36	0.78	0.94	0.78	0.98	0.64

Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4



Figure 4.1. Scatterplots of Five Rates of Gay Partnering for 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.2. Scatterplots of Five Rates of Lesbian Partnering for 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.3. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Partnered Lesbian Rate 1 for 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.4. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.5. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.6. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Partnered Lesbian Rate 4 for 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census.

4.2.2. Metropolitan Areas

Rate 1 for gays (Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the 331 metropolitan areas of 13.3 (Table 4.3). This means that across metropolitan areas of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of 13 gay cohabiters for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over. San Francisco, California has the highest value on Gay Rate 1, a score of 47.9; for every 1,000 unmarried men in San Francisco, California in 2000, almost 48 of them were in a gay partnering relationship. Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest Gay Rate 1 value, almost 5 per 1,000.

The first rate for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 1) has an average across the metropolitan areas of 12.1 per 1,000. Santa Rosa, California has the highest value of all the metropolitan areas, a score of 30.9; just over 3.0 percent of all unmarried females in San Francisco of age 18 or more are in lesbian partnering relationships. Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest score on Lesbian Rate 1, just slightly less than its lowest score on Gay Rate 1.

Among gay men, the second rate, Gay Rate 2, has an average score across the 331 metropolitan areas of 20.0 (Table 4.3). For every 1,000 never married males of age 18 and over, there is an average of 2.0 percent of gay men in partnering relationships. San Francisco has the highest score of all metropolitan areas. For every 1,000 never married males, 6.0 percent of gay men are in partnering relationships. Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest score on this rate of all the areas.

For lesbians, the mean value on the second rate, Lesbian Rate 2, is 26.8. Across the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 26.8 lesbian partners per 1,000 never

married females of age 18 and over. Santa Rosa, California has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 2 of 72.2, and Provo-Orem, Utah has the lowest value.

Gay Rate 3 has a mean value across the 331 metropolitan areas of 501.6 (Table 4.3). For every 100,000 males of age 18 and over, there is an average of almost 501 gay men in partnering relationships. San Francisco, California has the highest score of all metropolitan areas, 2,315.4 gay partners per 100,000 males in the population. Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest score on this rate of all the areas.

This third rate for lesbians, Lesbian Rate 3, has a mean value of 513.5. Across the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 513.5 lesbian partners per 100,000 females of age 18 and over. Santa Rosa, California has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 3 of 1384.1, and Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest value.

Gay Rate 4 has a mean value among the 331 metropolitan areas of 46.4. Across the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 46.4 male same-sex unmarried households for every 1,000 households of unmarried cohabiters. San Francisco, California has the highest value on Gay Rate 4 of 183.2, while Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest value.

Rate 4 for lesbians, Lesbian Rate 4, has a mean value among the 331 metropolitan areas of 51.1. Across the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 51.1 female same-sex unmarried households for every 1,000 households of unmarried cohabiters. McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, Texas has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 4 of 116.0, while Rapid City, South Dakota has the lowest value.

The last rate for gay men, Gay Rate 5, has a mean value of 2.4. Across the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 2.4 male same-sex unmarried households for every 1,000 total households. San Francisco, California has the highest value on Gay Rate 5 of 11.8, while Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest value.

Rate 5 for lesbians, Lesbian Rate 5, has a mean value among the 331 metropolitan areas of 2.6, slightly higher than Gay Rate 5. Across the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 2.6 female same-sex unmarried households for every 1,000 total households. Santa Rosa, California has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 5 of 7.2, while Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest value. Tables A.3 and A.4 present the 331 metropolitan statistical areas with gay and lesbian rates.

Table 4.4 presents zero-order correlations showing the relationship between the various rates. The five gay rates are highly correlated with one another. Of the five zero-order correlations involving the relationships between each pair of gay rates, the lowest is 0.711 between Gay Rate 2 and Gay Rate 4. The highest correlation among the gay rates is 0.984 between Gay Rate 3 and Gay Rate 5. The five lesbian rates are also positively and highly correlated with each other, although the correlations are not as high as those for the five gay rates. The lowest correlations involve the relationship between each pair of lesbian rates. The lowest is 0.477 between Lesbian Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 4. The highest correlations of lesbian rates are between Lesbian Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 3 of 0.950. Between the gay and lesbian rates, the highest correlation is 0.668 between Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. The lowest correlations is 0.358 between Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 4. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 present the correlations of all the rates.

Table 4.3. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values of Indices for 331 Metropolitan Areas, 2000 U.S. Census

Rate	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Minimum Values MSA	Maximum Values MSA
Gay Rate 1	13.3 (4.4)	4.3 Dubuque, IA	47.9 San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 2	20.0 (6.9)	6.3 Dubuque, IA	60.7 San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 3	501.6 (187.9)	151.5 Dubuque, IA	2,315.4 San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 4	46.4 (16.8)	17.2 Dubuque, IA	183.2 San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 5	2.4 (0.9)	0.7 Dubuque, IA	11.8 San Francisco, CA
Lesbian Rate 1	12.1 (3.7)	5.0 Dubuque, IA	31.0 Santa Rosa, CA
Lesbian Rate 2	26.8 (8.6)	9.0 Provo-Orem, UT	72.2 Santa Rosa, CA
Lesbian Rate 3	515.2 (168.3)	201.7 Dubuque, IA	1,384.1 Santa Rosa, CA
Lesbian Rate 4	51.1 (14.7)	19.2 Rapid City, SD	116.0 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX
Lesbian Rate 5	2.6 (0.9)	1.0 Dubuque, IA	7.2 Santa Rosa, CA

Source: 2000 US Census Data Summary File 3 and 4

Figure 4.9 presents the relationship between Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1. There are 230 metropolitan statistical areas that have more male same-sex households than female and 101 metropolitan statistical areas with more female same-sex households than male same-sex households.

Figure 4.10 represents the relationship between Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. There are 21 metropolitan statistical areas which have a higher Gay Rate 2 than Lesbian Rate 2 There are 21 metropolitan statistical areas which have a higher Gay Rate 2 than Lesbian Rate 2 (Hattiesburg, MS; Springfield, IL; New Orleans, LA; Orlando, FL; Charleston, WV; Chicago, IL; Dallas, TX; West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL; Birmingham, AL; Greenville, NC; Atlanta, GA; Athens, GA; Fargo-Moorhead, ND—MN; Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA; Muncie, IN; Miami, FL; Jersey City, NJ; Stamford-Norwalk, CT; Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV; New York, NY; Fort Lauderdale, FL; San Francisco, CA). The majority of the metropolitan statistical areas (310) fall below the line on the graph suggesting a higher Lesbian Rate 2 than Gay Rate 2.

Figure 4.11 shows the relationship between Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. There are 153 metropolitan statistical areas with a higher Gay Rate 3 than Lesbian Rate 3. In Figure 4.11, this suggests that there are 153 metropolitan statistical areas above the line and 178 metropolitan statistical areas below the line. Again Lesbian Rate 3 is higher than Gay Rate 3 in the number of metropolitan statistical areas.

Figure 4.12 represents the relationship between Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. There is one metropolitan statistical area, Benton Harbor, MI, which has the same Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. There are 100 metropolitan statistical areas with a higher Gay Rate 4 than Lesbian Rate 4. There are 230 metropolitan statistical areas with a higher Lesbian Rate 4 than Gay Rate 4.

Figure 4.13 shows the relationship between Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. One metropolitan statistical area has the same value for Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5, Benton Harbor, MI. Ninety-five metropolitan statistical areas have a higher Gay Rate 5 than Lesbian Rate 5.

Table 4.4. Zero-Order Correlation of Gay and Lesbian Indices for 331 Metropolitan Areas, 2000 U.S. Census

	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4
Gay Rate 2	0.94								
Gay Rate 3	0.94	0.83							
Gay Rate 4	0.82	0.71	0.81						
Gay Rate 5	0.92	0.78	0.98	0.82					
Lesbian Rate 1	0.57	0.50	0.59	0.38	0.60				
Lesbian Rate 2	0.57	0.66	0.47	0.29	0.45	0.83			
Lesbian Rate 3	0.55	0.44	0.64	0.38	0.64	0.95	0.69		
Lesbian Rate 4	0.46	0.35	0.47	0.68	0.49	0.68	0.47	0.68	
Lesbian Rate 5	0.55	0.42	0.64	0.42	0.65	0.93	0.65	0.98	0.73

Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4.



Figure 4.7. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.8. Scatterplot of Partnered Lesbian Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.9. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Partnered Lesbian Rate 1 for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.10. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.11. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.12. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.13. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.

4.2.3. Counties

Table A.5 lists all the counties with no male or female same-sex couples. For male same-sex couples, Colorado and Kansas counties each have 10 counties with no male same-sex households. Nebraska contains twelve counties with no female same-sex households. There are 22 counties with neither male nor female same-sex households. Figure 4.14 is a U.S. map showing Gay Rate 2 for all counties. Figure 4.15 is a U.S. map showing Lesbian Rate 2. As one can see from the maps, male and female same-sex households are distributed throughout the United States.

When all counties are included in the analysis, statistical noise occurs. For instance, Gay Rate 1 has King County, Texas as the lowest value; however, King County, Texas has 2 male same sex partners and only 147 total households. Thus, King County, Texas is not representative of the majority of counties. Rosenfeld (2007) found that 70 percent of all unmarried partners reside in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, they also show that it makes little theoretical or statistical sense to include those counties with less than 50 same-sex households contains analysis of all counties. I thus so restricted the counties to be analyzed here.



Figure 4.14. Map of Counties in the U.S. for Gay Rate 2, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.15. Map of Counties in the U.S. for Lesbian Rate 2, 2000 U.S. Census.

Rate 1 for gays (Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the counties of 13.5 (Table 4.5). This means that across counties of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of 13 gay cohabiters for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over. San Francisco has the highest value on Gay Rate 1, a score of 66.2. Riley County, Kansas has the lowest Gay Rate 1 value, almost 3 per 1,000.

The first rate for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 1) has an average across the counties of 12.6 per 1,000. Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest value of all the counties with 50 or more same-sex households with a score of 39.5, that is, almost 4.0 percent of all unmarried females in Hampshire County, Massachusetts of age 18 or more are in lesbian partnering relationships. Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest score on Lesbian Rate 1, just slightly more than its lowest score on Gay Rate 1.

Gay Rate 2, has an average score across the 1,288 counties of 21.6. This means that across counties with 50 or more same gender households in the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of 21 gay cohabiters for every 1,000 never married men of age 18 or over. San Francisco has the highest value of Gay Rate 2, a score of 79.4. Riley County, Kansas has the lowest Gay Rate 2 value, 3.5 per 1,000.

Lesbian Rate 2 has an average across the counties of 31.4 per 1,000 never married women. San Juan County, Washington has the highest value of all the counties. San Juan County, Washington has a score of 127.5. This means that just over 12 percent of all never married females in San Juan County, Washington of age 18 or more are in lesbian partnering relationships. Riley County, Kansas has the lowest score on Lesbian

Rate 2. Riley County, Kansas has just 0.8 percent of all never married females age 18 or more are in female same-sex household.

Gay Rate 3, across the 1,288 counties with more than 50 same-sex households, has an average score of 481.5. For every 100,000 males of age 18 and over, there is an average of almost 481 gay men in male same-sex households. San Francisco County, California has the highest score. San Francisco County, California has 3889 gay partners per 100,000 males in the population. Dubuque County, Iowa has the lowest score on this rate of all the counties.

Lesbian Rate 3 has a mean value of 502.3. Across the 1,288 counties with 50 or more same-sex households, there is an average of 502.3 female same-sex households per 100,000 females of age 18 and over. Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 3 of 2,164.7, and Dubuque County, Iowa has the lowest value on Lesbian Rate 3 of 201.7.

Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 measures the number of same-sex households for every 1,000 unmarried households. Gay Rate 4 has a mean value among the 1,288 counties with 50 or more same-sex households of 46.4, while the Lesbian Rate 4 has a mean value among the 1,288 counties of the U.S. in 2000. For Gay Rate 4, San Francisco County, California has the highest value of 266.6. Huron County, Ohio has the lowest Gay Rate 4. For Lesbian Rate 4, Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 4 (183.6). Pennington County, South Dakota has the lowest Lesbian Rate 4 value.

The mean values for Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 have a mean value among the 1288 counties with 50 or more same-sex households of 2.5. San Francisco County, California has the highest value of Gay Rate 5 (19.8 for every 1,000 total households). Dubuque County, Iowa has the lowest value of Gay Rate 5. For the Lesbian Rate 5, again, Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 5 (12.8; for every 1,000 total households). Manitowoc County, Wisconsin and Dubuque County, Iowa has the lowest Lesbian Rate 5 value of 1.0 (see Table 4.5).

How are the rates related at the county level? Table 4.6 presents a matrix of zero-order correlations showing the relationships between the various rates. The five gay rates are highly correlated with one another. Of the ten zero-order correlations involving the relationships between each pair of gay rates, the lowest is .68 between Gay Rate 2 and Gay Rate 4. The five lesbian rates are also positively and highly correlated with each other, although the correlations are not as high as those for the five gay rates.

Table 4.5. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values of Indices for 1288 Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households

Rate	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Minimum	Maximum
Gay Rate 1	13.5 (5.0)	3.1 (Riley County, Kansas)	66.2 (San Francisco County, California)
Gay Rate 2	21.6 (8.6)	3.5 (Riley County, Kansas)	79.4 (San Francisco County, California)
Gay Rate 3	481.5 (227.1)	151.4 (Dubuque County, Iowa)	3889.0 (San Francisco County, California)
Gay Rate 4	46.4 (19.6)	15.9 (Huron County, Ohio)	266.6 (San Francisco County, California)
Gay Rate 5	2.2 (1.0)	0.7 (Dubuque County, Iowa)	19.8 (San Francisco County, California)
Lesbian Rate 1	12.6 (4.1)	4.9 (Dubuque County, Iowa)	39.5 (Hampshire County, Massachusetts)
Lesbian Rate 2	31.4 (13.1)	8.4 (Riley County, Kansas)	127.5 (San Juan County, Washington)
Lesbian Rate 3	502.3 (179.1)	201.7 (Dubuque County, Iowa)	2164.7 (Hampshire County, Massachusetts)
Lesbian Rate 4	51.6 (17.0)	19.2 (Pennington County, South Dakota)	183.6 (Hampshire County, Massachusetts)
Lesbian Rate 5	2.5 (0.9)	1.0 (Manitowoc County, Wisconsin and Dubuque County, Iowa)	12.8 (Hampshire County, Massachusetts)

Source: 2000 US Census Data Summary File 3 and 4

The correlations for the five pairs of lesbian rates range from a low of .46 (Lesbian Rate 2 with Lesbian Rate 4) to a high of .98 (Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 5). Between the gay rates and the lesbian rates, the highest correlation is between Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2 (0.58) and Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4 (0.58). Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 present scatterplots of gay and lesbian rates. As one can see from the figures, the rates are correlated. Figures 4.18 through 4.22 present the relationship for each rate. Figure 4.18 demonstrates the relationship between Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1. There are two counties, Webster Parish, Louisiana and Lee County, Alabama that have the same Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1.There are 714 counties that have a higher Gay Rate 1 than Lesbian Rate 1. There are 512 counties that have a higher Lesbian Rate 1 than Gay Rate 1. Figure 4.19 demonstrates the relationship between Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. There are only 60 counties with a higher Gay Rate 2 than Lesbian Rate 2 and 1,168 counties that have a higher Lesbian Rate 2 than Gay Rate 2.

Figure 4.20 shows the relationship between Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. There are 485 counties with a higher Gay Rate 3 than Lesbian Rate 3 and 743 counties with a higher Lesbian Rate 3 than Gay Rate 3. Figure 4.21 demonstrates the relationship between Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. There are 27 counties which have the same Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4.[37] There are 334 counties that have a higher Gay Rate 4 than Lesbian Rate 4. Figure 4.22 shows the relationship for Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. There are 18 counties that have the same Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5.[38] There are 333 counties that have a higher Gay Rate 5 than Lesbian Rate 5 and thus fall above the line in Figure 4.22. There are 877 counties that have a higher Lesbian Rate 5 and fall below the line in Figure 4.22. Overall, all of the indices are highly correlated with one another.

[37] Lewis County, Washington; Chesterfield County, Virginia; Alcorn County, Mississippi; Covington County, Alabama; Columbia County, Wisconsin; Macoupin County, Illinois; Berrien County, Michigan; Queen Anne's County, Maryland; Kings County, California; Floyd County, Kentucky; Sawyer County, Wisconsin; Fayette County, Ohio; Jackson County, Alabama; Chester County, South Carolina; Geauga County, Ohio; St. Joseph County, Michigan; Dallas County, Alabama; Grafton County, New Hampshire; Lauderdale County, Alabama; Barnwell County, South Carolina; Whitley County, Indiana; Montgomery County, Indiana; Danville city, Virginia; Wood County, Texas; Jefferson County, West Virginia; Wilkes County, North Carolina; Columbia County, Pennsylvania

[38] Whitley County, Indiana; Geauga County, Ohio; Wilkes County, North Carolina; Berrien County, Michigan; Danville city, Virginia; Kings County, California; Floyd County, Kentucky; Montgomery County, Indiana; Gwinnett County, Georgia; Lauderdale County, Alabama; Barnwell County, South Carolina; Lewis County, Washington; Jackson County, Alabama; Sawyer County, Wisconsin; Grafton County, New Hampshire; Columbia County, Pennsylvania; Covington County, Alabama; Dallas County, Alabama; Wood County, Texas; Fayette County, Ohio; Jefferson County, West Virginia; Columbia County, Wisconsin; Chester County, South Carolina; Macoupin County, Illinois; Alcorn County, Mississippi; St. Covington County, Alabama; Dallas County, Alabama; Wood County, Texas; Fayette County, Ohio; Jefferson County, West Virginia; Columbia County, Wisconsin; Chester County, South Carolina; Macoupin County, Illinois; Alcorn County, Mississippi; St. Joseph County, Michigan; Queen Anne's County, Maryland; Chesterfield County, Virginia

Table 4.6. Zero-Order Correlation of Gay and Lesbian Indices, 1288 Counties with 50 or more Same Sex Households, 2000 US Census Data

	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4
Gay Rate 2	0.92								
Gay Rate 3	0.89	0.72							
Gay Rate 4	0.81	0.68	0.78						
Gay Rate 5	0.87	0.69	0.98	0.78					
Lesbian Rate 1	0.47	0.45	0.39	0.25	0.42				
Lesbian Rate 2	0.43	0.58	0.22	0.18	0.21	0.80			
Lesbian Rate 3	0.46	0.35	0.54	0.30	0.55	0.88	0.57		
Lesbian Rate 4	0.37	0.29	0.31	0.58	0.33	0.62	0.46	0.63	
Lesbian Rate 5	0.43	0.30	0.51	0.30	0.53	0.86	0.51	0.98	0.67

Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4.



Figure 4.16. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay Rates for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.17. Scatterplot of Partnered Lesbian Rates for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.18. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 1 for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.19. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.20. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.21. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.22. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.

4.2.4. Census Tracts

For the census tract analyses, I included twenty-seven counties with a high number of male or female same-sex households and selected tracts in which interviews were conducted based upon previous research conducted by Gates and Ost (2004) (Alameda County, California, Allendale County, South Carolina Charlottesville city, Virginia Franklin County, Maine Santa Fe County, New Mexico Tompkins County, New York Washington D.C., San Francisco County, California, King County, Washington, DeKalb County, Georgia, Suffolk County, Massachusetts; Arlington County, Virginia; Monroe County, Florida, Hampshire County, Massachusetts, Nantucket County, Massachusetts, Alexandria city, Virginia, Sonoma County, California, Dallas County, Texas, Brazos County, Texas, Travis, Texas, Harris County, Texas, New York County, New York, Fulton County, Georgia, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, St. Louis city, Missouri, Multnomah County, Oregon, Allendale County, South Carolina, Charlottesville city, Virginia). I excluded all tracts that did not contain complete data from Summary File 3 or Summary File 4. Census Tract 204, San Francisco County, California had the highest number of same-sex unmarried households.

Table 4.7. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values for Indices of 4,079 Tracts in the U.S., 2000 U.S. Census

Rates	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Minimum	Maximum
Gay Rate 1	27.4 (36.5)	0	338.0 (Census Tract 205, San Francisco County, California)
Gay Rate 2	35.6 (47.0)	0	416.3 (Census Tract 44, Dallas County, Texas)
Gay Rate 3	1470.2 (2235.1)	0	29705.2 (Census Tract 205, San Francisco County, California)
Gay Rate 4	114.6 (144.0)	0	1000.0 (Census Tract 205, San Francisco County, California)
Gay Rate 5	7.0 (10.7)	0	180.5 (Census Tract 114, San Francisco County, California)
Lesbian Rate 1	18.6 (23.5)	0	176.8 (Census Tract 226, San Francisco County, California)
Lesbian Rate 2	28.4 (37.5)	0	358.2 (Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California)
Lesbian Rate 3	924.7 (1197.9)	0	10480.3 (Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California)
Lesbian Rate 4	88.1 (115.1)	0	1000.0 (Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California)
Lesbian Rate 5	5.0 (6.4)	0	69.7 (Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California)
Total Same-Sex Households	21.6 (28.5)	0	519.0 (Census Tract 204, San Francisco County, California)

Overall, the results in most of the tracts are not very surprising. The highest prevalence rates of same-sex households are predominately in California. Rate1 for gays (Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 27.4 (Table 4.7). This means that across the largest tracts of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of almost 27 male same-sex householders for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over. San Francisco Census Tract 205 has the highest value on Gay Rate 1. San Francisco Census Tract 205 has a score of 338.0 for every 1,000 unmarried men in San Francisco in 2000, that is, 338 of them (or more than 33 percent) were in a male same-sex household. Lesbian Rate 1 has an average across the tract areas of 18.6 per 1,000. San Francisco Census Tract 226 has the highest value of all the tracts with a score of 176.8. This means that just over 17.6 percent of all unmarried females in that tract of age 18 or more are in female same-sex households.

Gay Rate 2 has a mean value among the tracts of 35.6. This means that across the 4,079 tracts in 2000, there was an average of almost 36 male same-sex households for every 1,000 never married men of age 18 or over. Census Tract 44, Dallas County, Texas has the highest value of Gay Rate 2 with a score of 416.3. Lesbian Rate 2 has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 28.4. This means that across the 4,079 tracts in 2000, there was an average of 28 female same-sex households for every 1,000 never married women of age 18 or over. Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 2 with a score of 358.2.

Gay Rate 3 has an average score across the 4,079 tracts of 1,470.2. For every 100,000 males of age 18 and over, there is an average of almost 1,470 male same-sex

households. San Francisco Census Tract 205 has the highest score of all the 4,079 tracts. Almost 30 percent of all males of age 18 or older in San Francisco Census Tract 205 in 2000 were in a male same-sex household. For lesbians, the mean value on Lesbian Rate 3 is 924.7. Across 4079 tracts, there is an average of 924 female same-sex households per 100,000 females of age 18 and over. Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 3 of 10,480.3.

Gay Rate 4 has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 114.6. This means that of the 4,079 tracts, there was an average of 114 male same-sex households for every 1,000 unmarried households. Census Tract 205, San Francisco County, California has the highest value of Gay Rate 4. Lesbian Rate 4 has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 88.1, significantly lower than Gay Rate 4. This means that across the 4,079 tracts in 2000, there was an average of 88 female same-sex households for every 1,000 unmarried households. Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 4.

Finally, Gay Rate 5 has a mean value among the tracts of 7.0. This means that of the 4,079 tracts chosen in 2000, there was an average of 7.0 male same-sex households for every 1,000 total households. Census Tract 114, San Francisco County, California has the highest value of Gay Rate 5, a score of 180.5. Lesbian Rate 5 has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 5.0, significantly lower than Gay Rate 5. This means that across the 4,079 tracts in 2000, there was an average of 5.0 female same-sex households for every 1,000 total household. Again, Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 5.

Table 4.8 presents a matrix of zero-order correlations showing the relationships among the various rates. The five gay rates are highly correlated with one another. Of the five zero-order correlations involving relationships between each pair of gay rates, the lowest is .83 between Gay Rate 2 and Gay Rate 4. This suggests that the variation among the male rates is very similar. The five lesbian rates are also positively and highly correlated with each other, although the correlations are not as high as those for the five gay rates. The correlations for the five pairs of lesbian rates range from a low of .63 (Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 4) to a high of .95 (Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 5). These variations by rate is also similar. However, when comparing the male same-gender indices and the female same-sex indices, the correlations are much weaker. Some of the indices are not statistically significant or have a negative correlation. For instance, of the five gay indices and the five lesbian indices, Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3 have the highest correlation of 0.29. Furthermore, Lesbian Rate 4 is negatively correlated with Gay Rate 3, Gay Rate 4, and Gay Rate 5. Thus, this suggests that the variation in the rates is different (Kennedy 2001; Black et al 2004).

Figures 4.23 and 4.24 contain scatterplots of all five rates. Figures 4.25 through 4.29 show the relationship for all the rates. Figure 4.25 shows the relationship for Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1. There are 1,104 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 1 than Lesbian Rate 1. Figure 4.26 presents the relationship for Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. There are 1,043 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 2 than Lesbian Rate 2. Figure 4.27 shows the relationship for Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. There are 1,091 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 3 than Lesbian Rate 3. Furthermore, Figure 4.28 demonstrates the relationship for Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. There are 1,043 tracts that are above the line in the Figure 4.28. This suggests that there are 1,043 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 4 than Lesbian Rate 4. Finally, Figure 4.29 shows the relationship for Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. There are 973 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 5 than Lesbian Rate 5.

Table 4.8. Zero-Order Correlation of Gay and Lesbian Indices for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census Data

Rates	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4
Gay Rate 2	.98								
Gay Rate 3	.94	.90							
Gay Rate 4	.84	.83	.76						
Gay Rate 5	.91	.88	.97	.77					
Lesbian Rate 1	.21	.21	.20	.05	.20				
Lesbian Rate 2	.13	.14	.08	-.01	.07	.92			
Lesbian Rate 3	.26	.25	.29	.08	.28	.94	.87		
Lesbian Rate 4	.00	.00	-.01	-.02	-.01	.75	.77	.69	
Lesbian Rate 5	.17	.17	.18	.02	.19	.92	.89	.95	.76

Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4



Figure 4.23. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay Rates for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.24. Scatterplot of Partnered Lesbian Rates for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.25. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 1 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.26. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.27. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.28. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census.



Figure 4.29. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census.

In this chapter, I have calculated five different rates for various areas; states, metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and census tracts. From a demographic perspective, the second set of rates is more statistically defensible. The population most "at risk" of being in a same-sex household are individuals who have never married. Therefore, I use the second rates as my dependent variable in the next analysis to determine the social and political correlates of concentrations same-sex households.

4.3. Social and Political Correlates of Gay and Lesbian Partnering

I now turn to the issue of accounting for variation in the rates of gay and lesbian partnering. Why does San Francisco have the highest gay rate and Santa Rosa the highest lesbian rate? Why on so many of the sets of rates does Dubuque have the lowest gay and lesbian rates? What kinds of social and political considerations might be brought to bear? In this section, I propose and test a number of hypotheses in an attempt to address this question.

In Chapter II, I described Sewell's concept of dual structures. He argues that structural determinants have two tenets: resources and rules or cultural schema. I have identified four resource independent variables that are not necessarily specific to male or female same-sex households: unemployment, poverty rate, infant mortality rate, and temperature index. These four independent variables are not specific to gay men and lesbians. Most people would like to live in areas of low unemployment, low poverty, low infant mortality, and temperate weather (Poston and Mao 1996). I have obtained data on rates of civilian unemployment in 1996 for each metropolitan area (U.S. Bureau of the

Census 1998). I hypothesize that the greater the levels of unemployment, the less the concentrations of gay and lesbian partners.

Two other factors that may be hypothesized to be related to the metropolitan areas are its poverty rate and its infant mortality rate. Both reflect the general quality of life of the area. For each metropolitan area I have data on the infant mortality rate in 1994 and the percentage of persons below the poverty level in 1993 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998). I hypothesize that the greater the levels of infant mortality and poverty of the area, the less the concentrations of gay and lesbian partners.

Empirical research in the social sciences using climate as an independent variable often includes temperature as a key consideration of climate (Karp and Kelly 1971; Graves 1980; Poston and Mao 1996; 1998; Poston, Gotcher and Gu 2005). I obtained January and July temperature data for each metropolitan area based on average daily temperature data for these two months from 1951 to 1970, and calculated a temperature index by dividing the average July temperature into the average January temperature. Under the assumption that persons prefer to avoid exposure to bitter and cold winters and to excessively hot and humid summers, the higher the value of this index, the more favorable the climate. This is because the index value is lowered if it is cold in the winter or hot in summer (Karp and Kelly 1971: 25).

There are rules and cultural schema of metropolitan areas and states that may be hypothesized to specifically draw gays and lesbians, and not necessarily heterosexual people. For instance, Black and colleagues (2003) have noted the importance of the metropolitan area's social attitudes, and political and religious orientation as factors that

should be related to the prevalence of gays and lesbians. O'Reilly and Webster (1998) have written that the social and political characteristics of communities should be associated with levels of gay and lesbian concentration. I have gathered data for each metropolitan area on the percentage of votes cast in the 1996 presidential election for the Republican candidate, Robert Dole. I have also obtained data for each area on the number of Southern Baptist members per 1,000 population. I hypothesize that the more Republican the voting patterns in the area, and the more conservative the religious attitudes, as measured by the prevalence of Southern Baptists, the lower the concentrations of gay and lesbian partners.

Why should the prevalence of Republicans and Southern Baptists be negatively associated with the prevalence of gays and lesbians? The Republican Party has long been identified, rightly or wrongly, as having an anti-homosexual orientation. Although there is a vocal homosexual group in the Republican Party, namely, the Log Cabin Republicans, its influence on the party is thought to be minimal (O'Reilly and Webster 1998: 501; Green et al. 1995; Guth 1995).

Research on the conflicts over homosexuality in religious Christian denominations is extensive (Anderson 1997; Wood and Bloch 1995; Beuttler 1999; Ellingson et al. 2001; Koch and Curry 2000; Wellman 1999). Few Christian denominations (except Unitarian Universalism) and denominational religious groups such as the United Church of Christ, the Integrity group in the Episcopal Church, the Dignity group in the Roman Catholic Church, and the Lutherans Concerned group view homosexuality in a more tolerant light (Ellison 1993; Mahaffy 1996). Melton (1991)

found that 72% of surveyed churches and organizations condemned homosexuals and homosexuality as being an abomination in the eyes of God. Members and participants in many conservative Christian denominations refer to gays and lesbians as "unnatural", "evil", "sinners", and "perverts" (Clark, Brown and Hochstein 1990; Greenberg and Bystryn 1982; Keysor 1979; Scanzoni and Mollenkott 1978). The Southern Baptist denomination's conferences regularly pass resolutions that consider homosexuality as an "abomination in the eyes of God" (Steinfels 1988: 6).

There is very little empirical literature about the relationship between the presence of sodomy laws and anti-gay/lesbian discrimination laws and the concentrations of gays and lesbians. Gates and Ost (2004: 3) note that states with a large relative presence of gays and lesbians tend to have more favorable laws pertaining to homosexuals. As of 2000, numerous states had sodomy laws that applied only to homosexuals, and other states had sodomy laws that applied to both homosexuals and heterosexuals. Of the 331 metropolitan areas in 2000, 21 percent were in states with sodomy laws against both homosexuals and heterosexuals, and 13 percent in states with sodomy laws only against homosexuals. Alternately, in 2000, 23 percent of the metropolitan areas were in states that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in both the public and private sectors, and 40 percent of the metropolitan areas were in states that prohibited such discrimination only in the public sector.

I have constructed one dummy variables to measure the presence of sodomy laws: Sodomy-1 is scored 1 if the metropolitan area is in a state that has a sodomy law directed against homosexuals and heterosexuals, and 0 if not. I expect that the sodomy

variables should be negatively related to the levels of concentration of gay and lesbian partners, that is, the levels of gay and lesbian concentration should be lower in metropolitan areas in states with sodomy laws.

I have also constructed two dummy variables measuring the presence in the state of laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. Anti-disc-1 is scored 1 if the metropolitan area is in a state with laws prohibiting discrimination in the private sectors, and 0 if not. Anti-disc-2 is scored 1 if the metropolitan area is in a state with laws prohibiting discrimination in the public sector, and 0 if not.

The size of the metropolitan area's total population should also be associated in a positive way with the levels of gay and lesbian concentration. There is good reason to expect higher levels of gay and lesbian concentration in metropolitan areas with larger populations (Abrahamson 2002; Rosenfeld 2007). These expectations are based in part on the notion that the larger the size of the general population, the greater the likelihood for some of these people to be gay and lesbian. Because a few metropolitan areas are outliers owing to their extremely large populations, I have taken the natural log of the metropolitan area's population size in 2000.

Finally, I believe there is reason to expect that levels of gay and lesbian concentration should be associated with levels of heterosexual cohabitation. If the social and political climate of an area is conducive to heterosexual cohabitation, the same should be the case for homosexual cohabitation (Black et al 2002). Thus areas with high rates of unmarried heterosexuals who are cohabiting should have high rates of homosexual cohabitation, and vice versa. I have taken unmarried partner data from

Census 2000 and have calculated for each metropolitan area the number of unmarried heterosexual cohabiting households per 1,000 total households.

Table 4.9 presents the results of two ordinary least squares multiple regression equations modeling the prevalence of gays and lesbians among the 331 metropolitan areas. The dependent variable is the second gay(lesbian) rate, namely, the number of partnered gays(lesbians) per 1,000 never married males(females) of age 18 and over; the above mentioned twelve variables are the independent variables. I have placed positive or negative signs to the right of the variable name indicating the direction of the variable's hypothesized relationship with the gay/lesbian rate.

I note first that the statistical tolerances of the twelve independent variables are all acceptable, ranging from a low of .40 (Southern Baptists per 1,000 population) to a high of .76 (infant mortality rate, and the log of population size). The mean tolerance of the twelve independent variables is .52.

Table 4.9. Metric and Standardized Regression Coefficients from Multiple Regression Equations of Gay and Lesbian Partnering Rates (per 1,000 Never Married Males/Females age 18+) on Twelve Independent Variables, 331 Metropolitan Areas of the U.S., 2000 U.S. Census Data

Independent Variables	Gay Rate 1		Lesbian Rate 1	
	metric	standardized	metric	standardized
Unemployment Rate (-)	0.386*	.153	.901*	0.288
Poverty Rate (-)	-.415*	-.296	-.771*	-.444
Infant Mortality Rate (-)	-.180	-.060	-.651*	-.176
Temperature Index (+)	22.136*	.449	28.906*	.474
Percent Voting for Dole, 1996 (-)	-.108*	-.142	-.089*	-.093
Southern Baptists per 1,000 Population (-)	.012*	.187	.027*	.341
Sodomy (Homo and Hetero) (-)	1.475	.087	.879	.042
Sodomy (Homo) (-)	1.123	.054	2.926*	.114
Anti-discrimination (public & private) (+)	-.379	-.023	-2.081*	-.102
Anti-discrimination (public) (+)	-.423	-.030	.698	.040
Log of Population size of Met Area (+)	1.905*	.287	.165	.020
Heterosexual Cohabitation Rate (+)	.109*	.146	.340*	.367
Constant		-6.953		13.285
R^2 (adj.)		.417		.395

* p-value > 0.05

Of the twelve regression coefficients in the OLS equation predicting levels of gay concentration, eight are signed in the hypothesized direction, but of these correctly signed coefficients, only five are statistically significant. The more agreeable the physical temperature of the area, the higher the concentration of gay partners. And the higher the poverty rate in the metropolitan area, and the higher the percentage voting Republican, the lower the concentration of partnered gays. And the larger the area's population, and the higher the level of heterosexual cohabitation, the higher the concentration of gays. None of the three independent variables dealing with sodomy laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual orientation are significantly associated in the hypothesized negative direction with the level of gay concentration.

The most influential of the independent variables is the temperature index. For every one standard deviation increase in the temperature index, there is almost a one-half standard deviation increase in the gay concentration rate, holding constant the effects of the other independent variables. In order, the next most influential independent variables are the poverty rate, the log of population size, the heterosexual cohabitation rate, and the percent voting Republican. The independent variables account for over 41 percent of the variation in the gay partnering rate.

The results of the OLS regression equation modeling the prevalence of lesbians among the metropolitan areas are similar to those modeling the prevalence of gays. The main differences in the two sets of results are as follows: the infant mortality rate is significant in the lesbian equation. The presence of laws prohibiting discrimination in the public and private sectors on the basis of sexual orientation is significant in the lesbian

equation, but the log of population size is not. The most influential independent variable in the lesbian equation, as in the gay equation, is the temperature index, and the next most important are the poverty rate and the heterosexual cohabitation rate. The independent variables account for almost 40 percent of the variation among the metropolitan areas in the lesbian prevalence rate, which is an adjusted R^2 value only slightly less than that in the gay equation.

In both the partnered gay and partnered lesbian equations, it appears that of the significant independent variables, the most important ones are amenity-based effects that apply to the population in general, and not only to homosexuals, a conclusion reached by Black and his associates (2002) in their study of San Francisco and other areas with large relatives numbers of gays. The next most influential independent variables, however, are effects that operate primarily for homosexuals. I turn now to a discussion of these results.

4.4. Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter I addressed two issues. The first was the development of five rates to measure the levels of concentration of gay and lesbian partnering in the United States, metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and 4,079 census tracts. While each rate has statistical, descriptive, and demographic merit, I focused on one of the rates, that measuring the number of partnered gays, or partnered lesbians, per 1,000 never married males, or females, of age 18 and over. Statistically and demographically, I argued, this rate has the most defensible denominator, that is, it is based on the statistically "best" population from which partnered lesbians and gays are drawn.

I then described the settlement patterns of gay and lesbian partners. Results from all five rates indicated that gay partners and lesbian partners settle in states that one would expect: California, Vermont, and Florida and do not live in North and South Dakota. For gay partners, the five rates indicated that San Francisco has the highest gay partner levels of concentration in 2000. For lesbian partners, four of the five rates indicated that the largest concentration of lesbian partners in 2000 is in Santa Rosa. Most of the rates showed that Dubuque has the lowest levels of concentrations of gays and lesbians. Moreover, I demonstrated that variance of gay and lesbian prevalence occurs across the United States. Also, the five gay/lesbian rates are all highly correlated with each other, suggesting any of these rates could be used almost interchangeably. Owing to the high correlation between the gay rates and the lesbian rates, I also concluded that gay and lesbian couples tend to settle in similar metropolitan areas although not at the same levels and also not in the same census tracts. Gay men tend to have a few favorite metropolitan areas, namely, San Francisco, Atlanta, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Miami, Jersey City, Washington, DC, New York, and Fort Lauderdale, where their prevalence rates surpass those of lesbians. Partnered lesbians, on the other hand, tend to have concentrations that are greater than those of gays in most of the metropolitan areas, tending not to prefer certain areas to the degree they are preferred by gays.

Second, I asked about the kinds of structural determinants that influence and are related to the geographical locations of gay and lesbian partners. Drawing on limited literature dealing with gay and lesbian settlement patterns, I identified characteristics of metropolitan areas that have been argued to be related to levels of gay and lesbian

concentration. Structural determinants that I predicted to impact gay and lesbian settlement patterns seemed to have little influence upon gay and lesbian prevalence.

In the multivariate context, the variables that were the most influential in predicting levels of gay and lesbian concentration were a physical temperature index (average January temperature divided by average July temperature), the poverty rate, and the heterosexual cohabitation rate. Variables that I had constructed to represent cultural schema and focusing on characteristics of the metropolitan areas of relevance mainly to gays and lesbians such as those dealing with sodomy law and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual orientation, as well as presence of political and religious conservatism were either not statistically important predictors or exhibited minimal influences. For instance, the independent variable, Southern Baptist membership, is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction of the prediction. There are three main reasons for this possibility. First, religious identity may not be important to gay men and lesbians. Singer and Deschamps (1994) found that 62% of gay men and lesbians feel that religion is not an important part of their lives. Secondly, gay men and lesbians who may not deal with religious institutions that condemn important aspects of their sexual identity. Thirdly, Sherkat (1997; 1998) argues that gay men and lesbians underconsume religious goods. Gay men and lesbians are rejected by most religious organizations that would "very likely diminish many nonheterosexuals' capacities to adapt preferences for religious goods" (Sherkat 2002: 315).

Other independent variables which were not statistically significant were the laws and ordinance variables. Of the laws and ordinances variables only the anti-

discrimination laws in private variable is statistically significant and in the opposite direction of the prediction. This suggests that enforcement of sodomy and anti-discrimination laws were sporadic at best and remain more of a symbolic threat towards gay men and lesbians (Eskridge 2002).

Quantitative assessments of the patterns of gay and lesbian prevalence in U.S. metropolitan areas are particularly relevant today given the active discussions in the political, religious, and social arenas with regard to gay marriage, the adoption of children by gays and lesbians, and other issues involving sexual orientation. As Gates and Ost (2004: 3) have noted, these topics lead to intense discussions, arguments and debates, most of which are "marked by an astonishing lack of empirical data." It has been difficult if not impossible for policymakers, community activists, and gay and lesbian leaders to appraise the effects that gay marriage laws, domestic partnership benefits, adoption rights, and other related issues would have on the homosexual and heterosexual communities in the country because of the paucity of information about the locations of gays and lesbians. Aside from everyone seeming to know that there are a lot of homosexuals in San Francisco, the amount of knowledge about the prevalence of gays and lesbians elsewhere in the U.S. is miniscule.

In the next chapter, I inquire about how gay men and lesbians filled out the census form. Only about thirty-five percent of gay men and lesbian filled in the "unmarried partner" category. Most of the respondents discuss the census form as a legal document. I argue that my respondents exhibit a legal consciousness of injustice

(Marshall 2005). As a result of this analysis, I argue for a new concept which I call statistical consciousness.

CHAPTER V

LEGAL AND STATISTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In the previous chapter, I analyzed Census data to determine how the State defines and determines same-sex households. Furthermore, I provided five different indices to measure same-sex households. Implementing Sewell's argument about structure as represented in resources and cultural schema, I argued that same-sex households would have specific resources and cultural schema that would encourage them to settle in certain areas of the United States as opposed to other areas of the United States. However, many variables operationalized as resources and cultural schemas specific to gay and lesbian households were not statistically significant or lacked statistical power when compared to other variables.

In this chapter, I turn to how individual gay and lesbian couples respond to the Census categories and how they socially construct their relationships. While the State suggests how same-sex households should mark their relationship on the Census Schedule, gay and lesbian couples mark various categories on the Census Schedule, that is, using their own agency, they marked categories based on three major themes. The three major themes are: 1) redefining relationships in the context of the Census Schedule; 2) enumeration and misenumeration; and 3) utilization of consciousness.

5.1. (Re)Defining Relationship in the Context of the Census Schedule

Significantly more people marked "single" or "unmarried partner," than "housemate/roommate" or "husband/wife" (Table 5.1). Fifty-four percent of the interviews and fifty-one percent of the respondents from the Internet survey marked

"single" on the Census Schedule. The next most marked category was "unmarried partner" with 32% of the interviewees and 30% of respondents from the internet survey marking this category. Very few of the respondents marked "husband/wife" category.

Table 5.1. How Respondents Marked the Census Schedule

	Unmarried Partners N (Percentage)	Divorced N (Percentage)	Married N (Percentage)	Single N (Percentage)	Husband/Wife N (Percentage)
Interviews	7 (32)	0 (0)	1 (5)	12 (54)	2 (9)
Internet Survey	14 (30)	3 (6)	6 (13)	24 (51)	0 (0)

The biggest factor in picking a category was the duration of the relationship. If the relationship was new, then the couples tended to mark housemate/roommate or single. For instance, Margaret and Joanne had recently started a relationship and had just moved in together. At the time of the 2000 Census Schedule, they lived in separate households. Margaret suggests that because of the newness of their relationship she would have picked housemate/roommate. Margaret stated,

> Well, I'm not sure but I would either pick for Joanne or I mean Joanne and I would talk about it….. I would either say housemate or roommate or unmarried partner depending on how she felt about it and… I imagine we would talk about what it would mean to say unmarried partner and if there would be any ramifications for that and…if there might be positive reasons to say unmarried partner so that we were counted as lesbians and not as assume straight people, straight women living together. Housemates/roommates, …but also we have not

> been together that long so I wouldn't necessarily apply the term partner to her in other circumstances. They don't give the option girlfriend so…either partner or roommate I guess would be the closest answer.

Margaret struggles to define the category that her relationship is in. She varies from filling it out herself without a discussion with Joanne to having an in-depth discussion with Joanne to choosing "either partner or roommate."

This struggle about how to define the couple's relationship was not unusual. Similar to Margaret, others were very confused about the census categories and vacillated between which categories they would chose. For instance, Lucy stated, "It was either housemate/roommate or wife." Furthermore, Kate stated, "Depending on how advanced the relationship was, it might be roommate or husband/wife." In neither Lucy's nor Kate's interview, did they state they would mark 'unmarried partner' on the Census form.

In Paula's situation everyone knows the couple as housemates, but on the Census Schedule she defines her relationship as an unmarried partnership. She states:

> Well, I don't know if we should say married, but probably, well, but everybody knows us as housemates, but I don't know. I would, in my personal opinion? Okay, then I'm an unmarried partner

In these cases, respondents could not categorize their relationship into set Census categories, but waffle on how to label their relationships.

Others were adamant about their choice and had few problems defining the significance of their relationship. For these respondents, the emphasis was placed upon

the strength of the relationship. For example, Candace a White graduate student attending seminary and Andrea had been in a relationship for five years. As Candace examined the Census Schedule, she stated:

> Because she is more than householder, roommate, more than roomer or boarder. She's not an other, non-relative. I thought about putting other relative, and putting partner, to put exact relationship. But unmarried partner probably comes closes.

Candace provides significance to the category of partner. She examines all of the categories and determines the best category for her significant other is partner. Aimee, a White counselor who had been with her partner for over twenty years, made similar comments. She stated:

> Aimee: Is there a partner choice? I picked that one.
>
> Carol: The unmarried partner.
>
> Aimee: Yea yea, that's what I put.
>
> Carol: Okay, so why did you pick that one?
>
> Aimee: Because that's the truth. You know, ten years ago I would talk about my roommate. She's not my roommate, she's not my friend, she's my partner.

For Aimee, ten years ago she would have classified her partner as a roommate not a partner. However, because she has been with her significant other for ten years, she defines her as a partner. Aimee places significance upon the category of partner.

Others had various problems with filling out the Census form. Two people had just recently moved and could not remember receiving a form. A few couples had

recently moved into a shared living space but were not in the same household at the time of the Census. For example, Xavier had accepted a new job in a different city. He felt that his home was with his partner, Don, but he would have received a Census form in both locations. Because of this migration, Xavier does not recall receiving the Census form or filling it out. He assumes that Don filled it out. Xavier stated,

> I don't remember receiving it which is pretty bad. I don't remember we receiving maybe Don got it in [another city]? You think I did it and I don't, won't remember…See I was moving March or April of 2000. See we probably got it in [another city]. Don probably filled it out.

In this case, Xavier believes that Don counted him in his household in another city, but he was actually living in a different city. Kenneth Pewitt (2003), previous Census Bureau Chef, notes that he had a similar problem. His family was living in a different location while he was living in Washington D.C. While his home was with his family, he also received a short form of the 2000 Census Schedule at his apartment. He was being counted in two different locations.

Additionally, gay and lesbian couples' legality as a couple came into question. Brianna's partner was legally married to her separated husband at the time the Census Schedule reached their door. Both Brianna and Jasmine had previously been married. However, Jasmine was still legally married to her separated husband. When filling out the Census form during the interview, Brianna commented that

> Well, I don't know cause she is still married. I don't know if you have to do this legally. Probably. Everyone knows us as housemates. I don't know. I…would lets see. I'm Person 2. Then I am unmarried partner. Yes.

Although at the time of the interview, she might have chosen the unmarried partner category, her partner was legally in a heterosexual marriage. This caused Brianna trouble in determining how to mark their relationship on the Census Schedule.

5.2. Enumeration and Misenumeration: Power in Numbers

Literature has suggested that same-sex households are underenumerated (Black et al. 2000, 2002). In the previous section, many same-sex households did not mark their relationship on the Census Schedule because of how they felt about the relationship, but also because of mobility, heterosexual marriage, and discrimination felt by the respondents. Other researchers postulate that gay and lesbian couples may not understand the census questions and categories.

When I asked if the relationship question was confusing, some of the respondents discussed how they were frustrated with Census categories. Larry and David, an interethnic couple, found the household question confusing because it does not account for gay and lesbian couples. Larry stated,

> Larry: I would say what is your relationship?
>
> David: Yea, what is your relationship to Person 1, and I think they should have, I mean they print other exact relationship. Gay lover? I mean what are you going to put there? You know, it seems like they could add some other box to check that said same-sex spouse, or same-sex domestic partner.

Larry: Right. I mean there is the option of not related, but it's unmarried partner. You know there could be another option that said partner.

David: Same-sex domestic partner.

Larry: Right.

Ava, furthermore, found the question confusing because she felt it did not differentiate between relative and non-relative. To her, her partner is a "blood relative," even if society does not view her partner as such.[39] She states,

Yes. Because what's the difference between other relative, other non-relative, unmarried partner? You know, trying to find the best option, it comes down to three that I can choose from, or four, some people would consider housemate/roommate as an option for gay and lesbian couples but...

More often, the interviewees did not find the question confusing at all. *They understood what the question was asking and how it was being answered in the current social and political environment.* Ava notes that she completely understands what the question means in "the current social and political environment," that is, she should not mark "wife" as a legitimate choice. Ava demonstrates that even though she understands how to answer the question, she is refusing to do so and is in opposition to being categorized as a non-relative.

Chloe, who was living in the household by herself at the time of the census and did not answer the door when a census-taker came to the door, verbally acknowledged

[39] This is not uncommon for gays and lesbians to view non-blood relations as blood relations or as families of kin (Weston 1997).

each category and concludes that her partner is not a relation. She does not find the question confusing. She states,

> How is this person related to person 1? Husband or wife. Natural born son/daughter. Adopted. Father. Child. Grandchild. Son. Mother in law. Other relative print…So if you're not married then you're not related, so I would not think it would be, yea, it's cool. I would not be married. And even if I did exchange rings on a United States constitution, as far as I know it, and also Texas law, I don't think I could define her as relations (a kin). So, sorry about that, ya'll.

Chloe's answer again reveals an awareness that her own personal actions engage with socially enforced definitions and boundaries. She does not find this question confusing, and because she is conscious of "Texas law" and "even if I did exchange rings" she would not consider her partner a relation (a kin). She is fine-tuning the differences between partnership and legal relatives, acknowledging her lack of power in changing those boundaries, and she's "cool" with it.

In the interview, I asked the interviewees if gay men and lesbians would want to be counted by the Census Bureau. Some of the respondents suggested that they would not want the Census Bureau to collect data about gay male and lesbian couples. For instance, David asserted that the form was not meant to collect data about gay men and lesbians. He stated

> Because it's not designed with GLBT [gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender] issues in mind. It's designed from a heterosexual view and it leaves that bit of information out, and it's not written sensitively wise for GLBT.

David points out the Census Schedule represents heteronormativity. He specifically states, "It's designed from a heterosexual view." Others were unsure about being counted by the Census Bureau. Sophia, stated, "I don't know. I don't see the need."

Other respondents would like the Census Bureau to collect data about gay men and lesbians to exert power via numbers. Christiania, for example, believes that the ten percent figure (Kinsey 1948) that estimates the number of gay men and lesbians living in the United States is too low. She states,

> Yes, because I think that 10% is a low number. But that is kind of out there, and I really think that there are more, and that data can really affect the laws that are being created and those laws can improve the lives of gay people. Particularly the poor, I know a lot of gay people at the poverty level, and there could be laws that would improve there lives, like getting tax breaks. And I could bring an awareness that everybody isn't heterosexual.

Christiania asserts that power and law can be changed by being enumerated by the Census Bureau. Gay men and lesbians could gain resources related to being counted by the Census Bureau.

Madeline also believed there is significant value in being counted on the Census Schedule. She asserts,

> Personally, yes. I don't think there is anything wrong with it. I think that anonymity is our biggest downfall. I don't see any reason why anybody would want to count how many blacks, how many Asians, how many queers. But if they wanted to, I don't have any reason why I wouldn't stand up and say "Yes I am." However, most of my friends are professionals, and they don't want the closet door open. And will not be counted.

Interestingly, Madeline's partner is a teacher in a rural district and must walk a line between being "out" and too "out." Furthermore, Madeline compares queers with Blacks and Asians, in that, if racial groups are counted then queers should also be counted. For Madeline, being counted suggests being out of the closet and having others aware of her sexual identity. Madeline judges others as living in the closet and thus would not be counted by the Census Bureau.

Whereas Madeline focused on the similarities to other racial groups being counted, Heather focused on the differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Heather agrees that gay men and lesbians should be counted because "We are a unique class in ourselves." Heather suggests that gay men and lesbians are there own group with their own interests.

Leigh argues that gay men and lesbians should be counted by the Census Bureau, but does not believe that all gay men and lesbians would be willing to be counted. As we saw above Madeline provided a similar analysis. Leigh states,

> Yes. Because I think we are under-counted. People don't think there are very many of us. I think the stereotypical 10% of us is very low. But I don't think that everyone would honestly do it.

I have defined statistical consciousness as using statistics in everyday life,. The above quotes suggest that many of my respondents felt that there was power in being enumerated. The respondents suggested that if gay men and lesbians were enumerated by the Census Bureau, society would find that there are many gay men and lesbians living in the United States. Similar to the multiracial movement for the Census Schedule, interviewees argue that enumeration by the Census Bureau would decrease anonymity and thus create more power for gay men and lesbians. Furthermore, these respondents judge that closet gay men and lesbians will not mark their relationship on the Census Schedule.

5.3. Utilization of Legal Consciousness

Law is a social construction and is fluid in the boundaries that it sets up. Law helps shape the meaning that people make of their lives – the way that they understand the living conditions created by structural inequality (Engel and Munger 2003; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Merry 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1993; Nielsen 2000). People may see in law and the legal system a set of traps that support systems of oppression, but they may also find in law a set of tools to resist such oppression (Merry 1995; McCann 1994; Thompson 1975). But law alone does not determine people's interpretations of their experiences. Rather, it is one of many frames and schemas – both hegemonic and subversive – that promote or discourage the everyday conflicts that constitute social

change. Law supported oppressive regimes at the same time that it represented the hopes and aspirations of liberation, but it was always part of a larger social struggle that touched everyday lives (Marshall 2005: 2).

In my interviews, the continual discussion about gay marriage framed how the respondents viewed the Census Schedule. Some respondents made legal distinctions on which category they chose. When I asked if respondents would fill out the Census form in a different manner, the respondents tended to respond in legalistic terms. Many discussed how they were denied the ability to marry. Often the interviewees' definition of household intersected with the current debates about gay marriage. For instance, Tristan and Matthew, who met at a university that they attended as undergraduates and have been a couple for over twenty years, stated that they marked the 'unmarried category' but when I asked if they would ever mark 'husband,' they responded as to why they would not as:

> Matthew: Because they won't recognize gay marriage
>
> Tristan: Recently I was doing a survey by Jack in the Box, the ones that you go to the web and do the number off the receipt, and I actually wrote them in the comments box because they had significant other on there. And I feel that significant other is much more meaningful than unmarried partner. Or civil unions; we don't have a problem with 'other' because from our stand point we want marriage for the legal benefits, and that goes back to what you believe; that you should be showing your commitment through your actions. So that other people can see that you are committed to each other. Most people don't know us

> as anything other than Matthew and Tristan. Because they always see us together. And it is in part that we are always together, as you can tell we talk in stereo together. And so I was very happy with the significant other option on there rather than having to check other or none sometimes. Unmarried partner isn't used a lot. Usually it is single or married…
>
> Matthew: single, married or divorced. Since it's a legal document probably not. But we refer to ourselves as husbands.
>
> Tristan: When we are asked for a beneficiary on an insurance form and they ask the relationship, at the point we put husband. If it is an IRS form, and we know what definition they are going by, then we follow the definition because we feel that it is important.

For Matthew and Tristan, they would mark some other category because unmarried partner does not represent their relationship. Furthermore, they would mark single on the Census Schedule, because of where the document is going to go. Matthew and Tristan suggested that they understand the question, but decided to not mark their relationship on the Census Schedule. Another couple discussed not marking unmarried partner or wife on the Census Schedule, because they were suspicious of the government knowing about their relationship. In Matthew and Tristan's case, they did not mark their relationship because they constructed it as a legal document that should not be falsified.

Furthermore, Madeline, a White working class women who has been in a relationship with her partner for over twenty years and raising a daughter, refered to her partner as a spouse in their everyday life. On the Census Schedule, she marked

'unmarried partner.' She defined 'unmarried partner' as "[W]e aren't married because the law won't allow it. So we have to call it a partnership. Because the law sucks." Clearly, Madeline is suggesting a legal consciousness of injustice. She calls her partner spouse in their everyday lives, but marks unmarried partner on the Census Schedule. Moreover, she is aware of the law and even describes it as "suck[ing]" because she feels as if they are married.

Additionally, Heather, a White university professor who is raising three children, filled out the Census form and marked 'unmarried partner' for her partner. When I asked if she would have considered marking wife as a Census category, she stated

> I have referred to her as my wife, and I suppose now in certain states, then yes a person could refer to them as wife. In 2000 I can't remember if it was legal in certain states. I affectionately refer to her as my wife, but I know that I am not legally married to her, and that I wouldn't on a census form refer to somebody as my wife.

During the interview Heather divulged that although she and her partner were recently separated, they had included each other on insurance forms, and her partner had a guardian ad lieu for their three children. In everyday life, they had labeled their relationship as spouses, but on the Census form Heather did not mark 'wife' because she was not "legally married to her partner" Furthermore, she is unsure of her legal status in Texas or other states about being married. She falsely (at the time of the interview) asserts that in some states she and her partner would have the option to be married.

In a similar manner, Chloe refers to her partner, Brooke as unmarried partner. She defines their relationship on the Census form as "unmarried partner," and then states when asked if she would ever mark wife,

> Chloe: Not seriously. Because I think the most accurate term is unmarried partner. In legal terms we are unmarried partners, but if anything were to happen to one of us, I would call her my wife because that's how we are emotionally.

In the above quote, Chloe labels her relationship as spouse; "my wife because that's how we are emotionally," but on a Census form, she clearly delineates that the relationship is 'unmarried partner.' In all of these examples, respondents understood rightly or wrongly the legal climate and their status as legally married. In all the above quotes, people understood what the relationship question was asking, but defined the Census Schedule as a legal document. In many cases, the were aware of the legal injustices that were occurring to them, but still answered the relationship question in the "correct" manner.

During the time of the interviews, some politicians were proposing a Constitutional Amendment to define marriage as one man and one woman. Prior to the suggested Constitutional Amendment, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and state (DOMAS) defined marriage as occurring between one man and one woman. I asked interviewees if they were aware of the Defense of Marriage Act and if so, how they defined it. Everyone, except for Toby, was aware of the Defense of Marriage Act. All those who knew of it disagreed with the Defense of Marriage Act.

Abigail chose to redefine what the Defense of Marriage Act meant. She argued that "lesbian marriage" was much better than heterosexual marriage. She stated,

> Well, as far as I know, my opinion of it is it's really cool. That defense of marriage is good. We should define our relationship as better than defense of marriage. We should define it as lesbian marriage because it's much much better than heterosexual marriage, so they can keep their heterosexual marriage if they give us a different title.

Other interviews focused on political and civil rights discourse. For instance, Matthew and Tristan stated that the Defense of Marriage Act was:

> Matthew: A bunch of crap
>
> Tristan: OK, the Defense of Marriage Act is DOMA, and not the federal marriage…ok, it goes back to; that politicians go to the highest bidder now and aren't truly representative of the people. Therefore they are going for the highest paying constituents, and that is the extreme radical right, and they people in charge, even in Clinton's day are trying to placate the right because we scare people. And it all goes back to the fact that most of the surveys that I like generally ask the same question "do you believe in gay marriage?" then follow that question with "do you know a gay person?" and generally people that know a gay person are more likely to be accepting and think differently. The unknown scares them. For the politicians, it is a divide and conquer strategy…
>
> Matthew:…absolutely…
>
> Tristan: all they are trying to do is divide the nation and conquer the other party. Not gay people necessary, but we are the scapegoats now.
>
> Matthew: we are what the communists used to be…

Tristan:….right. something that they could money off of.

Previously, Madeline used a rights discourse to discuss the similarities between gay men and lesbians and racial minorities. In the exchange above, Matthew and Tristan view the Defense of Marriage Act as extremely political, that is, the politicians are just using the Defense of Marriage Act as a "divid[e] and conquer strategy." Furthermore, Matthew and Tristan believed that gay men and lesbians are being used as "scapegoats" and the new "communists."

Furthermore, Matthew and Tristan viewed the proposed federal amendment as unconstitutional. They argue,

> Matthew: totally wrong from the standpoint of putting bigotry into the Constitution. There has never been a amendment taking away the rights of people, except for prohibition. And it shouldn't start with this. What the problem is, is that it is a very slippery slope that we would be going down if we do it. What is going to happen next? Are the going to allow choice decisions? Women's right to choose. They are going back to race relations…possibly immigration. All these different things that people love to be bigoted about. We would only be the start of it. I find many, many more people that are willing to go against in for that reason…
>
> Tristan: than disagree with gay marriage…
>
> Matthew: yea definitely disagree with gay marriage. Reading about that really annoys me, and I cant imagine that the Supreme Court will allow it because it says something to the effect…according to the Constitution entire judiciary is the

> Supreme Court and other are create as the lamb of Congress, so this tells the Congress that they have the authority to tell the lower level courts that they cant even hear cases about whether DOMA is constitutional. And it revokes any appellate jurisdiction that the Supreme Court has, which I don't think they have the power to, and it seems extremely republican to me. Basically if they disagree with something, they don't even want you to hear the opposition. It's like with Fahrenheit 911. Do they try to tell people to not see it, to tell them its awful, NO, they try to get it out of the theatres so you cant have the option to see it. Its like they don't trust their own voters to vote republican, they redistrict so they have to. Its all about taking away choices. That's what the republicans are all about right now…but its not like I am biased or bitter at this point.

Natalie focused on similarities and differences between heterosexual and gay marriage. She defined the Defense of Marriage Act as, "Well, were all afraid of different, and we don't want anybody but a man and a woman to be married because of the sanctity of marriage." When I asked her opinions about the Defense of Marriage Act, she argued that it was about politics and economics.

> It's stupid. It's political. It's about economics. And she said I don't need to be on my partner's healthcare benefits. They don't really care if I'm married or not. I mean most people, the sanctity of marriage, you go to Las Vegas and get married on a whim.

Another respondent declared the Defense of Marriage Act as also being political and turning the country away from what politically really matter, the Iraq War.

Candace has a similar strong reaction to the Defense of Marriage Act. When I asked her how she defined it, she stated,

> Getting on, and getting along straight, so to speak. That was the one that Clinton signed that basically said that if one state allows gay marriage, then the other states are not required to view it as a marriage.

She continues when asked about her opinion of it,

> Clinton appealed to us to get him in office, and then he screwed us once he got there. Both with gays in the military, and the marriage act…To constitutionally disallow one of the populations of society full legal rights that another group has is unconstitutional. So, despite my sexuality, or morals, whatever spiritual stance, politically I think is unconstitutional.

Candace discusses not only the political aspect, that is, Clinton signing the Defense of Marriage Act into law and that she views it as unconstitutional but also the moral and spiritual aspects. Many researchers (Eskridge 2001; Goldberg-Hiller 2004; Mello 2004; Rauch 2004) have discussed the civil rights discourse associated with gay marriage, but few have discussed the moral or spiritual aspects. For Candace, everything in her life centers around her religious aspects. While she discusses political implications, the moral and spiritual are much more important.

5.4. Discussion and Conclusion

Badgett and Rogers (2005: 1) conducted two surveys, one at the Millennium March and an online survey. They found that the vast majority of respondents marked ‘unmarried partner’ and then ‘housemate/roommate’ rather than ‘husband/wife. Only

twenty-nine percent of respondents at the Millennium March chose "husband/wife" while none of the respondents on the online survey marked "husband/wife" (Badgett and Rogers 2005: 7). In contrast to my data, I had more variety of responses. People varied in how they filled out the Census form and how they marked the Census form, either unmarried partner, or housemate or roommate or single. The majority of my interviewees picked single.

With the majority of respondents both in the interviews and on the internet survey marking single on the Census Schedule suggests that gays and lesbians are being underenumerated. Black and his colleagues (2000) find that same-sex households are underenmerated by as much as 60 percent. I found that only 35% of the respondents in my interviews and the internet survey would be enumerated as same-sex households by the Census Bureau.

Using statistics in everyday life, I have defined as statistical consciousness. My respondents felt that there was power in being enumerated. The respondents suggested that if gay men and lesbians were enumerated by the Census Bureau, society would find that there are many gay men and lesbians living in the United States. Similar to the multiracial movement for the Census Schedule, interviewees argue that enumeration by the Census Bureau would decrease anonymity and thus create more power for gay men and lesbians. Furthermore, these respondents judge that closet gay men and lesbians will not mark their relationship on the Census Schedule.

Phua and Kaufman (1999) suggested that gay men and lesbians may not understand the Census question. In my interviews, gay men and lesbians definitely

understood what the relationship question meant and how they should fill the Census Schedule. For many of the interviewees it was not that they did not want to make their household on the Census Schedule. It was that they constructed the Census Schedule as a legal document; as a "cultural toolkit." Just as in Marshall's (2005) work, gay men and lesbians were aware of legal injustices that were occurring. Because gay and lesbian couples constructed the Census Schedule as a legal document, they had little agency to mark differently under the social and political milieu surrounding debates about gay marriage.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have discussed how the state, via the Census, has variously shaped and defined households, family, race, and ethnic categories. I have also noted the dual aspects that structures sexuality – the cultural schemas, tied to heteronormativity, that typically negatively define homosexuality and resources, the material consequences denied to gay men and lesbians, e.g. housing, child custody, and employment of these schemas.

While I have focused on the structuring forces centered on sexuality, I recognize structures are not unilaterally enacted. Rather, just as structures shape people's behaviors, individual practices impact those same structures. Much of the evolution of Census categories has in fact been in response to lobbying efforts by particular groups. Pressures by women's groups led to the change of the head of household category to Person 1. Multiple groups, people, and legislators have tried to influence the categories on the Census Schedule, the Census Schedule still revolves around a nuclear heterosexual family formation (de la Puente 1993; Martin and Griffin 1994; Presser 1998).

In Chapter IV, I developed five statistical rates to measure the levels of concentration of gay and lesbian partnering in the United States, 331 metropolitan areas, counties, and specific tracts of the U.S. in 2000. While each rate has statistical, descriptive, and demographic merit, I focused on one of the rates, that measuring the number of partnered gays, or partnered lesbians, per 1,000 never married males, or

females, of age 18 and over. Statistically and demographically, I argued, this rate has the most defensible denominator, that is, it is based on the statistically "best" population from which partnered lesbians and gays are drawn.

I then described the settlement patterns of gay and lesbian partners. Results from all five rates indicated that gay partners in San Francisco have the highest levels of concentration in 2000. For lesbian partners, four of the five rates indicated that the largest concentration of lesbian partners in 2000 is in Santa Rosa. Most of the rates showed that Dubuque has the lowest levels of concentrations of gays and lesbians. Also, the five gay/lesbian rates are all highly correlated with each other, suggesting any of these rates could be used almost interchangeably. Owing to the high correlation between the gay rates and the lesbian rates, I also concluded that gay and lesbian couples tend to settle in similar metropolitan areas, although not at the same levels. Indeed I showed that in over 92 percent of the metropolitan areas the levels of lesbian prevalence were greater than the levels of gay prevalence. Gays tend to have a few favorite metropolitan areas, namely, San Francisco, Atlanta, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Miami, Jersey City, Washington, DC, New York, and Fort Lauderdale, where their prevalence rates surpass those of lesbians. Partnered lesbians, on the other hand, tend to have concentrations that are greater than those of gays in most of the metropolitan areas, tending not to prefer certain areas to the degree they are preferred by gay men.

Second, I asked about the kinds of characteristics that influence and are related to the geographical locations of gay and lesbian partners. Drawing on sociological and a more limited literature dealing with gay and lesbian settlement patterns, I identified

characteristics of metropolitan areas that have been argued to be related to levels of gay and lesbian concentration.

In the multivariate context, the variables that were most influential in predicting levels of gay and lesbian concentration were a physical temperature index (average January temperature divided by average July temperature), the poverty rate, and the heterosexual cohabitation rate. Variables focusing on characteristics of the metropolitan areas of relevance mainly to gay men and lesbians such as those dealing with sodomy laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual orientation, as well as presence of political and religious conservatism were either not statistically important predictors or exhibited minimal influences. In regards to religious conservatism, many studies suggest why religious conservatism had little statistical influence upon gay and lesbian settlement patterns. For instance, Singer and Deschamps (1994) found from a survey of self-identified gay men and lesbians that 62% of gay men and lesbians feel that religion was not an important part of their lives. Secondly, gay men and lesbians have predominately been excluded from religious institutions. This argument postulates that if gay men and lesbians who are condemned by religious institutions in turn reject religious identities. Furthermore, Sherkat (1997, 1998) argues that gay men and lesbians underconsume religious goods and thus do not participate in religious activities. Sherkat (2002) finds that gay men have higher rates of religious participation than heterosexual men, while lesbians and bisexual women have significantly lower rates of religious participation than heterosexual women.

Chapter IV has undertaken a quantitative examination of the prevalence of partnered gays and lesbians in the metropolitan areas of the U.S. in 2000. It builds on and extends the previous and limited literature on the prevalence of gays and lesbians in geographical areas of the U.S. reviewed earlier in this paper (Gates and Ost 2004; Black et al. 2000, 2002; Walther and Poston 2004).

Quantitative assessments of the patterns of gay and lesbian prevalence in U.S. metropolitan areas are particularly relevant today given the active discussions in the political, religious, and social arenas with regard to gay marriage, the adoption of children by gays and lesbians, and other issues involving sexual orientation. As Gates and Ost (2004: 3) have noted, these topics lead to intense discussions, arguments and debates, most of which are "marked by an astonishing lack of empirical data." It has been difficult if not impossible for policymakers, community activists, and gay and lesbian leaders to appraise the effects that gay marriage laws, domestic partnership benefits, adoption rights, and other related issues would have on the queer and heterosexual communities in the country because of the paucity of information about the locations of gays and lesbians. Aside from everyone seeming to know that there are a lot of homosexuals in San Francisco, the amount of knowledge about the prevalence of gays and lesbians elsewhere in the U.S. is miniscule. It is hoped that the quantitative presentations in this dissertation will contribute toward addressing this void.

In Chapter V, I examined how gay and lesbian couples answered the Census Schedule. The highest percentage of individuals marked single on the Census Schedule. This is significant because more research is demonstrating that gay men and lesbians are

being underenumerated by the Census Bureau. I also found that the second most marked category was "unmarried partner" on the Census Schedule rather than "husband/wife" or "housemate/roommate." Many of the respondents based their marking on the Census Schedule based on how they viewed their relationship and how society viewed their relationship. For the couples who marked the category, husband/wife, had lived together for a longer time period, owned property together, and had not moved as often. They viewed themselves as a married couple – who deserved similar legal rights as heterosexual married couples.

Furthermore, in regards to the Census and the state, two underlying ideas influence 'individuals' enactments of agency: legal consciousness and statistical consciousness. Legal consciousness refers to people's lay understandings of the law, while statistical consciousness refers to everyday knowledge of statistics. In both cases the production of legal interpretation and statistics by authoritative sources is then variously understood, consumed, and employed by ordinary citizens for their distinct purposes. This understanding takes on forms of generally unquestioned folk knowledge, despite being socially constructed in specific historical-cultural contexts. The respondents described the Census Schedule as a legal document which they knew how to fill out properly. However, when I asked about other legal forms such as life insurance, interviewees have placed their partners on these forms. These forms are less secure than the Census Schedule. The production and consumption of statistics serve as a pivotal point of contestation of power and resistance, especially for these interviewees and newspaper accounts. Some of the respondents discussed wanting to be counted on the

Census Schedule because power is represented in enumeration. If one's household is counted, the group is powerful.

6.1. Future Research

One aspect of future research would include a comparison between how the Census Schedule has categorized race and households. As I alluded to in Chapter II, there is a strong connection between how the state responds to changes in society. For instance, in 1990 Census, very few same-sex households were reported. However, today, the American Community Survey has now begun to report data about male and female same-sex households. Comparing racial and household definitions provide what the transition that the Census Schedule evolves.

Furthermore, the American Community Survey (ACS) has some of the same issues as the 2000 Census Schedule. First, the ACS does not ask for one's sexual identity but enumerates same-sex households based on the gender and relationship question. As I have shown in Chapter V, the majority of gay men and lesbians marked "single" on the Census Schedule. Thus, the ACS will still have a significant undercount of gay men and lesbians. Secondly, the ACS does not do a good job of enumerating small areas. Although 70 percent of same-sex households live in metropolitan statistical areas, 30 percent do not. I have shown that there is variation across the counties in the prevalence of same-sex households. This suggests that the ACS will not be able to enumerate same-sex households living in smaller areas of the United States. Thirdly, the ACS continues with 'unmarried partner' as not being a family household. My interviewees noted that they consider their significant others as family members. For these reasons, I suggest

future research using the ACS for same-sex settlement patterns. I would also like to extend Chapter IV to include other countries, such as Canada and Australia.

As well, the concept of statistical consciousness can be linked to social movement literature. Gay and lesbian activists continue to assert that in the United States, 10 percent of the population is homosexual. Activists use the slogan, "10 percent," to show the power and numbers of the gay and lesbian population. The 10 percent statistic has taken on a mythical realm in queer communities. For instance, the 10 percent statistic has appeared in scholarly work (Jennings 1994; Smith 1998), work about religion (Thompson 2005) and youth (Owens 1998). Peter Sprigg from Family Research Center, accounts for 124,000 google hits of the 10 percent statistic. The 10 percent statistic has become pervasive throughout society. In every gay pride parade, the ten percent statistic is used to assert a large number of the population is queer. Tilly (1999: 203) argues that for social movements to have strength, the social movement must have worthiness X unity X numbers X commitment. The ten percent slogan has both symbolic meaning as well as having the ability to demonstrate numbers and power. A content-analysis of newspapers as the media reported the release of data about same-sex households and how those data has been used in media accounts would further explicate the concept of statistical analysis.

Finally, future research would extend the argument of sexualities as a structure. I dismiss postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives. Sexualities are not just "play" as Butler (1999) suggests. Furthermore, sexualities are not "serious play" (Derrida 1978). I noted various cultural schema and resources within the literature that illustrate how

sexualities as a structure intersect with the state and how individuals responded to these constructs. In Chapter V, many of the respondents suggest cultural schema to not marking their relationship on the Census Schedule. For instance, one interviewee stated she knew how to answer the question based on the current "social and political environment." This suggests that at least laws and the state are intersecting with sexualities and how these respondents mark their relationship on the Census Schedule.

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APPENDIX



Person 2

Your answers are important!
Every person in the Census counts.

1. What is Person 2's name? *Print name below.*
Last Name

First Name MI

2. How is this person related to Person 1? *Mark* ☒ *ONE box.*

- ☐ Husband/wife
- ☐ Natural-born son/daughter
- ☐ Adopted son/daughter
- ☐ Stepson/stepdaughter
- ☐ Brother/sister
- ☐ Father/mother
- ☐ Grandchild
- ☐ Parent-in-law
- ☐ Son-in-law/daughter-in-law
- ☐ Other relative — *Print exact relationship.*

If NOT RELATED to Person 1:

- ☐ Roomer, boarder
- ☐ Housemate, roommate
- ☐ Unmarried partner
- ☐ Foster child
- ☐ Other nonrelative

3. What is this person's sex? *Mark* ☒ *ONE box.*

☐ Male ☐ Female

4. What is this person's age and what is this person's date of birth?
Print numbers in boxes.

Age on April 1, 2000 | Month | Day | Year of birth

Figure A.1. 2000 Census Short Form Schedule (U.S. Census Bureau 2007)

Table A.1. Female Same-Sex Rates for States, 2000 U.S. Census

States	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Alabama	11.16	27.17	470.77	70.54	2.38
Alaska	17.43	35.64	662.45	42.07	3.15
Arizona	15.29	34.06	633.92	51.22	3.18
Arkansas	11.05	30.80	432.52	55.42	2.15
California	15.56	30.06	678.07	62.21	3.69
Colorado	16.62	34.79	674.17	59.25	3.25
Connecticut	13.09	26.92	567.59	55.57	2.94
Delaware	12.98	26.53	575.51	48.58	2.97
Florida	13.05	33.12	562.27	48.86	2.84
Georgia	13.53	28.38	581.69	62.01	3.00
Hawaii	11.68	22.60	501.83	49.12	2.86
Idaho	11.64	28.93	415.77	43.03	2.06
Illinois	10.27	20.30	450.40	48.88	2.33
Indiana	10.72	24.84	442.50	41.37	2.21
Iowa	8.44	19.25	336.50	33.60	1.66
Kansas	10.53	25.30	410.74	49.29	2.00
Kentucky	11.96	30.57	480.25	53.38	2.39
Louisiana	11.79	24.73	540.57	55.38	2.79
Maine	17.91	43.56	748.08	50.18	3.66
Maryland	13.05	24.99	577.84	54.50	3.03
Massachusetts	15.34	28.14	714.02	69.94	3.74
Michigan	9.70	20.25	424.42	39.93	2.13
Minnesota	12.87	25.30	522.53	48.40	2.56
Mississippi	10.20	22.23	461.88	53.98	2.41
Missouri	10.36	24.23	435.01	42.73	2.16
Montana	10.03	25.04	389.32	37.01	1.85
Nebraska	9.48	21.04	376.11	41.30	1.83
Nevada	14.64	35.76	608.43	41.45	2.97
New Hampshire	16.24	35.41	647.90	47.51	3.25
New Jersey	11.69	23.01	502.36	55.16	2.72
New Mexico	17.56	38.19	765.77	59.60	3.82
New York	12.43	22.63	581.43	58.26	3.11
North Carolina	13.18	28.73	529.46	58.11	2.66
North Dakota	7.09	15.16	281.75	30.14	1.33
Ohio	10.06	22.32	436.08	42.22	2.17
Oklahoma	11.27	30.55	446.50	55.38	2.19
Oregon	18.74	43.47	773.44	60.09	3.81
Pennsylvania	9.93	20.58	432.61	44.92	2.23
Rhode Island	13.01	25.65	610.67	56.04	3.18
South Carolina	12.22	26.24	515.05	57.48	2.63
South Dakota	7.88	17.57	310.18	31.46	1.50

Table A.1. (cont.)

States	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Texas	14.01	30.49	553.37	64.70	2.86
Utah	12.31	22.76	444.85	70.74	2.43
Vermont	23.15	49.73	981.51	64.77	4.86
Virginia	12.00	24.62	488.55	53.41	2.50
Washington	18.04	39.74	740.33	59.14	3.63
West Virginia	9.42	25.28	387.49	40.91	1.93
Wisconsin	10.41	21.30	426.43	37.04	2.09
Wyoming	11.51	29.02	430.94	38.05	2.04

Source: 2000 US Census Data 100% Summary File 3 and 4

Table A.2. Male Same-Sex Rates for States, 2000 U.S. Census

States	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Alabama	14.22	22.75	506.90	67.99	2.29
Alaska	10.51	15.55	427.45	29.15	2.18
Arizona	17.45	26.35	675.81	53.12	3.30
Arkansas	13.63	23.39	456.03	53.67	2.09
California	20.18	27.39	819.55	72.59	4.31
Colorado	15.00	21.84	579.64	50.86	2.80
Connecticut	15.59	22.27	584.65	51.67	2.73
Delaware	18.56	27.37	697.56	53.50	3.28
Florida	20.43	32.83	776.12	62.19	3.63
Georgia	18.50	26.77	703.68	70.34	3.41
Hawaii	12.87	17.35	540.17	52.47	3.06
Idaho	11.75	19.03	393.25	39.98	1.92
Illinois	14.16	19.78	550.68	55.36	2.65
Indiana	12.68	19.82	465.11	40.48	2.16
Iowa	9.51	14.21	337.74	31.48	1.56
Kansas	11.18	17.22	392.53	44.63	1.82
Kentucky	12.90	20.97	452.26	46.45	2.08
Louisiana	13.79	20.49	543.48	50.02	2.52
Maine	17.55	28.64	641.17	39.41	2.88
Maryland	14.98	20.82	561.80	47.40	2.64
Massachusetts	17.08	22.82	694.17	60.67	3.25
Michigan	10.52	15.49	411.96	36.06	1.93
Minnesota	12.85	17.98	483.68	42.75	2.26
Mississippi	11.8	17.82	460.44	48.16	2.15
Missouri	12.83	20.21	471.22	42.19	2.13
Montana	9.16	14.68	334.60	30.88	1.54
Nebraska	10.11	14.81	362.86	37.65	1.67
Nevada	17.50	28.65	726.36	50.81	3.65
New Hampshire	14.25	22.01	514.53	35.50	2.44
New Jersey	14.83	20.02	548.69	54.57	2.69
New Mexico	15.15	23.26	599.94	43.66	2.80
New York	17.78	23.38	727.24	64.88	3.47
North Carolina	15.11	21.92	535.00	54.63	2.51
North Dakota	7.97	11.01	302.75	31.64	1.40
Ohio	12.07	18.46	459.55	40.45	2.08
Oklahoma	12.95	21.56	454.08	52.73	2.09
Oregon	16.02	25.07	609.53	45.44	2.88
Pennsylvania	12.71	18.15	473.97	44.15	2.20
Rhode Island	15.42	21.66	624.44	50.56	2.87
South Carolina	13.66	20.14	497.68	50.57	2.32
South Dakota	7.86	11.55	287.78	28.00	1.34

Table A.2. (cont.)

States	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Tennessee	13.80	22.16	496.50	54.18	2.27
Texas	16.82	24.73	593.51	66.43	2.94
Utah	12.91	17.91	444.12	69.08	2.37
Vermont	17.96	26.96	684.53	42.15	3.17
Virginia	15.20	21.69	546.78	55.81	2.61
Washington	18.40	27.72	709.79	54.87	3.37
West Virginia	12.56	20.83	444.24	42.99	2.03
Wisconsin	10.63	15.33	396.78	32.74	1.85
Wyoming	12.57	21.06	451.84	39.69	2.13

Source: 2000 US Census Data 100% Summary File 3 and 4

Table A.3. Male Same-Sex Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Abilene, TX	9.01	14.12	311.64	36.49	1.46
Akron, OH	11.78	17.89	456.97	39.91	2.06
Albany, GA	11.32	16.26	446.22	39.57	2.03
Albany--Schenectady--Troy, NY	12.72	17.92	492.88	34.41	2.23
Albuquerque, NM	16.55	24.77	691.76	46.79	3.18
Alexandria, LA	12.73	19.23	483.07	49.71	2.21
Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton, PA	12.18	18.05	430.97	34.67	2.02
Altoona, PA	9.35	14.06	336.54	31.16	1.53
Amarillo, TX	12.29	20.45	394.53	42.17	1.87
Anchorage, AK	12.32	18.23	502.94	33.62	2.47
Ann Arbor, MI	11.63	15.51	467.62	46.06	2.33
Anniston, AL	13.72	23.56	477.07	59.44	2.12
Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah, WI	9.36	13.51	321.58	27.88	1.54
Asheville, NC	20.82	32.54	729.39	68.35	3.23
Athens, GA	13.62	16.85	663.25	66.21	3.30
Atlanta, GA	23.40	32.29	912.26	87.47	4.45
Atlantic--Cape May, NJ	15.53	23.35	606.02	44.03	2.79
Auburn--Opelika, AL	8.85	11.00	427.40	52.75	2.01
Augusta--Aiken, GA--SC	14.05	21.2	516.80	53.49	2.42
Austin--San Marcos, TX	18.58	24.66	808.21	71.4	4.03
Bakersfield, CA	14.62	22.97	486.42	42.69	2.68
Baltimore, MD	15.17	21.36	594.18	47.05	2.74
Bangor, ME	10.31	15.01	446.19	27.7	2.05
Barnstable--Yarmouth, MA	24.80	40.95	804.69	73.96	3.43
Baton Rouge, LA	12.90	18.05	517.93	50.11	2.40
Beaumont—Port Arthur, TX	11.71	19.73	399.48	49.94	1.96
Bellingham, WA	11.47	16.15	465.27	37.38	2.23
Benton Harbor, MI	13.85	21.70	509.48	43.44	2.28
Bergen--Passaic, NJ	13.62	18.20	488.09	58.11	2.43
Billings, MT	10.00	16.62	366.93	30.43	1.61
Biloxi--Gulfport--Pascagoula, MS	13.23	21.97	511.54	44.33	2.47
Binghamton, NY	9.40	13.68	366.10	27.25	1.66
Birmingham, AL	18.06	28.09	651.44	91.13	2.90
Bismarck, ND	8.81	12.38	309.93	31.91	1.41

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Bloomington, IN	11.62	14.16	643.17	56.72	3.28
Bloomington--Normal, IL	8.38	11.02	340.77	34.82	1.64
Boise City, ID	11.84	18.67	409.83	37.13	1.98
Boston, MA--NH	19.26	24.6	813.65	46.43	2.34
Boulder--Longmont, CO	11.20	14.55	492.81	40.3	2.43
Brazoria, TX	12.18	20.12	408.70	50.28	2.22
Bremerton, WA	16.36	26.1	562.56	48.58	2.78
Bridgeport, CT	14.16	19.96	537.30	50.89	2.52
Brockton, MA	11.87	16.37	456.83	39.21	2.31
Brownsville--Harlingen--San Benito, TX	17.78	24.90	545.59	82.99	2.88
Bryan--College Station, TX	6.32	7.21	318.23	47.43	1.72
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY	9.08	13.01	357.02	31.49	1.58
Burlington, VT	15.92	21.54	649.99	40.75	3.09
Canton--Massillon, OH	9.70	15.85	342.29	30.63	1.54
Casper, WY	14.25	25.14	534.98	37.1	2.39
Cedar Rapids, IA	9.56	14.21	349.42	28.32	1.58
Champaign--Urbana, IL	7.83	9.5	396.84	38.68	1.98
Charleston, WV	16.2	28.13	579.89	55.41	2.50
Charleston--North Charleston, SC	15.21	21.16	610.34	58.05	2.89
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill NC--SC	18.09	25.85	634.77	60.69	2.98
Charlottesville, VA	10.81	14.44	456.28	41.85	2.14
Chattanooga, TN--GA	15.37	25.66	531.38	62.32	2.40
Cheyenne, WY	8.08	13.93	289.47	26.67	1.38
Chicago, IL	16.15	21.41	652.53	67.63	3.19
Chico--Paradise, CA	9.42	13.96	407.47	30.10	1.90
Cincinnati, OH--KY—IN	13.05	19.44	494.43	43.71	2.20
Clarksville--Hopkinsville, TN—KY	9.10	13.38	315.62	37.28	1.61
Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria, OH	11.99	18.09	478.62	43.51	2.11
Colorado Springs, CO	10.21	15.09	363.54	35.5	1.76
Columbia, MO	10.43	13.63	477.33	38.45	2.24
Columbia, SC	13.50	18.71	508.34	51.33	2.39
Columbus, GA--AL	10.31	15.07	435.34	46.39	2.1
Columbus, OH	17.83	25.47	738.31	57.14	3.35

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Corpus Christi, TX	12.38	19.24	471.68	43.04	2.33
Corvallis, OR	5.54	6.82	250.68	21.71	1.26
Cumberland, MD--WV	10.25	16.07	320.09	32.04	1.57
Dallas, TX	23.36	32.77	866.66	90.23	4.22
Danbury, CT	21.61	30.50	683.82	77.99	3.45
Danville, VA	11.89	19.57	415.27	49.66	1.79
Davenport--Moline--Rock Island, IA—IL	10.20	16.14	380.14	30.83	1.71
Dayton--Springfield, OH	12.19	19.00	461.75	40.55	2.05
Daytona Beach, FL	15.72	27.63	570.15	44.39	2.61
Decatur, AL	16.32	27.43	512.11	77.32	2.35
Decatur, IL	9.60	15.74	352.31	31.95	1.52
Denver, CO	19.35	28.12	774.51	63.66	3.64
Des Moines, IA	15.72	23.75	549.34	44.84	2.46
Detroit, MI	10.51	15.24	432.13	38.57	1.98
Dothan, AL	16.83	29.3	541.17	66.91	2.38
Dover, DE	12.62	19.36	468.57	32.61	2.16
Dubuque, IA	4.28	6.26	151.46	17.16	0.71
Duluth--Superior, MN--WI	7.57	11.37	302.37	24.43	1.37
Dutchess County, NY	13.33	18.05	483.37	45.1	2.53
Eau Claire, WI	8.9	12.51	349.08	28.13	1.64
El Paso, TX	13.19	18.86	438.56	61.14	2.26
Elkhart--Goshen, IN	10.92	17.12	368.61	29.19	1.77
Elmira, NY	9.67	14.41	386.51	26.46	1.85
Enid, OK	9.66	16.8	311.28	34.01	1.38
Erie, PA	8.51	12.36	328.39	27.96	1.55
Eugene--Springfield, OR	13.53	20.41	564.96	37.16	2.62
Evansville--Henderson, IN--KY	12.2	20.15	427.20	38.97	1.90
Fargo--Moorhead, ND--MN	8.55	10.97	366.02	32.00	1.70
Fayetteville, NC	8.92	12.40	345.83	39.45	1.78
Fayetteville--Springdale—Rogers, AR	15.14	23.23	505.42	55.16	2.42
Fitchburg--Leominster, MA	12.81	19.44	490.27	33.7	2.27
Flagstaff, AZ--UT	11.39	15.09	494.33	34.74	2.48
Flint, MI	10.06	15.38	409.25	28.73	1.79
Florence, AL	13.01	22.45	409.13	65.14	1.79

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Florence, SC	10.53	15.46	372.30	40.62	1.68
Fort Collins--Loveland, CO	8.44	11.33	341.70	29.77	1.68
Fort Lauderdale, FL	31.61	48.76	1287.06	90.66	5.77
Fort Myers--Cape Coral, FL	21.03	39.35	688.17	53.95	3.12
Fort Pierce--Port St. Lucie, FL	18.06	33.21	590.90	49.68	2.72
Fort Smith, AR--OK	13.51	24.19	438.26	47.53	2.01
Fort Walton Beach, FL	10.99	17.67	394.04	41.83	1.93
Fort Wayne, IN	11.26	17.43	398.84	35.22	1.82
Fort Worth--Arlington, TX	15.32	23.32	535.34	55.72	2.57
Fresno, CA	15.75	21.76	596.48	50.00	3.18
Gadsden, AL	12.08	20.71	402.24	59.25	1.78
Gainesville, FL	11.18	13.74	591.50	47.70	2.82
Galveston--Texas City, TX	17.90	29.36	646.08	60.96	3.01
Gary, IN	8.74	13.11	342.31	30.80	1.59
Glens Falls, NY	9.34	13.76	344.43	22.68	1.66
Goldsboro, NC	13.33	19.70	481.03	52.21	2.30
Grand Forks, ND--MN	5.04	6.40	217.72	22.43	1.07
Grand Junction, CO	12.95	21.56	434.04	41.16	1.99
Grand Rapids--Muskegon—Holland, MI	12.73	18.32	461.62	42.92	2.21
Great Falls, MT	8.85	15.05	309.76	29.82	1.38
Greeley, CO	12.20	17.71	420.94	40.37	2.13
Green Bay, WI	10.58	15.14	395.24	28.58	1.87
Greensboro--Winston-Salem—High Point, NC	15.93	23.82	548.39	55.51	2.48
Greenville, NC	11.96	15.32	522.99	45.32	2.36
Greenville--Spartanburg—Anderson, SC	12.93	19.60	453.54	48.87	2.11
Hagerstown, MD	15.82	25.57	498.00	40.42	2.57
Hamilton--Middletown, OH	9.96	14.94	352.35	33.15	1.69
Harrisburg--Lebanon--Carlisle, PA	13.16	19.36	461.03	39.90	2.13
Hartford, CT	14.89	21.34	570.44	47.76	2.65
Hattiesburg, MS	8.86	12.39	368.07	41.50	1.71

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir, NC	13.05	20.47	433.35	41.03	2.05
Honolulu, HI	10.95	14.38	459.66	53.19	2.68
Houma, LA	12.38	18.49	432.55	34.88	2.13
Houston, TX	19.33	27.06	703.09	75.10	3.49
Huntington--Ashland, WV--KY—OH	12.99	21.57	439.49	50.48	1.99
Huntsville, AL	11.97	18.98	409.37	57.91	1.88
Indianapolis, IN	16.98	26.47	637.64	49.19	2.86
Iowa City, IA	10.09	12.06	507.23	42.50	2.52
Jackson, MI	12.12	20.83	393.43	33.05	2.03
Jackson, MS	12.05	17.14	497.72	50.61	2.30
Jackson, TN	12.02	18.90	445.73	50.73	2.01
Jacksonville, FL	16.31	26.38	614.43	48.47	2.81
Jacksonville, NC	6.04	7.28	266.72	39.75	1.75
Jamestown, NY	9.37	14.00	355.58	25.72	1.65
Janesville--Beloit, WI	7.82	12.27	276.85	19.08	1.28
Jersey City, NJ	19.46	24.26	940.02	76.17	4.65
Johnson City--Kingsport—Bristol, TN—VA	12.42	21.62	401.76	51.85	1.81
Johnstown, PA	8.76	12.76	323.02	38.86	1.56
Jonesboro, AR	11.51	17.37	422.30	50.00	1.92
Joplin, MO	8.31	14.73	270.43	23.70	1.22
Kalamazoo--Battle Creek, MI	10.92	16.20	432.65	32.91	1.99
Kankakee, IL	7.86	11.68	291.60	24.31	1.39
Kansas City, MO--KS	15.34	23.93	562.01	51.28	2.53
Kenosha, WI	11.15	16.66	420.84	31.67	2.00
Killeen--Temple, TX	8.98	13.04	314.56	41.19	1.68
Knoxville, TN	14.05	22.60	496.86	57.64	2.23
Kokomo, IN	12.31	21.14	406.06	39.85	1.77
La Crosse, WI--MN	6.28	8.48	253.42	20.98	1.18
Lafayette, IN	7.8	9.88	360.39	36.29	1.92
Lafayette, LA	12.59	18.66	475.00	38.51	2.17
Lake Charles, LA	11.69	18.31	414.89	40.70	1.92
Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL	17.62	30.67	617.38	51.28	2.91
Lancaster, PA	11.23	16.19	360.90	34.14	1.73
Lansing--East Lansing, MI	11.71	16.11	499.90	40.07	2.33

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Laredo, TX	15.38	19.57	463.48	85.59	2.62
Las Cruces, NM	11.71	16.57	468.87	36.88	2.33
Las Vegas, NV--AZ	18.38	30.04	765.43	52.69	3.84
Lawrence, KS	9.79	11.61	514.70	47.40	2.62
Lawrence, MA—NH	14.41	20.66	504.24	39.67	2.38
Lawton, OK	6.77	9.99	271.63	36.42	1.48
Lewiston--Auburn, ME	15.31	24.73	605.49	34.47	2.69
Lexington, KY	13.71	19.56	549.32	50.13	2.57
Lima, OH	6.95	10.97	256.68	26.98	1.24
Lincoln, NE	8.52	11.35	358.75	33.02	1.71
Little Rock--North Little Rock, AR	15.53	24.80	548.74	61.86	2.44
Longview--Marshall, TX	14.99	25.86	481.34	56.60	2.20
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA	19.83	25.4	869.30	77.83	4.62
Louisville, KY--IN	14.63	23.15	563.12	47.90	2.50
Lowell, MA—NH	12.37	16.68	461.33	42.86	2.32
Lubbock, TX	9.97	13.82	415.59	42.81	1.95
Lynchburg, VA	11.05	16.79	367.65	39.59	1.68
Macon, GA	11.32	17.32	432.81	42.27	1.93
Madison, WI	14.66	18.78	651.27	46.6	3.04
Manchester, NH	14.45	21.57	557.05	36.37	2.64
Mansfield, OH	9.53	16.09	353.88	32.9	1.68
McAllen--Edinburg--Mission, TX	16.78	22.17	495.97	95.46	2.76
Medford--Ashland, OR	17.59	31.08	621.02	46.80	2.84
Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay, FL	13.21	23.88	468.21	38.12	2.12
Memphis, TN--AR--MS	14.43	20.91	586.63	54.97	2.63
Merced, CA	14.15	19.85	511.63	41.61	2.71
Miami, FL	20.92	30.28	865.30	77.58	4.47
Middlesex--Somerset—Hunterdon, NJ	13.95	18.48	477.50	56.05	2.43
Milwaukee--Waukesha, WI	12.36	17.23	499.16	40.99	2.23
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI	15.75	21.52	610.65	50.45	2.84
Missoula, MT	8.97	12.36	404.47	29.01	1.93
Mobile, AL	15.6	25.37	556.67	65.59	2.52

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Modesto, CA	15.08	22.81	539.28	43.67	2.75
Monmouth--Ocean, NJ	13.95	20.34	459.73	50.21	2.15
Monroe, LA	11.19	16.31	423.57	39.85	1.87
Montgomery, AL	12.59	19.37	494.65	61.20	2.32
Muncie, IN	12.91	18.84	528.04	46.86	2.44
Myrtle Beach, SC	16.55	25.85	610.06	47.74	2.79
Naples, FL	21.03	34.81	677.34	64.63	3.30
Nashua, NH	15.33	22.96	512.91	39.59	2.44
Nashville, TN	16.88	25.51	638.74	64.20	2.97
Nassau--Suffolk, NY	15.07	20.03	501.88	69.54	2.68
New Bedford, MA	12.32	18.02	477.77	37.03	2.19
New Haven--Meriden, CT	15.45	21.47	614.17	54.99	2.85
New London--Norwich, CT--RI	11.85	17.8	453.48	34.03	2.16
New Orleans, LA	18.19	26.71	789.03	64.50	3.57
New York, NY	22.54	28.21	1009.86	94.52	4.71
Newark, NJ	15.78	20.82	598.61	59.27	2.93
Newburgh, NY—PA	16.61	22.95	573.71	51.90	2.96
Norfolk--Virginia Beach—Newport, VA	11.28	15.94	422.60	76.39	3.64
Oakland, CA	22.59	31.04	909.82	75.79	4.52
Ocala, FL	17.17	34.39	546.69	41.04	2.05
Odessa--Midland, TX	12.39	20.92	381.48	46.02	2.46
Oklahoma City, OK	13.85	21.97	524.86	39.70	1.72
Olympia, WA	13.32	21.27	480.22	34.23	2.19
Omaha, NE--IA	11.27	16.47	430.97	56.01	2.40
Orange County, CA	14.89	19.85	569.07	61.98	3.10
Orlando, FL	21.87	32.44	856.85	38.91	1.97
Owensboro, KY	8.22	14.02	281.22	63.05	4.11
Panama City, FL	13.18	23.15	466.69	29.35	1.25
Parkersburg--Marietta, WV--OH	11.53	20.19	386.82	38.37	2.15
Pensacola, FL	13.19	20.5	518.34	34.44	1.73
Peoria--Pekin, IL	10.90	16.95	377.70	51.26	2.57
Philadelphia, PA—NJ	15.40	20.78	607.61	55.13	2.83
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ	18.55	27.25	724.88	37.08	1.72
Pine Bluff, AR	7.79	15.26	333.16	56.53	3.59
Pittsburgh, PA	10.92	15.84	404.49	43.4	1.64
Pittsfield, MA	10.98	17.2	414.20	42.11	1.79

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Pocatello, ID	10.05	15.21	350.22	30.78	1.75
Portland, ME	22.39	33.41	867.40	68.03	2.01
Portland—Vancouver, OR—WA	18.54	27.76	727.11	52.61	3.43
Portsmouth--Rochester, NH--ME	14.68	21.88	558.77	37.86	2.58
Providence--Fall River—Warwick, RI—MA	15.46	21.80	616.17	53.64	3.85
Provo--Orem, UT	6.04	7.23	205.08	49.78	2.83
Pueblo, CO	10.06	16.54	380.15	81.10	1.21
Punta Gorda, FL	17.57	38.05	486.87	33.41	1.76
Racine, WI	11.97	17.93	409.97	34.44	1.95
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill, NC	16.64	21.84	636.53	45.77	2.15
Rapid City, SD	6.95	10.75	263.96	62.94	3.00
Reading, PA	11.35	17.00	399.62	20.17	1.21
Redding, CA	12.41	23.29	442.00	29.42	1.91
Reno, NV	16.92	27.94	731.23	33.58	2.00
Richland--Kennewick--Pasco, WA	12.36	19.34	418.29	48.29	3.56
Richmond--Petersburg, VA	14.83	21.37	550.22	38.97	2.04
Riverside--San Bernardino, CA	19.32	28.11	712.05	61.7	3.77
Roanoke, VA	14.50	23.72	503.89	51.23	2.48
Rochester, MN	10.07	14.05	332.76	50.3	2.17
Rochester, NY	13.36	18.95	515.97	32.29	1.53
Rockford, IL	11.56	18.31	407.65	37.51	2.39
Rocky Mount, NC	10.72	15.83	390.32	33.64	1.88
Sacramento, CA	17.72	26.75	690.17	50.67	3.25
Saginaw--Bay City--Midland, MI	9.24	13.81	335.39	39.06	1.76
Salem, OR	12.11	18.98	457.88	38.89	2.29
Salinas, CA	15.85	22.95	611.32	41.53	2.11
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT	15.04	21.42	543.05	64.91	3.74
San Angelo, TX	10.83	16.60	379.71	70.27	2.87
San Antonio, TX	13.61	20.24	512.09	38.12	1.75
San Diego, CA	19.41	26.12	827.08	49.87	2.49
San Francisco, CA	47.88	60.65	2315.38	183.15	11.83
San Jose, CA	15.56	20.06	634.97	68.79	3.58

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
San Luis Obispo--Atascadero—Paso Robles, CA	10.78	15.52	417.75	73.63	4.33
Santa Barbara--Santa Maria—Lompoc, CA	14.91	20.11	596.82	40.97	2.23
Santa Cruz--Watsonville, CA	15.99	21.59	730.12	49.84	3.86
Santa Fe, NM	25.35	39.77	1014.70	60.22	3.25
Santa Rosa, CA	26.05	38.69	1053.95	72.69	5.14
Sarasota--Bradenton, FL	23.51	44.33	771.89	65.69	4.57
Savannah, GA	17.63	26.12	704.50	63.53	3.33
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre—Hazleton, PA	10.54	15.45	407.14	66.02	3.26
Seattle--Bellevue--Everett, WA	24.75	34.97	1031.92	77.05	4.86
Sharon, PA	7.13	11.52	251.75	41.24	1.85
Sheboygan, WI	8.92	13.34	295.72	27.35	1.18
Sherman--Denison, TX	16.24	29.05	550.94	28.56	1.42
Shreveport--Bossier City, LA	10.27	16.12	404.08	59.70	2.52
Sioux City, IA--NE	8.95	13.35	337.64	37.28	1.78
Sioux Falls, SD	8.37	11.94	311.37	25.98	1.58
South Bend, IN	11.44	16.57	457.84	26.61	1.44
Spokane, WA	13.09	20.59	492.64	39.05	2.11
Springfield, IL	14.62	23.28	548.78	37.72	2.26
Springfield, MA	11.55	15.82	503.68	42.23	2.10
Springfield, MO	12.64	19.7	458.19	42.56	2.31
St. Cloud, MN	6.11	7.67	256.17	29.48	1.52
St. Joseph, MO	10.68	17.83	412.87	23.27	1.30
St. Louis, MO--IL	12.46	18.72	473.42	33.13	1.93
Stamford--Norwalk, CT	21.19	28.62	715.78	85.45	3.35
State College, PA	8.14	9.44	419.46	35.92	2.32
Steubenville--Weirton, OH--WV	10.27	17.21	364.30	54.51	2.41
Stockton--Lodi, CA	16.47	24.35	575.50	35.67	1.63
Sumter, SC	11.55	17.46	426.86	48.35	3.03
Syracuse, NY	11.27	15.87	437.03	47.38	2.01
Tacoma, WA	12.29	19.30	469.21	36.27	2.25
Tallahassee, FL	10.62	13.80	514.33	29.79	2.00

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
Tampa--St. Petersburg—Clearwater, FL	21.32	36.36	815.68	43.66	2.37
Terre Haute, IN	8.45	13.16	328.95	57.57	3.58
Texarkana, TX--Texarkana, AR	11.35	19.36	365.82	28.09	1.57
Toledo, OH	11.10	16.61	456.37	46.5	1.79
Topeka, KS	11.50	18.93	422.56	34.95	2.03
Trenton, NJ	14.69	19.67	558.69	54.07	2.83
Tucson, AZ	16.17	24.35	672.57	38.06	1.84
Tulsa, OK	15.83	26.10	552.46	49.15	3.09
Tuscaloosa, AL	10.28	13.80	436.57	60.54	2.47
Tyler, TX	15.01	24.47	463.74	58.22	2.01
Utica--Rome, NY	10.52	15.15	414.66	59.84	2.12
Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa, CA	16.90	25.18	610.42	55.04	3.26
Ventura, CA	13.34	18.81	478.83	51.56	2.62
Victoria, TX	10.86	16.96	359.15	32.58	1.98
Vineland--Millville—Bridgeton, NJ	9.61	13.58	404.40	29.59	2.28
Visalia--Tulare--Porterville, CA	15.36	21.65	541.75	36.66	1.70
Waco, TX	11.95	17.65	447.47	46.77	2.94
Washington, DC--MD--VA—WV	23.18	30.57	908.33	84.96	4.32
Waterbury, CT	15.05	22.44	581.22	44.78	2.61
Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA	7.68	10.51	315.01	53.95	2.11
Wausau, WI	10.19	14.80	342.81	27.56	1.47
West Palm Beach--Boca Raton, FL	23.45	38.47	845.62	31.04	1.64
Wheeling, WV--OH	9.23	15.15	338.83	68.60	3.77
Wichita Falls, TX	7.82	12.44	267.48	51.53	2.10
Wichita, KS	13.01	21.13	461.76	33.72	1.54
Williamsport, PA	11.75	17.96	423.68	33.71	1.37
Wilmington, NC	15.5	22.93	570.16	35.17	2.00
Wilmington--Newark, DE—MD	15.72	22.64	604.63	46.65	2.87
Worcester, MA—CT	13.47	19.03	519.09	41.94	2.43
Yakima, WA	11.22	16.65	399.52	50.55	2.56
Yolo, CA	10.17	12.96	454.65	39.81	2.31

Table A.3. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Gay Rate 1	Gay Rate 2	Gay Rate 3	Gay Rate 4	Gay Rate 5
York, PA	12.62	19.73	408.20	30.87	2.01
Youngstown--Warren, OH	8.22	13.27	305.30	31.26	1.92
Yuba City, CA	11.04	17.79	391.59	30.93	1.40
Yuma, AZ	13.64	21.69	439.94	34.19	1.98

Table A.4. Female Same-Sex Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Abilene, TX	11.68	27.72	460.59	59.23	2.37
Akron, OH	9.57	20.62	425.1	41.25	2.13
Albany, GA	9.52	19.33	478.08	49.80	2.56
Albany--Schenectady--Troy, NY	13.31	26.7	585.59	45.06	2.92
Albuquerque, NM	20.79	44.22	952.31	69.59	4.73
Alexandria, LA	11.29	26.58	507.71	59.27	2.63
Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton, PA	10.39	23.19	426.14	37.86	2.21
Altoona, PA	7.12	17.32	313.81	32.74	1.61
Amarillo, TX	11.40	28.83	451.31	50.72	2.24
Anchorage, AK	16.23	33.07	652.89	42.95	3.15
Ann Arbor, MI	14.89	25.27	641.26	64.67	3.27
Anniston, AL	9.12	25.03	381.99	53.87	1.92
Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah, WI	8.56	17.07	321.55	28.68	1.58
Asheville, NC	21.33	52.62	888.76	93.84	4.44
Athens, GA	9.99	15.15	519.32	55.57	2.77
Atlanta, GA	15.49	29.73	667.35	67.67	3.44
Atlantic--Cape May, NJ	11.18	24.95	515.25	41.96	2.66
Auburn--Opelika, AL	8.85	13.74	437.16	56.77	2.17
Augusta--Aiken, GA--SC	10.92	23.88	472.86	53.99	2.44
Austin--San Marcos, TX	19.58	34.71	864.09	75.00	4.24
Bakersfield, CA	13.48	29.95	529.41	44.52	2.80
Baltimore, MD	12.94	25.07	597.28	53.28	3.10
Bangor, ME	14.94	30.15	716.48	49.48	3.66
Barnstable--Yarmouth, MA	17.34	47.17	708.79	77.07	3.57
Baton Rouge, LA	10.39	19.72	482.03	52.07	2.50
Beaumont--Port Arthur, TX	11.20	30.22	459.23	59.07	2.32
Bellingham, WA	15.21	28.7	654.64	55.04	3.29
Benton Harbor, MI	10.54	23.9	457.37	43.44	2.28
Bergen--Passaic, NJ	10.97	21.94	462.62	61.54	2.58
Billings, MT	7.65	18.53	321.23	29.35	1.56
Biloxi--Gulfport--Pascagoula, MS	11.01	27.94	465.21	41.82	2.33
Binghamton, NY	9.20	19.94	405.74	33.45	2.04
Birmingham, AL	11.39	26.32	503.72	80.77	2.57
Bismarck, ND	6.30	13.73	246.77	27.09	1.20
Bloomington, IN	12.63	18.08	747.42	70.35	4.07

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Bloomington--Normal, IL	10.25	16.59	471.59	53.54	2.52
Boise City, ID	14.19	35.01	529.75	49.07	2.62
Boston, MA--NH ;	15.21	25.80	515.43	79.12	2.71
Boulder--Longmont, CO	21.67	37.72	963.25	77.57	4.68
Brazoria, TX	18.33	47.2	596.57	69.06	3.05
Bremerton, WA	17.75	46.87	640.32	54.86	3.14
Bridgeport, CT	11.18	22.76	497.52	53.60	2.66
Brockton, MA	11.04	21.45	485.14	45.52	2.69
Brownsville--Harlingen--San Bendito, CA	12.47	25.20	465.33	82.39	2.86
Bryan--College Station, TX	7.45	10.04	399.97	59.91	2.17
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY	8.20	17.07	376.13	37.70	1.89
Burlington, VT	23.05	40.27	1048.61	71.17	5.39
Canton--Massillon, OH	8.51	20.69	352.71	35.61	1.79
Casper, WY	13.23	35.13	535.83	39.42	2.54
Cedar Rapids, IA	8.59	17.81	353.38	30.66	1.71
Champaign--Urbana, IL	11.97	18.34	614.12	60.51	3.1
Charleston, WV	9.80	26.75	417.14	45.41	2.05
Charleston--North Charleston, SC	13.84	27.00	606.73	61.82	3.08
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC	13.20	26.95	520.93	53.36	2.62
Charlottesville, VA	12.67	21.08	599.65	63.09	3.23
Chattanooga, TN--GA	10.76	28.77	449.57	59.23	2.28
Cheyenne, WY	8.46	23.62	327.62	30.30	1.57
Chicago, IL	10.98	20.17	495.84	55.65	2.62
Chico--Paradise, CA	14.45	31.79	688.99	55.22	3.48
Cincinnati, OH--KY—IN	10.51	22.31	454.9	44.44	2.24
Clarksville--Hopkinsville, TN	12.59	32.04	426.16	49.61	2.15
Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria, OH	9.04	19.70	422.88	43.72	2.12
Colorado Springs, CO	14.92	34.12	552.84	54.83	2.71
Columbia, MO	12.80	20.03	639.32	56.54	3.30
Columbia, SC	12.29	23.39	541.59	60.51	2.82
Columbus, GA--AL	9.81	24.13	452.58	50.96	2.31
Columbus, OH	14.45	28.38	653.8	54.05	3.17
Corpus Christi, TX	11.46	26.01	478.24	46.95	2.54

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Corvallis, OR	20.44	32.03	963.33	85.71	4.98
Cumberland, MD--WV	8.19	20.49	341.81	35.61	1.75
Dallas, TX	15.18	30.84	610.51	65.46	3.06
Danbury, CT	15.76	33.86	553.38	66.40	2.94
Danville, VA	9.91	25.04	420.54	58.86	2.12
Davenport--Moline--Rock Island, RI	8.00	18.91	337.33	29.70	1.65
Dayton--Springfield, OH	10.11	22.87	446.81	43.99	2.23
Daytona Beach, FL	12.20	37.28	509.54	43.32	2.55
Decatur, AL	11.91	34.09	422.17	68.67	2.08
Decatur, IL	9.89	24.00	423.72	44.10	2.10
Denver, CO	17.97	37.03	755.72	63.30	3.62
Des Moines, IA	11.50	24.73	468.49	42.00	2.31
Detroit, MI	8.63	17.79	401.79	39.48	2.03
Dothan, AL	11.97	35.82	468.27	64.85	2.30
Dover, DE	10.31	22.51	439.78	34.21	2.27
Dubuque, IA	4.98	9.76	201.7	25.02	1.04
Duluth--Superior, MN--WI	9.20	20.62	410.71	35.40	1.99
Dutchess County, NY	14.07	27.27	552.5	52.44	2.94
Eau Claire, WI	7.16	13.24	310.01	26.93	1.57
El Paso, TX	10.17	20.96	416.00	65.90	2.44
Elkhart--Goshen, IN	8.92	20.69	333.41	27.69	1.68
Elmira, NY	8.58	19.98	362.86	26.05	1.83
Enid, OK	10.77	32.79	403.08	48.88	1.98
Erie, PA	7.88	15.72	349.04	32.53	1.80
Eugene--Springfield, OR	21.42	45.31	958.73	66.82	4.71
Evansville--Henderson, IN--KY	9.81	24.9	411.44	42.26	2.06
Fargo--Moorhead, ND--MN	5.91	9.85	269.14	24.47	1.30
Fayetteville, NC	12.3	27.79	464.68	51.84	2.34
Fayetteville--Springdale—Roger, AR	13.83	34.59	476.06	53.62	2.36
Fitchburg—Leominster, MA	11.57	24.83	499.48	37.24	2.51
Flagstaff, AZ--UT	15.50	25.32	702.97	51.13	3.65
Flint, MI	8.81	18.87	409.06	32.50	2.03
Florence, AL	8.94	24.94	349.88	63.28	1.74
Florence, SC	11.35	23.78	516.4	67.35	2.78

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Fort Collins--Loveland, CO	16.32	29.48	678.58	59.90	3.38
Fort Lauderdale, FL	14.50	35.43	670.28	52.72	3.35
Fort Myers--Cape Coral, FL	13.97	45.22	528.00	44.50	2.57
Fort Pierce--Port St. Lucie, FL	12.43	39.96	475.62	42.92	2.35
Fort Smith, AR—OK	11.84	38.50	439.33	51.40	2.17
Fort Walton Beach, FL	10.65	30.71	376.62	39.22	1.81
Fort Wayne, IN	11.23	26.04	448.29	42.48	2.19
Fort Worth--Arlington, TX	14.06	32.36	538.82	58.77	2.71
Fresno, CA	13.91	27.84	582.99	51.15	3.25
Gadsden, AL	12.19	38.5	495.49	83.27	2.50
Gainesville, FL	12.30	18.71	694.78	60.83	3.60
Galveston--Texas City, TX	14.60	35.70	581.90	59.25	2.92
Gary, IN	8.41	18.03	376.62	37.68	1.95
Glens Falls, NY	12.42	31.39	495.03	33.45	2.45
Goldsboro, NC	11.60	26.91	466.19	53.28	2.35
Grand Forks, ND--MN	6.39	11.62	282.06	29.16	1.39
Grand Junction, CO	12.57	33.70	489.4	50.20	2.42
Grand Rapids--Muskegon—Holland, MI	10.31	20.72	414.28	40.91	2.10
Great Falls, MT	8.46	24.28	328.46	33.13	1.54
Greeley, CO	14.20	26.89	538.25	52.93	2.80
Green Bay, WI	9.37	18.19	384.53	28.76	1.88
Greensboro--Winston-Salem, NC	12.83	27.94	520.98	58.65	2.62
Greenville, NC	8.92	14.35	455.03	45.69	2.38
Greenville—Spartanburg, NC	11.33	25.81	454.17	53.33	2.30
Hagerstown, MD	11.44	29.17	435.49	34.10	2.17
Hamilton--Middletown, OH	9.69	19.90	386	39.53	2.01
Harrisburg--Lebanon--Carlisle, PA	9.50	20.41	395.41	37.49	2.00
Hartford, CT	14.39	29.06	632.66	58.55	3.25
Hattiesburg, MS	6.28	12.10	306.38	39.74	1.64

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir, NC	13.49	37.08	489.26	48.49	2.43
Honolulu, HI	10.48	19.72	449.57	52.22	2.63
Houma, LA	12.93	28.11	508.05	44.26	2.70
Houston, TX	15.67	31.22	620.37	68.84	3.20
Huntington--Ashland, WV--KY—OH	11.01	30.08	451.72	57.60	2.27
Huntsville, AL	11.28	27.55	429.45	64.77	2.10
Indianapolis, IN	12.85	28.32	549.98	46.18	2.69
Iowa City, IA	16.79	22.99	893.15	76.95	4.56
Jackson, MI	9.52	24.04	387.41	31.37	1.93
Jackson, MS	9.14	17.71	443.2	52.12	2.37
Jackson, TN	9.31	20.50	417.25	54.40	2.16
Jacksonville, FL	13.02	31.73	551.75	47.62	2.76
Jacksonville, NC	16.33	37.93	500.4	56.79	2.49
Jamestown, NY	10.18	22.98	439.76	34.58	2.22
Janesville--Beloit, WI	11.04	25.94	446.07	32.82	2.20
Jersey City, NJ	11.61	19.65	592.4	51.26	3.13
Johnson City--Kingsport—Briston, NJ	10.24	31.82	393.56	56.03	1.95
Johnstown, PA	7.39	18.10	307.87	39.40	1.58
Jonesboro, AR	8.35	19.67	340.5	45.16	1.73
Joplin, MO	10.14	29.35	386.18	37.28	1.92
Kalamazoo--Battle Creek, MI	10.81	21.83	483.55	40.35	2.44
Kankakee, IL	10.41	23.16	451.72	40.83	2.33
Kansas City, MO--KS	11.98	27.22	499.68	49.67	2.45
Kenosha, WI	10.05	22.29	414.14	32.81	2.07
Killeen--Temple, TX	12.89	32.00	419.34	54.69	2.23
Knoxville, TN	12.68	31.75	519.16	66.74	2.58
Kokomo, IN	9.67	28.84	388.08	42.03	1.87
La Crosse, WI--MN	9.92	17.52	452.32	41.23	2.32
Lafayette, IN	9.15	15.32	420.83	41.32	2.18
Lafayette, LA	12.37	25.94	540.44	48.82	2.75
Lake Charles, LA	13.09	30.94	539.56	57.97	2.74
Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL	12.47	35.76	494.17	44.13	2.50
Lancaster, PA	10.88	22.09	410.55	42.38	2.14
Lansing--East Lansing, MI	12.66	22.66	599.87	52.96	3.07

Table A.4.(cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Laredo, TX	11.70	20.95	444.11	93.95	2.88
Las Cruces, NM	14.82	27.75	638.78	53.86	3.41
Las Vegas, NV--AZ	14.45	35.62	602.15	40.76	2.97
Lawrence, KS	12.81	18.31	683.95	64.76	3.59
Lawrence, MA—NH	15.52	32.39	626.46	54.68	3.29
Lawton, OK	9.08	23.29	350.57	43.21	1.76
Lewiston--Auburn, ME	12.65	30.45	569.07	35.85	2.80
Lexington, KY	13.68	26.72	611.13	60.05	3.07
Lima, OH	7.37	18.32	299.75	32.60	1.50
Lincoln, NE	11.50	20.46	521.3	48.95	2.54
Little Rock--North Little Rock, AK	11.04	26.49	465.15	58.35	2.30
Longview—Marshall, TX	12.02	34.64	467.25	61.16	2.38
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA	13.04	22.52	606.36	57.59	3.42
Louisville, KY--IN	11.59	27.34	516.2	48.69	2.54
Lowell, MA--NH	11.48	22.58	465.82	46.00	2.49
Lubbock, TX	10.21	20.23	459.66	51.37	2.33
Lynchburg, VA	9.62	21.27	395.14	48.23	2.05
Macon, GA	10.85	23.64	486.93	55.41	2.53
Madison, WI	21.83	35.11	1012.18	75.61	4.93
Manchester, NH	13.49	27.64	569.1	39.47	2.87
Mansfield, OH	8.48	23.46	333.99	32.05	1.64
McAllen--Edinburg--Mission, TX	15.56	28.72	541.31	115.96	3.35
Medford--Ashland, OR	17.95	50.80	738.48	61.09	3.70
Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Beach, FL	11.53	34.90	457.17	39.94	2.22
Memphis, TN--AR--MS	10.63	21.38	500.56	53.63	2.56
Merced, CA	13.83	29.66	541.74	45.94	2.99
Miami, FL	11.49	25.01	541.14	54.05	3.11
Middlesex--Somerset—Hunterdon, MA	13.07	25.41	509.78	64.42	2.80
Milwaukee--Waukesha, WI	9.18	17.47	419.86	38.11	2.07
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI	15.62	28.56	415.59	57.38	3.23
Missoula, MT	14.74	26.99	658.02	49.39	3.28
Mobile, AL	12.03	28.29	674.95	68.26	2.62
Modesto, CA	14.06	31.72	511.59	49.25	3.10

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Monmouth--Ocean, NJ	11.45	27.54	459.10	56.58	2.43
Monroe, LA	10.91	22.25	561.78	56.87	2.66
Montgomery, AL	8.99	19.67	510.31	56.12	2.12
Muncie, IN	8.24	16.13	409.87	38.71	2.02
Myrtle Beach, SC	12.18	29.28	388.42	41.25	2.41
Naples, FL	12.05	37.01	492.81	41.25	2.11
Nashua, NH	17.57	37.54	628.33	50.74	3.13
Nashville, TN	12.24	26.21	428.95	57.07	2.64
Nassau--Suffolk, NY	13.41	27.05	517.64	79.09	3.04
New Bedford, MA	10.42	22.74	470.43	41.75	2.46
New Haven--Meriden, CT	12.63	24.32	590.65	59.53	3.08
New London--Norwich, CT--RI	13.99	32.46	525.97	46.21	2.93
New Orleans, LA	12.95	25.72	583.02	60.67	3.35
New York, NY	12.67	21.16	652.36	71.27	3.55
Newark, NJ	12.10	22.29	536	59.66	2.95
Newburgh, NY--PA	16.18	33.59	606.2	56.41	3.21
Norfolk--Virginia Beach—Newport, VA	11.08	23.07	648.18	47.17	3.16
Oakland, CA	22.65	43.81	1011.68	90.59	5.40
Ocala, FL	11.92	39.10	457.63	43.39	2.36
Odessa--Midland, TX	11.26	30.48	461.7	49.03	2.32
Oklahoma City, OK	11.89	28.36	422.05	58.65	2.12
Olympia, WA	23.87	55.38	974.8	74.95	4.80
Omaha, NE--IA	9.60	20.02	510.04	39.34	2.51
Orange County, CA	12.15	23.90	495.1	56.04	2.80
Orlando, FL	14.30	30.95	407.69	47.31	2.00
Owensboro, KY	8.75	23.56	603.7	41.10	3.08
Panama City, FL	12.48	35.85	349.78	43.47	1.75
Parkersburg--Marietta, WV--OH	9.34	27.61	502.43	36.39	2.43
Pensacola, FL	11.55	28.87	365.27	49.46	1.82
Peoria--Pekin, IL	8.82	19.88	485.4	38.99	2.48
Philadelphia, PA--NJ	11.13	20.91	515.51	53.25	2.73
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ	15.12	33.01	359.91	49.27	1.81
Pine Bluff, AR	7.67	17.54	623.62	50.35	3.13
Pittsburgh, PA	9.05	19.97	359.4	47.73	1.90
Pittsfield, MA	10.68	26.22	401.2	41.52	2.03
Pocatello, ID	9.43	19.65	488.97	39.46	2.36

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Portland, ME	23.50	49.79	424.86	72.64	2.50
Portland--Vancouver, OR--WA	20.95	44.86	881.47	66.36	4.33
Portsmouth--Rochester, NH--ME	17.49	35.50	752.3	55.86	3.80
Providence--Fall River—Warwich, RI	13.01	25.94	1059.33	55.65	5.22
Provo--Orem, UT	6.28	9.00	605.58	99.87	3.16
Pueblo, CO	8.60	21.82	237.75	35.50	1.49
Punta Gorda, FL	10.34	45.02	372.67	38.76	1.87
Racine, WI	9.49	20.53	380.41	33.44	1.89
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill, NC	15.03	26.26	367.33	68.53	1.82
Rapid City, SD	5.92	13.57	646.87	19.21	3.27
Reading, PA	10.20	22.23	241.33	32.26	1.15
Redding, CA	11.80	36.54	404.13	40.19	2.09
Reno, NV	16.18	39.20	481.18	45.73	2.40
Richland--Kennewick--Pasco, WA	11.30	26.73	702.17	37.28	3.37
Richmond--Petersburg, VA	11.05	22.47	397.15	51.50	1.95
Riverside--San Bernardino, CA	14.25	30.79	565.93	50.98	3.12
Roanoke, VA	11.00	27.60	489.21	55.02	2.5
Rochester, MN	10.64	20.52	474.47	39.81	2.37
Rochester, NY	12.18	23.94	384.27	42.92	1.88
Rockford, IL	10.42	24.21	537.18	36.03	2.74
Rocky Mount, NC	11.08	24.24	407.77	55.92	2.02
Sacramento, CA	17.84	39.85	776.25	61.45	3.94
Saginaw--Bay City--Midland, MI	7.95	17.45	476.85	32.72	2.52
Salem, OR	14.23	34.54	573.85	50.17	2.96
Salinas, CA	15.91	33.00	433.92	65.34	2.18
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT	14.33	28.10	656.18	68.96	3.77
San Angelo, TX	10.60	25.38	529.09	48.62	2.82
San Antonio, TX	12.56	27.31	433.84	57.71	2.23
San Diego, CA	14.66	29.35	538.82	56.95	2.88
San Francisco, CA	21.91	38.18	1105.60	88.62	5.72
San Jose, CA	14.92	27.60	606.13	64.65	3.37

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Santa Barbara--Santa Maria, CA	13.25	25.56	620.04	60.76	3.16
Santa Cruz--Watsonville, CA	26.39	49.63	1269.94	88.79	6.88
Santa Fe, NM	28.24	63.04	590.30	87.75	3.28
Santa Rosa, CA	30.99	72.15	1384.06	101.66	7.19
Sarasota--Bradenton, FL	12.66	45.06	1264.40	48.36	6.10
Savannah, GA	12.98	28.28	520.02	60.92	2.54
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre—Hazlet, PA	8.06	18.24	588.00	42.47	3.01
Seattle--Bellevue--Everett, WA	21.95	43.61	954.37	73.25	4.62
Sharon, PA	7.79	19.09	369.49	37.79	1.91
Sheboygan, WI	7.99	18.96	313.95	27.64	1.63
Sherman—Denison, TX	10.06	31.05	285.65	47.54	1.38
Shreveport--Bossier City, LA	9.69	22.40	395.08	47.68	2.01
Sioux City, IA--NE	7.42	16.47	448.54	25.98	2.28
Sioux Falls, SD	7.89	15.93	315.12	28.82	1.58
South Bend, IN	8.79	17.95	320.93	38.32	1.56
Spokane, WA	12.14	29.19	401.10	42.82	2.07
Springfield, IL	9.66	22.62	522.32	38.37	2.57
Springfield, MA	19.34	35.26	418.28	80.49	2.09
Springfield, MO	10.20	23.85	431.25	42.07	2.08
St. Cloud, MN	8.19	13.42	335.45	31.22	1.68
St. Joseph, MO	8.92	22.49	340.8	32.70	1.75
St. Louis, MO--IL	9.76	20.85	380.08	43.02	1.91
Stamford--Norwalk, CT	11.40	22.77	462.8	61.99	2.43
State College, PA	8.61	11.98	973.64	54.97	5.20
Steubenville--Weirton, OH--WV	7.41	19.65	439.08	34.47	2.43
Stockton--Lodi, CA	14.82	32.62	311.22	51.78	1.58
Sumter, SC	10.65	23.21	594.18	56.73	3.24
Syracuse, NY	11.35	22.33	459.56	37.81	2.41
Tacoma, WA	15.29	36.21	622.23	50.05	3.11
Tallahassee, FL	11.08	17.57	503.42	58.26	2.54
Tampa—St. Petersburg—Clearwater, FL	14.31	39.22	600.14	50.14	3.16
Terre Haute, IN	8.37	20.55	637.58	33.33	3.12

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Texarkana, TX--Texarkana, AR	9.87	27.39	367.48	55.59	1.86
Toledo, OH	10.66	21.63	421.95	42.88	2.14
Topeka, KS	11.05	27.36	500.91	49.15	2.49
Trenton, NJ	11.65	21.47	532.8	56.50	2.96
Tucson, AZ	16.18	35.23	490.03	58.13	2.38
Tulsa, OK	11.9	31.12	734.59	56.12	3.66
Tuscaloosa, AL	10.09	18.18	471.06	74.79	2.29
Tyler, TX	11.46	29.93	500.41	64.14	2.59
Utica--Rome, NY	10.08	22.81	436.8	36.83	2.27
Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa, CA	17.19	38.80	695.6	63.30	3.75
Ventura, CA	14.37	31.46	544.73	60.30	3.06
Victoria, TX	10.21	23.98	444.56	41.70	2.24
Vineland--Millville—Bridgeton, CA	9.49	19.42	438.12	31.18	2.40
Visalia--Tulare--Porterville, CA	15.65	32.72	372.08	53.39	1.93
Waco, TX	10.11	22.00	599.11	58.82	3.36
Washington, DC--MD--VA--WV	13.77	24.00	606.85	62.04	3.16
Waterbury, CT	10.42	22.45	474.4	41.67	2.43
Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA	6.72	12.35	438.42	30.96	2.30
Wausau, WI	7.59	17.26	314.47	24.67	1.65
West Palm Beach--Boca Raton, FL	12.86	36.17	265.63	49.21	1.30
Wheeling, WV--OH	8.00	21.65	546.4	37.93	2.70
Wichita Falls, TX	10.69	28.58	486.47	52.23	2.32
Wichita, KS	12.39	30.69	342.78	57.01	1.73
Williamsport, PA	9.01	21.15	422.61	32.55	2.12
Wilmington, NC	10.83	23.95	363.83	43.33	1.85
Wilmington--Newark, DE--MD	12.14	23.66	542.06	45.84	2.82
Worcester, MA--CT	13.31	26.87	585.63	51.96	3.01
Yakima, WA	12.57	28.07	449.66	37.91	2.19
Yolo, CA	15.84	25.24	785.28	75.27	4.36
York, PA	12.13	28.13	472.64	36.11	2.47
Youngstown--Warren, OH	7.48	18.85	441.61	36.03	2.21

Table A.4. (cont.)

Metropolitan Statistical Areas	Lesbian Rate 1	Lesbian Rate 2	Lesbian Rate 3	Lesbian Rate 4	Lesbian Rate 5
Yuba City, CA	14.22	37.85	322.48	48.74	1.63
Yuma, AZ	15.58	38.69	538.49	53.80	2.82

Table A.5. List of Counties with No Male or Female Same-Sex Couples

Male Same-Sex Couples	Female Same-Sex Couples	No Same-Sex Couples
Alamosa County, Colorado	Denali Borough, Alaska	Baca County, Colorado
Conejos County, Colorado	Yakutat City and Borough, Alaska	Cheyenne County, Colorado
Crowley County, Colorado	Alpine County, California	Custer County, Colorado
Kiowa County, Colorado	Dolores County, Colorado	Hinsdale County, Colorado
Kit Carson County, Colorado	Lake County, Colorado	Jackson County, Colorado
Mineral County, Colorado	Mineral County, Colorado	Lincoln County, Colorado
Ouray County, Colorado	Phillips County, Colorado	Liberty County, Montana
Rio Blanco County, Colorado	San Juan County, Colorado	Blaine County, Nebraska
Washington County, Colorado	Glascock County, Georgia	Boyd County, Nebraska
Yuma County, Colorado	Quitman County, Georgia	Greeley County, Nebraska
Taliaferro County, Georgia	Camas County, Idaho	Hayes County, Nebraska
Comanche County, Kansas	Oneida County, Idaho	Hooker County, Nebraska
Decatur County, Kansas	Calhoun County, Illinois	Logan County, Nebraska
Elk County, Kansas	Pope County, Illinois	Loup County, Nebraska
Ellsworth County, Kansas	Scott County, Illinois	Webster County, Nebraska
Graham County, Kansas	Adams County, Iowa	Wheeler County, Nebraska
Hodgeman County, Kansas	Audubon County, Iowa	Hettinger County, North Dakota
Jewell County, Kansas	Barber County, Kansas	Slope County, North Dakota
Logan County, Kansas	Cheyenne County, Kansas	Cimarron County, Oklahoma
Morton County, Kansas	Meade County, Kansas	Buffalo County, South Dakota
Wichita County, Kansas	Rush County, Kansas	Kennedy County, Texas
Keweenaw County, Michigan	Wallace County, Kansas	Roberts County, Texas
Kittson County, Minnesota	Hickman County, Kentucky	
Pennington County, Minnesota	Rock County, Minnesota	
Schuyler County, Missouri	Knox County, Missouri	
Shelby County, Missouri	Putnam County, Missouri	
Broadwater County, Montana	Worth County, Missouri	
Judith Basin County, Montana	Golden Valley County, Montana	
McCone County, Montana	Musselshell County, Montana	
Sheridan County, Montana	Petroleum County, Montana	
Treasure County, Montana	Toole County, Montana	
Arthur County, Nebraska	Wibaux County, Montana	
Grant County, Nebraska	Arthur County, Nebraska	

Table A.5. (cont.)

Male Same-Sex Couples	Female Same-Sex Couples	No Same-Sex Couples
Hooker County, Nebraska	Deuel County, Nebraska	
McPherson County, Nebraska	Furnas County, Nebraska	
Perkins County, Nebraska	Garfield County, Nebraska	
Sioux County, Nebraska	Gosper County, Nebraska	
Billings County, North Dakota	Hayes County, Nebraska	
Foster County, North Dakota	Hooker County, Nebraska	
Golden Valley County, North Dakota	Johnson County, Nebraska	
Griggs County, North Dakota	Keya Paha County, Nebraska	
Kidder County, North Dakota	Nance County, Nebraska	
Renville County, North Dakota	Polk County, Nebraska	
Sioux County, North Dakota	Sherman County, Nebraska	
Towner County, North Dakota	Burke County, North Dakota	
Greer County, Oklahoma	Sherman County, Oregon	
Aurora County, South Dakota	Wheeler County, Oregon	
Corson County, South Dakota	Edmunds County, South Dakota	
Hanson County, South Dakota	Harding County, South Dakota	
Sanborn County, South Dakota	Jerauld County, South Dakota	
Sully County, South Dakota	Jones County, South Dakota	
Ziebach County, South Dakota	Miner County, South Dakota	
Cochran County, Texas	Potter County, South Dakota	
Concho County, Texas	Borden County, Texas	
Cottle County, Texas	Jeff Davis County, Texas	
Dickens County, Texas	King County, Texas	
Foard County, Texas	McMullen County, Texas	
Glasscock County, Texas	Terrell County, Texas	
Reagan County, Texas	Daggett County, Utah	
Schleicher County, Texas	Wayne County, Utah	

Table A.5. (cont.)

Male Same-Sex Couples	Female Same-Sex Couples	No Same-Sex Couples
Throckmorton County, Texas		
Morgan County, Utah		
Rich County, Utah		
Surry County, Virginia		
Garfield County, Washington		
N=66	N=61	N=22
2.02%	1.86%	0.6%

VITA

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